Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses

Graduate School

1995

Direct United States Military Intervention: the Essentials for
Success in the Post-Cold War Era.
Glenn Joseph Antizzo
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation
Antizzo, Glenn Joseph, "Direct United States Military Intervention: the Essentials for Success in the PostCold War Era." (1995). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 5992.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/5992

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may
be from any type of computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins,
and improper alignment can adversely afreet reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in
reduced form at the back of the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly
to order.

A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor. Ml 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

DIRECT U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION:
THE ESSENTIALS FOR SUCCESS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Political Science

by
Glenn Joseph Antizzo
A.B., Cornell University, 1985
M.A., University of Georgia, 1990
August 1995

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI Number: 9609066

Copyright 1995 by
Antizzo, Glenn Joseph
All rights reserved.

UMI Microform 9609066
Copyright 1996, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

OCopyright 1995
Glenn Joseph Antizzo
All rights reserved

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have been possible without
the assistance, encouragement, love, and support of many
people. Therefore, I want to gratefully acknowledge the
following for their essential roles in bringing this work
to its fruition.
I wish to thank and praise my Lord and Savior Jesus
Christ. It is by His grace that I have been able to come
this far in my studies. This work is dedicated to His
glory.
I wish to give my most heartfelt thanks to my advisor,
Dr. Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. I am so very grateful to have had
the opportunity to work with such a truly great man and
scholar. Although he retired during my tenure at LSU, Dr.
Crabb continued to serve as the chair of my dissertation
committee. His wisdom and vast knowledge are evident
throughout this work. He always believed in me and his
encouragement sustained me through the more difficult
times. In many respects he was like a father to me during
my studies here at Louisiana State University. I will
always remember him with, great affection.
I wish to express my great love for, and eternal
gratitude to, Suzanne Hoke, her mother Mary Jo, and her
iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

entire family. Their friendship is of the type that one
rarely experiences and, consequently, greatly cherishes.
They stood by me and sustained me through all of my
difficulties. They never stopped believing in me and always
urged me on. For all that they have done for me over these
five years, I am in their debt. Suzie is truly my best
friend.
I wish to thank my father, John Antizzo, for his love
and support. His assistance, especially in the later stages
of this project, was selfless and was always offered with
words of encouragement and praise.
I wish to thank my mother, Jeanne Judge. Without her
love, faith in my work, and financial sacrifice my graduate
education would not have been possible.
I also want to gratefully acknowledge my stepfather,
George V. Judge III, and my stepmother, Barbara Antizzo.
They both sacrificed greatly to make this Ph.D. possible. I
love them very much and consider myself blessed to have
them in my family.
I want to express my appreciation to my minor
professor, Dr. Karl A. Roider. His knowledge of Eastern
Europe has greatly enriched my graduate education. I am
grateful for his careful reading of this dissertation and
his constructive criticism, both of which have made this a
much better work.

iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

I wish to also express my gratitude to Dr. William A.
Clark, who continually challenged me to produce work of
only the very highest quality. His knowledge of Eastern
European politics has sparked my interest in the foreign
and military policies of the states of the former Warsaw
Pact. Furthermore, he has always provided me with sound
counsel with regard to my academic and professional career.
Many thanks to Dr. E. Ramon Arango. His infectious
enthusiasm in the classroom has greatly influenced my
teaching style. His support and faith in me are greatly
appreciated and will always be remembered.
Thanks also to Dr. Kevin V. Mulcahy. His careful
consideration of my work and his thoughtful insights have
helped make this a more complete work.
I want to also acknowledge the contribution of Dr.
Harry Mokeba. Although not a member of my committee, Dr.
Mokeba took an interest in my work and was especially
helpful in the development of the chapter on Somalia.
I must also thank my close friends Dr. and Mrs. Ronald
Keith Gaddie for all their love and support.
I wish to extend especially warm thanks to Dr. James
Campbell, who always believed in me. His assistance at
various key points in my academic career have made this
Ph.D. possible. I hope my work will always be a source of
pride to him.

v

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

I want to thank Dr. James Garand who saw the potential
in me. He was instrumental in securing my assistantship and
allowing me the opportunity to prove myself here at LSU. I
will always be grateful to him.
I wish to also thank my grandparents, Joseph and Agnes
Antizzo and the late Imogene Lawrence for all their love,
understanding, and faith.
For her Christian fellowship, I am especially grateful
to my aunt, Joyce Donath. She was a pillar of spiritual
strength.
I also wish to thank Carol Hodges for her meticulous
proofreading of this work and her helpful suggestions
regarding its format.
Finally, I would like to express my thanks to various
others who have made my experience at LSU something that I
will always cherish:

Anthony Vachris, Mr. and Mrs. John

Murphy, Mr. and Mrs.

Mark Johnson, Dr.Keith A. Boeckelman,

Dr. William Arp, Dr.

G. Ellis Sandoz,

Dr. Thomas Owen,

Mr. and Mrs. Jeff Cubbage, and Mr. William Crawford of the
Louisiana State Law Institute. Their support and
encouragement gave me the determination to see this project
through. I will remember them all with great fondness.

vi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements....................................... iii
Abstract.............................................. viii
Chapter
I

Direct U.S. Military Intervention: An
Introduction................................. 1

II

A Brief History of U.S. Direct Military
Intervention................................ 20

III

A Typology of Preconditions Favoring the
Success of Military Intervention in the
Post-Cold War Era........................... 48

IV

Operation Just Cause: The Invasion of
Panama...................................... 77

V

Iraq: Operation Desert Storm.................. 137

VI

Operation Restore Hope: Humanitarian Relief
in Somalia................................. 213

VII

Conclusion: Evaluating the Interventionist
Typology................................... 279

List ofWorks Consulted................................. 317
Vita................................................... 323

vii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ABSTRACT

Direct U.S. military intervention in the Third World
featured prominently in American foreign policy during the
post-World War II era. However, the Cold War placed
restraints on where and how Washington could intervene. The
collapse of the former Soviet Union appears to have removed
many of the barriers to, if not the ideological
justifications for, American intervention. Since the end of
the Cold War, the United States has intervened militarily
in several countries. However, these post-Cold War
interventions seem to be guided by different motives than
those traditionally given. Likewise, such operations, now
free from the fear of counter-intervention by any other
superpower, seem to be governed by a new set of rules.
This dissertation considers the efficacy of direct
U.S. military intervention: when it will work, when it will
not, and how to undertake such action in a manner that will
bring rapid victory at an acceptable political cost.
Consequently, this study develops a typology of the
preconditions that tend to favor the success of direct U.S.
military intervention in the post-Cold War era. The
criteria considered relate to the various aspects of
intervention, including: the motives underlying the
decision to intervene, the nature of the situation in the
target country, domestic political conditions, how the
viii
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operation is carried out, and exit strategies. In addition,
aspects of civilian-military relations are considered, with
an emphasis on the role of the theater commander in both
the decision making process and the prosecution of the
action. The propositions advanced are tested by the use of
focused case studies of the major episodes of direct
American military intervention since 1989: Panama (1989),
Iraq (1991), and Somalia (1992-1994).

ix
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CHAPTER I

DIRECT 0.8. MILITARY INTERVENTION: AN INTRODUCTION

Introduction/Background
As Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. points out in his book, The
Doctrines of American Foreign Policy, the doctrines that
have guided U.S. foreign policy are not static. Rather,
despite recurring themes such as anti-communism, they are
pragmatically adjusted on a "need" basis. That is to say
that they evolve, adapting to circumstances as the
international environment and changing perceptions of
national interests dictate. Bearing this in mind, it would
seem that the American foreign policy has undergone a
gradual, yet discernable, evolution since the end of World
War II.
Like nothing before it, the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor in 1941 forced Americans to face the fact that,
whether they liked it or not, U.S. security needs
absolutely compelled defense of the nation's interests
abroad. This became even clearer when, shortly after allied
victory, the Soviet Union began to indicate that it would
no longer be a friend, let alone an ally, of the United
States.
Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, while condemned
by the West, was in fact tolerated and accepted. Soon
l
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afterward, however, Communist designs were perceived
against areas outside the conceded Soviet sphere of
influence. The U.S. response to this challenge, the Truman
Doctrine, seems to have set into motion a series of phases
though which American policy has passed. They are as
follows (approximately):
1947-1957 The use (or at least the implied threat) of
direct U.S. military intervention in order
to defend established friendly governments
from "armed minorities" acting with the aid,
or at least the blessing, of the USSR and
its allies. Examples of this include U.S.
aid to Greece and Turkey, as well as direct
military intervention in Korea. In defense
of core U.S. interests, particularly
Western Europe, the U.S. invokes the
doctrine of "massive retaliation," a policy
which remains in place until the 1960s.
1957-1973 The use of direct U.S. intervention in the
Third World for two distinct, yet
complementary, objectives. First, to
contain communist expansion by whatever
means necessary, including armed force.
Second, to help immunize newly emerging
nations from communism through the process
of U.S. sponsored "nation-building" and
Rostowian development policies. Prominent
examples of this include Lebanon (1958),
the Dominican Republic (1965), and most
clearly South Vietnam (1962-1973).
1973-1980 This was a period of relative dormancy in
U.S. foreign policy, perhaps bordering on
neo-isolationism. Public paranoia over
getting involved in "another Vietnam" as
well as a general distrust of government due
to ten years of lies from both the Johnson
and Nixon administrations culminated in
congressional micro-management of U.S.
foreign policy. The passage of the War
Powers Act, as well as the Clark and Tunney
Amendments, virtually tied the hands of the
executive for two administrations. Though
there are some uses of armed force (freeing
the "Mayaguez" in 1975, "Desert One" in
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1979, supplying Israel in 1973) and threats
to use force (ongoing commitments to NATO,
South Korea, etc), the U.S. avoids prolonged
interventions that characterized earlier
periods.
1980-1989 The era of the Reagan Doctrine. This policy
took account of the fact that the USSR was a
superpower only in the military sense.
Furthermore, during the 1970s the Soviet
,,empireM had become overextended.
Consequently, the U.S. sought to exploit the
many weak points, thereby rolling-back
communism in the Third World while
simultaneously bleeding Moscow by forcing it
to engage in the costly task of defending
its allies for a change. This task was
accomplished by funding pre-existing
indigenous rebel groups that could costeffectively press U.S. claims without the
need to commit U.S. land forces in a
prolonged Vietnam-style conflict. Examples
of this include U.S. aid to rebels in
Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua. (It is
interesting to note that, in the case of
Nicaragua, while the Reagan administration
denied any involvement, it used the CIA to
mine Nicaraguan harbors and financed the
rebels through the Iran-Contra arms sales to
Iran as well as actively seeking the
financial support of friendly Gulf
emirates.)
1989-1995 This period is characterized by the threat
and/or use of direct U.S. military power for
the achievement of two goals that seem, on
the face of it, to be at odds with each
other: (1) the protection of national
interests such as Middle East oil and the
Panama Canal and (2) humanitarian concern in
areas of the world, the value of which to
vital U.S. interests cannot be readily
demonstrated. Examples of (1) include U.S.
participation in the 1991 Persian Gulf War
and the 1989 intervention in Panama.
Examples of (2) include the U.S. mercy
mission in Somalia, the food airlift to
Bosnia, as well as the stationing of some
U.S. ground forces in Macedonia.
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1995 - ?

Anticipated challenges to U.S. foreign
policy:
1. The need to deal militarily with
terrorists and the states that sponsor
them (e.g. Libya, Iran, Sudan).
2. The need to deal with "loose cannons"
that acquire nuclear weapons (e.g. North
Korea)
3. The need to intervene again in the
Persian Gulf so as to defend U.S.
allies, access to oil, ensure freedom of
navigation within the Gulf, and/or
enforce the terms of surrender imposed
on Iraq at the end of the 1991 war.
4. The need to intervene militarily so as
to restore order, promote democracy, and
prevent mayhem (Haiti, post-Castro Cuba)
5. The need to take direct military action
to deal with drug lords (?)
6. The need to again engage in peacekeeping
and/or humanitarian relief duties.
7. The need to deter Beijing from attempts
to intimidate American friends in the
Far East such as Taiwan, Japan, South
Korea (or a weak Russia?).

It is these two most recent "periods" that will be the
focus of this dissertation.
Purpose of This Study
The central purpose of this dissertation is to develop
a new typology of successful direct military intervention
V

consistent with the needs and priorities of the post-Cold
War world, as articulated by the Bush and Clinton
administrations in the early-to-mid-1990s.
It is expected that the findings will show that, when
the principles that will be presented below are adhered to,
American forces will tend to enjoy success. Conversely,
when these principles are deviated from, military failure,
while perhaps not pre-ordained, is made more likely.
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Furthermore, the political aspects of the policy become
either a domestic albatross for the President as American
soldiers die for nebulous purposes that their families
cannot understand (Somalia) or a source of decay of
international credibility as the President makes threats
that he cannot keep (Bosnia) or perhaps had no intention of
ever seriously keeping (North Korea).
What then will this study add to our understanding of
international politics? This study will yield a new
framework which will greatly facilitate the scholarly study
of actual and potential military intervention. It will
provide criteria which can be used to dissect the various
elements of motivation, action, and completion of such
operations. As such, we can assess each phase of such
operations and diagnose problems that, as a result, need
not be repeated later. In a word, the key scholarly
contribution of this work: clarity of understanding.
Literature Review
Literature regarding intervention as a general topic
of discussion is abundant. However, as Richard Smoke has
implied, the task of building a body of literature which
develops a typology of the number and nature of specific
preconditions for successful intervention has largely been
neglected. This is regrettable, especially in light of the
fact that military options, by their very nature, "require
more preconditions in place, for the options to have a
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reasonable chance of success at reasonable cost, than do
non-military options" (Smoke, 1977: 39). The dearth of
literature on this topic should not act as a deterrent to
its scholarly pursuit. To the contrary, it is this very
void which this study hopes to fill. Although it has been
possible to locate only a very few authors who have
featured such preconditions as a central concern of their
writings, it is enough to get a picture of the intellectual
heritage of the development of such typologies.
This literature review will begin with a brief
discussion of why intervention will probably figure
prominently in post-Cold War politics. The body of this
survey, however, will concentrate specifically on
literature dealing with typologies outlining the
preconditions to be satisfied before an intervention policy
can promise a favorable ratio of expected benefits to
expected costs. This overview will conclude with a summary
of what the literature has thus far provided the scholarly
community and what still remains to be said.
Setting the Stage
In a recent article, former National Security Advisor
to President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, noted that "war
has become a luxury that only poor nations can afford
(Brzezinski, 1991: 5)." This is because the post-Cold War
world is characterized by a dichotomy. On one hand, the
threat of nuclear weapons still restrains the actions of
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the world's "major players."

On the other hand, many

countries, due to a variety of reasons, have had loosened
the restraints formerly imposed on their external behavior.
At the same time, many of these same states have had their
domestic dictatorial foundations undermined. The resultant
instability, both internal and external, has made these
states (primarily, but not exclusively, in the Third World)
into sources and/or locations of conflict. Due to the ever
increasing interdependence of the world community "it is
just as likely that major threats could originate from
within states, either through civil conflicts or because of
the increased technological sophistication of terrorist
acts."
He implies that pragmatically guided, prudently
pursued intervention may be an answer to this challenge
(Brzezinski, 1991: 6, 20). However, there is a question of
sovereignty and its possible violation in such situations.
The United States clings to what may be an antiquated
notion: that sovereignty places absolute limits on
circumstances where intervention is possible (recall that
the U.S. was "asked" to
Grenada, etc.).

"assist" in Vietnam, Korea,

Brzezinski, however, sees a possible

opening: that the decision of when and where to intervene
may necessarily have to downplay a strict view of
sovereignty in favor of an appreciation of the scope of a
given threat. Specifically, "there may develop situations
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in which external intervention in the seemingly internal
affairs of a state...may be necessary and justified by the
potential consequences of activities that are otherwise of
internal character and that do not, of themselves, involve
interstate collision" (Brzezinski, 1991: 5-6).
Steven E. Goldman takes this argument further. In
essence, he argues that our traditional notions of
sovereignty are not only antiquated, but also unduly
legalistic. It is ridiculous to assume that all states are
equal, especially when it comes to this very central issue.
Goldman believes that, in order to exercise full
sovereignty, a condition that would legally proscribe
foreign intervention, a state must be legitimate in the
eyes of modern legality. This legitimacy, of necessity, is
predicated on the exercise of political self-determination
within the state in question. This self-determination is
clearly evident in liberal democracies, as manifested by
the conduct of their political institutions and
constitutional safeguards.
By contrast, states that are not democratic
should not be viewed as possessing the same full
untrammelled sovereignty, since the civil
population, the nation that is the source and the
possessor of sovereignty, has not been allowed
even the rudimentary opportunity of expressing
its political will. Sovereignty in such cases may
be said to be in a state of suspension or
impaired (emphasis added). The state in such
circumstances is illegitimate and is not the
bearer of any degree of sovereignty...(Goldman
1994: 127).
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Since, in such cases, sovereignty is said not to
exist, democratic states are free, and in some specific
circumstances may be morally obligated, to intervene in the
internal affairs of undemocratic states when circumstances
there represent a threat to the world community, or if the
state in question directly threatens its own citizens human
rights (e.g. the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia 1975-1979).
It should be noted that Goldman clearly states that
while a "right of" intervention exists legally in such
circumstances, the "decision to" actually intervene is and
"must always remain fundamentally a political judgement"
(Goldman 1994: 128). It is the circumstances surrounding
this "political judgement" that the next section of this
literature review concerns itself.
Typologies of Intervention Preconditions
Typologies of intervention are not new to political
science. Only a very few authors, however, have featured
such preconditions as a central concern of their writings.
In many cases, the discussion of this topic is overlapped
by, or buried within, literature associated with other
subjects such as deterrence, compellence, and political
realism. However, these subjects are beyond the scope of
this study. Our intent here is to confine discussion to the
intellectual heritage of the issue at hand: specifically we
will consider literature which lays out specific criteria
which would seem to constitute preconditions to any
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successful pursuit of interventionist strategies. Due to
space constraints, however, this overview will necessarily
be of a general and simplified nature.
A concern with direct military intervention seems
justified for a number of reasons. First and foremost, with
the collapse of the Soviet Union, there seems to be an
increased reliance by the United States on the use of such
direct force. Nowhere was this renewed enthusiasm for
military options more evident than in the adoption of an
uncharacteristically hawkish stance with regard to Haiti by
the almost uniformly liberal Congressional Black Caucus.
Second, while other forms of intervention (e.g.
economic sanctions) still have their place in the American
arsenal of options, it is evident that an increasing number
of dictators will respond only to military force. Whether
this is due to their ability to insulate themselves from
the effects of such sanctions, their fear that backing down
in a confrontation with the U.S. would result in a loss of
face that would threaten their hold on power, simple
callousness, or possibly failure to comprehend their own
interests, tyrants in the post-Cold War era seem
increasingly intransigent and unresponsive to lesser forms
of intervention.
Finally, as will be demonstrated below, there is a
dearth of literature identifying and examining those
preconditions favoring the success of direct military
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intervention. Because of the advance preparations, as well
as the heavy investment of both military personnel and
material required to undertake such operations, greater
attention to the preconditions for successful intervention
is a matter of great urgency and priority.
The most systematic scholarly consideration of
intervention in terms of the development of a typology of
preconditions was a 1971 study by Alexander George and his
associates. This work, entitled The Limits of Coercive
Diplomacy. compared three instances when the U.S.
intervened with "coercive diplomacy," that is to say,
diplomatic threats backed up with military force. These
case studies led to the development of eight preconditions
for successful intervention, at least by the United States
under the historical conditions considered. These factors
include:
1. The strength of U.S. motivation.
2. An asymmetry of motivation favoring the
United States.
3. The clarity of American objectives.
4. The projection of a sense of urgency to
achieve the objective sought.
5. The presence of adequate domestic support
for the policy.
6. The availability of usable military
options.
7. The development of the opponent's fear of
unacceptable escalation.
8. Clarity concerning the precise terms of
settlement. (George et al., 1971: 217226) .
The above criteria rest, however, on several premises.
First, force is used as part of a "carrot and stick"
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policy, employing both a positive inducement and threat of
military force to achieve the desired result. Second, force
should only be used to protect well-defined interests.
George believed that force cannot be well tailored and
successfully applied unless specific, clear objectives are
formulated regarding its use. Third, when using coercive
force, the coercing power must keep open its channels of
communication with its opponent. In this way, the coercing
power can transmit its demands, barter terms, and negotiate
an agreement which will lead to compliance. Failure to
maintain open communication may lead to the misreading of
intentions and unnecessary escalation. Finally, a
willingness to use force, if necessary, is needed in order
for the threat to have credibility, especially if the
coercing power's "bluff" is called.
Robert Jervis, while writing on the subject of
deterrence, states that "unfortunately no well-structured
or verified theory exists that tells us when force and
threats work." He does, however, indicate that it is
possible to set forth some propositions and draw some
preliminary conclusions. Although he does not set out
specific preconditions needed for successful intervention
of the type articulated below, Jervis argues that threats
(and thus deterrence) are more apt to work when the
following conditions are present:
1. The other side sees the costs of standing
firm as very high.
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2. The other side believes that the state
making the threats sees its costs of
standing firm as low.
3. The other side sees the costs of
retreating as relatively low (Jervis,
1976: 100-101).
Jervis enumerates several sub-criteria, especially
with respect to the first and third criteria, but does not
attempt to develop any operational prerequisites regarding
the actual undertaking of military action.
While Jervis is primarily concerned with deterrence,
Richard Smoke more directly addresses the circumstances
surrounding intervention per se. Smoke believes that an
increase in the number of "players" and points of conflict
probably yield a "rich menu of possibilities for low level,
•sub-threshold' intervention of various kinds as well as
more overt military intervention." When facing such
possible intervention situations, decisionmakers often have
a wide range of options available and generally will select
one that is adequate, even ample, to deal with the existing
opposition." In such situations, their decisions concerning
the size of the military commitment is often influenced
heavily by "the tradeoff between securing a rapid and sure
victory on the one hand and minimizing costs on the other"
(Smoke, 1977: 30).
Intervention to Smoke is not an "event." Rather, he
conceives of it as an ongoing cycle: a diagnosis of the
situation, then the choice of a response option, followed
by a new diagnosis, and so on. This process, however, is
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clouded by what he labels as "reductionism." During
diagnosis, this reductionism is manifest in the form of
preconceived notions drawn from varied sources such as
historical "laws," unwarranted historical analogies (e.g.
the opponent as "another Hitler" or the situation as
"another Vietnam"), or long term trends. Unfortunately, key
information such as the opponent's doctrines or personality
attributes are downplayed in favor of "hard information."
"In the context of option handling it [reductionism]
appears in the guise of an underemphasis on the analytical
preconditions for various strategies, in favor of
emphasizing technical aspects of carrying them out"
(emphasis added)(Smoke, 1977: 43).
The United States has an unprecedented number of
options for action to choose from. There is, however, a
problem in that policymakers, for whatever reason, tend to
pass quickly through diagnosis to option handling. This
haste is perhaps because of cultural bias toward action
over deliberation. Smoke suggests that this bias leads to
"premature closure" of the diagnosis stage.
An unfortunate consequence of this closure is that
"the consideration of military intervention from the angle
of ascertaining the number and kinds of preconditions for
success is a productive analytical approach that is not
always emphasized" (Smoke, 1977: 39). Smoke notes that in
their haste, policymakers overlook the fact that "military
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options require more preconditions in place, for the
options to have a reasonable chance of success at
reasonable cost, than do non military options" (Smoke,
1977: 39). Furthermore, because of its often unilateral
character, U.S. decisionmakers may not recognize that "in
most circumstances there are more preconditions to be
satisfied before this policy can promise a favorable ratio
of expected benefits to expected costs" (emphasis
added)(Smoke, 1977: 39).
Although the early 1990s have seen a marked increase
of instances of United States direct military intervention
(as well as the proliferation of potential "target
countries"), there is surprisingly little writing on
actual, specific preconditions necessary for the success of
such operations. Thomas Perry Thornton, for example,
discusses factors affecting whether intervention is, as he
puts it "an appropriate and necessary deviation from a
policy of support for regional autonomy" in conflict
resolution. However he chooses to steer clear of the issue
of preconditions for intervention except to admonish
policymakers that in exercising their military prerogatives
"an integral part of the planning process should be devoted
to seeing how our involvement can be shaped to restore and
enhance the autonomy of the nation or system" (Thornton,
1986: 138).
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Ted Galen Carpenter points out that the legacy of
involvement in Vietnam has "created a lasting element of
caution in the calculations of U.S. leaders" concerning
intervention. He refers to a 1984 speech made by thenSecretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in which Weinberger
laid out guidelines concerning the future use of American
forces abroad. The speech emphasized that the U.S. should
be much more selective in where it felt compelled to
intervene, reserving such a drastic option only for areas
deemed "vital" to American interests, and even then only as
a last resort. Furthermore, Washington must send its forces
only if it had "the clear intention of winning" the
conflict. In contrast to previous interventions, Weinberger
insisted that the United States should clearly formulate
its goals, be they political or military, and then send the
appropriate manpower to get the mission accomplished.
Finally, Weinberger believed that before undertaking such
an endeavor, there must be " 'some reasonable assurance' of
popular and congressional support" (Carpenter, 1992: 158).
Peter J. Schraeder has articulated a three part test
which he believes is an aid in establishing "those
circumstances in which the use of force is both a
legitimate and useful tool of intervention." These include:
1.

Whether the forces enjoy "majority support within

the target country."
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2. Whether the power that the U.S. intends to aid can
muster "majority regional and international support."
3. Whether the proposed intervention is consistent
with international law, which is valuable as a legitimizing
agent

(Schraeder, 1992: 396-397).

He concludes that "although the combination of these
three guidelines cannot, of course, guarantee a successful
intervention episode —

indeed, success depends on a host

of factors, including the goal pursued —

they at least

enhance the possibility for success and most certainly
ensure that U.S. policies foster a legitimacy that will
allow it to lead both regionally and within the
international system" (Schraeder, 1992: 397).
As this analysis has demonstrated, while there is
considerable literature regarding the general topic of
armed intervention abroad, relatively little of it deals
systematically with the preconditions that would enhance
the chances of successful intervention by the United States
abroad.
Most of the existing commentaries deal with general,
theoretical preconditions for interventionism. While such
works (especially that of Alexander George) have
considerable validity, they do not seem sufficiently
specific or applicable to contemporary conditions. To be
more precise, a typology should, and can, be developed that
identifies and explains those specific preconditions that
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tend to favor successful intervention by the USA overseas.
Commentators on the subject, such as Smoke, Levite, and
Jentleson, have asserted that the development of such
"necessary and sufficient conditions is a crucial task for
further research" (emphasis added)(Levite, Jentleson, and
Berman, 1992: 318).
Furthermore, this typology should be one that reflects
the realities of both the domestic and world political
environments of the 1990s, as well as attempts to serve as
a set of guidelines for the foreseeable future. A review of
the literature indicates that such a project has not been
undertaken previously.
It is clear, therefore, that there is a gap in the
literature that needs to be filled. This work proposes to
do so by articulating, and then evaluating the validity of,
such a typology. This task is the objective of the
following chapters of this paper.
Pursuit of the Study
As regards the methodology to be employed, it is clear
that, due to the small number of instances available, the
case study method is the only feasible approach. An
additional advantage of this method is the factual richness
that such qualitative methods lend to the establishment,
and subsequent refinement, of the typology and its
fulfillment indicators.
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The cases of American intervention in Somalia, Panama,
and the Persian Gulf area have been selected for detailed
evaluation. This is largely due to the fact they are, at
the time of this writing, the only fully completed missions
where the U.S. armed forces have been called upon to act,
for whatever reasons, since the fall of the Soviet empire.
(Haiti, the most recent case of American intervention, is
still underway and thus cannot be evaluated as fully as the
other cases.)
Three principal sources will be utilized in
researching this study. First, scholarly works (monographs
and articles) will be used to establish the academic
"context" into which this study fits, as well to provide
needed factual information and insights related to the
cases dealt with here. Second, records of official
proceedings —

such as congressional hearings, official

statements of policy, as well as "unofficial" speeches of
officials who were involved —

will be relied upon in

presenting the case studies. Finally, "newspapers of
record," such as the New York Times, as well as Facts on
File and Keesing's. will be consulted in order to establish
the necessary facts of each case. Together these should
provide all the necessary information required to make this
study possible.
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CHAPTER II

A BRIEF HISTORY OP U.S. DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION

Introduction
Military intervention has long been a prominent
feature of U.S. foreign policy. It may be recalled that one
of the first acts of the Second Continental Congress was to
authorize an invasion of Quebec in order to foment an
uprising there and perhaps gain an ally - a "fourteenth
colony" - in the rebellion against the British crown.
The purpose of this chapter is not to write the
definitive history of U.S. military intervention. Rather,
it is to give a broad overview of the historical
development of American military intervention. For this
purpose, our discussion will be general in nature. This
chapter will survey intervention over the last century.
Utilizing representative instances, the present discussion
will illustrate the types of such actions, official U.S.
attitudes toward the use of force, the legacy of the Cold
War tradition, and the resultant post-Vietnam mindset.
Earlv Interventions
United States foreign policy, from the founding of the
republic, has relied on a resort to the sword. In the late
1790s, President Adams waged an undeclared naval war
against France. His successor, Thomas Jefferson, dispatched
20
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the Navy and Marines to deal with marauding Barbary
pirates. Furthermore, in 1818 Andrew Jackson was given
unofficial approval to conduct an expedition into Spanish
Florida (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. [CQWR],
January 5, 1991, article by Ronald D. Elving: 37). Modern
U.S. military intervention, however, finds its origins in
the 1898 Spanish-American War. Prior to that conflict, U.S.
foreign policy was largely guided by the principle of non
intervention. Americans, concerned with fulfilling their
Manifest Destiny, for the most part ignored the outside
world. Conflicts, when they did come, were aimed at
expanding the new republic's frontiers.
The organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy was
the Monroe Doctrine. Promulgated in 1823, this policy was
aimed at European colonial powers who were contemplating
the reclamation of their recently liberated colonies in
Latin America. While warning European powers from
attempting to interfere in Latin American affairs, it also
had the effect of demarcating a United States sphere of
interest in Western Hemisphere (Gardner, 1992: 27). It
bears noting that these bold words were unenforceable
without the British Navy guaranteeing compliance.
Nevertheless, the Monroe Doctrine, in one form or another,
has been invoked well into the Twentieth Century.
The Spanish-American War, although a comic-opera
affair in its pursuit, was a watershed event in the history

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

22

of U.S. military intervention. Using the destruction of the
USS Maine in Havana Harbor (allegedly by the Spanish) as a
pretext, the United States invaded Cuba in support of an
anti-colonial uprising. The Pacific Fleet under Admiral
Dewey engaged the Spanish in the Philippines as well.
The war was short, barely longer than three months,
and with surprisingly few combat fatalities. This "splendid
little war" is significant not so much on its own merits,
but rather because of what resulted from it (Musicant,
1990: 6). With the cessation of hostilities, the United
States acquired a small empire. Added to U.S. territory
were such far-flung locales as Puerto Rico, Guam, and the
Philippine Islands. The United States was now a world
power, and jingoists were eager to extend American
interests to the four corners of the earth. President
McKinley, however, believed that American security and
interests did not require the addition of Cuba to American
territory. Rather, Washington chose to exercise a Europeanstyle "protectorate" over Cuba. That is to say that Cuba
would maintain its official independence, but Havana's
freedom in foreign policy would be limited by the United
States.

This policy was codified by the Platt Amendment

which, in addition, allowed the United States both basing
rights in Cuba, as well as carte blanche to intervene under
specific circumstances (Musicant, 1990: 50-51).
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Cuba would become a model for American military
intervention throughout the Caribbean basin in the first
third of the Twentieth Century. Such intervention was
virtually institutionalized by President Theodore
Roosevelt. Roosevelt added a "corollary" to the Monroe
Doctrine which asserted that the U.S. could engage in
unilateral military intervention anywhere within the
Americas where conditions might entice a European armed
response (Musicant, 1990: 3). As Roosevelt himself
declared: "Brutal wrongdoing, or an impotence which results
in a general loosening of the ties of a civilized society,
may finally require intervention by some civilized nation,
and in the Western Hemisphere the United States cannot
ignore this duty" (Chessman, 1969: 97).
This broadened interventionist policy is largely
associated with the 1904 Debt Default Crisis of the
Dominican Republic, when the Santo Domingo government
defaulted on loans made by European creditors. Roosevelt,
fearing a European "repossession" of the Dominican Republic
in violation of the Monroe Doctrine, sent U.S. troops to
head-off such a possibility. By the following year, the
situation had stabilized. With Washington acting as a loan
collector, payments to European creditors resumed.
The most enduring legacy of Roosevelt's policy of
hemispheric intervention, however, was his simultaneous
construction of both a new nation and a new canal in
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Panama. In 1903, a treaty which would have granted the U.S.
the right to build a canal across the isthmus in Panama
province was rejected by the Colombian Senate. An enraged
Roosevelt took advantage of an uprising in Panama. By
sending American warships, most notably the USS Nashville,
to waters off the Panamanian coast, Roosevelt was able to
prevent Colombian troops from suppressing the rebellion.
With Panamanian independence thus secured, the U.S. and the
new regime entered into negotiations.
These efforts culminated with the signing of the HayBunau-Varilla Treaty on November 18, 1903. This compact
provided for a ten-mile wide zone, stretching from coastto-coast, which would be leased in perpetuity to the U.S.
for the purposes of canal construction, maintenance, and
defense (Musicant, 1990: 136). In addition, the treaty
"provided a clear and specific legal basis for...U.S.
intervention in the event of disorder," making subsequent
U.S. intervention unique in that it was based on treaty
rights (Scranton, 1992: 344-45).
Woodrow Wilson, perhaps best known for his post World
War I policy of national self-determination in Europe, was
not above invoking Roosevelt's corollary in hemispheric
affairs. Under the earlier Taft Administration, Washington
had engaged in "dollar diplomacy," under which American
businessmen were encouraged to invest in the Caribbean
basin by guaranteeing their loans with the full diplomatic
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and, if necessary, military support of the U.S. government.
As such, U.S. loans were made to a number of Latin and
Caribbean states. In 1912, this policy was put to the test
when U.S. troops invaded and occupied Nicaragua in order to
safeguard U.S. lives and interests.
Over time, Wilson continued, yet refined, this
interventionist policy. He sought political and economic
stability in the Caribbean basin so as to engender
"sustained economic growth and [help] to insure the prompt
payment of foreign debt" which would keep U.S. [and
European] bankers happy while keeping foreign troops out of
the Western Hemisphere (Steward, 1980: 17).
In keeping with his established policy, in 1917 Wilson
sent 2,600 Marines to prop up the corrupt

Menocal regime in

Cuba. Likewise, Haiti was invaded in 1915

in order to

"prevent anarchy" or perhaps more accurately, to establish
a government capable of maintaining a stable environment
for foreign investment (Gardner, 1992: 30).

The Dominican

Republic, also, was invaded the following year and both it
and Haiti were placed under U.S. military rule.
During the period 1915-1934, 2,000 Haitians were
killed by U.S.troops (Steward, 1980: 20). Indigenous
government was not allowed in either Haiti or the Dominican
Republic until 1924. It should, however, be noted that the
U.S. trained paramilitary forces to maintain order. Steward
claims that these groups were the forerunners of the
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Haitian secret police: the Tontons Macoute (Steward, 1980:
18).
American intervention during this period was not
limited to Caribbean island republics. Wilson ordered U.s.
troops into Mexico twice. First, in 1913, American forces
occupied Vera Cruz as part of an attempt to overthrow
Mexican military dictator, Victoriano Huerta. Again, in
1916 the President dispatched General John "Black Jack"
Pershing on a punitive expedition to capture the bandit
Pancho Villa, who had killed several U.S. citizens during
raids into the American Southwest (Steward 1980: 17). Villa
eluded his pursuer and was never apprehended.
Intervention in the Caribbean basin continued into the
1920s, most notably in Nicaragua. U.S. Marines stationed
there to prop up the Nicaraguan regime were thought to be
no longer needed and were withdrawn in the mid-1920s.
However, a new uprising in 1926 prompted the Marines'
return. By 1927, U.S. forces deposed the incumbent regime
and installed a new one. The rebels, labeled "Bolshevists"
by Secretary of State Kellogg and armed by Mexico, were
pursued by the Marines until the mid-1930s. In 1934, rebel
leader Cesar Augusto Sandino was lured into a trap and
killed by U.S.-trained National Guardsmen led by future
Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Samoza (Steward, 1980: 24-5).
(It may be interesting to note that Sandino's name was
appropriated by a group - the "Sandinistas" - who,
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ironically overthrew the dictatorship of Samoza's namesake
nephew.)
Isolationism
The election of Herbert Hoover marked a change in the
direction of U.S. foreign policy. Going from
interventionism to restraint, this policy during the 1930s
would evolve into isolationism. The Hoover policy was most
clearly articulated in 1930 with the issuance of the socalled "Clark Memorandum." This document, while not
completely disavowing all possible future intervention, did
renounce the Roosevelt corollary of the Monroe Doctrine.
Henceforth, Washington would be more guarded in the
utilization of military diplomacy. President Hoover,
consequently, repressed the urge to send the Marines into
Panama and Haiti (1931), and El Salvador (1932) (Steward,
1980: 26). In 1933, Hoover withdrew all U.S. forces from
Nicaragua.
This retreat from overt interventionism in Central
America lasted beyond Hoover’s administration. Later, it
led the way to "the Good Neighbor policy" during President
Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration (Gardner, 1992: 32).
During the 1930s, isolationism, a term usually
associated with American policy toward European affairs,
was the word that best characterized both the political
atmosphere and the policy trends of the decade. The U.S.
government largely declined to use American troops in
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hemispheric affairs, while the strange political
bedpartners of communists, Lindburgh-Kennedy style fascist
sympathizers, and the apathetic majority managed to
forestall any U.S. intervention in Europe.
1947-1957; The Era of Containment
The ordeal of World War II, and the circumstances
leading to it, tremendously reshaped the political
landscape, especially with regard to American foreign
policy. With victory, there was a renewed interest in how
events beyond America's shoreline affected national
security. This reassessment was fuelled by a number of
factors. First among these factors was the belief by many
in both government and the public that American non
involvement in European affairs had left the democracies no
choice but appeasement, and that appeasement had
necessarily led to war.
Second, throughout the Nineteenth and early Twentieth
Centuries, U.S. policies were, as a practical matter,
enforced by British naval power. World War II, however,
brought this arrangement to an end.

The United States, as

the heir to the fallen Euro-centric order that had been
dominant in world affairs since the Sixteenth Century,
perceived the Soviet Union as "a distinctive challenge" to
American goals in the post-war era.
Third, these suspicious views of the USSR's ambitions,
especially when taken with hostile Soviet conduct in the

R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

29

immediate post-war era, as well as the evil nature of
Stalin himself, combined to become the what would be called
the "Cold War;" an intense ideological competition between
the superpowers. It was a challenge that American leaders
were eager to take on (Gardner, 1992: 33).
A war-weary public supported the initial
demobilization of U.S. forces that accompanied the
immediate post-war period. This view had not changed
substantially by the time the Greek Civil War erupted.
President Truman, however, thought it important to stop the
spread of communism; a threat that he believed, sooner or
later, would more directly threaten the West if not halted
in Greece. The result was the Truman Doctrine.
In a speech before Congress on March 12, 1947, Truman
sought $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey in order to
help those countries fend off communism. Truman justified
his request by arguing: "I believe that it must be the
policy of the United States to support free peoples who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by
outside pressures." The clear implication of the Truman
Doctrine was that the Soviets needed to be contained within
Eastern Europe. Although this policy was originally
intended to simply apply to the defense of Western Europe,
Truman made it clear that it could be applied in other
regions where Communism threatened American interests
(Woods and Jones, 1991: 145).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30

The first major expansion of the Truman Doctrine
beyond Europe was not long delayed. In 1949, Chaing Kaichek's Nationalist armies were defeated by Communist forces
and driven off the mainland to Taiwan. This was a jolt to
the United States. Congress, alarmed by the "loss" of
China, became acutely concerned over the "rising Red tide"
and what it perceived as its Soviet source.
On June 25, 1950, Communist North Korean forces
stormed across the 38th parallel into South Korea. They
rapidly captured Seoul, driving United States and South
Korean forces back to the port city of Pusan. Until this
invasion, Korea had not been perceived as a major strategic
interest of the United States. The President, however,
immediately invoked the Truman Doctrine and ordered
American troops to repel the North Korean assault (Klare,
1992: 40). United Nations forces (about 90% American) under
General Douglas McArthur counter-attacked at Inchon and
swept the North Koreans up the peninsula to the Chinese
border. With the success of the intervention there was
broad support for the "liberation of Korea" (MacDonald,
1986: 57). However, much of this support dissipated with
the entry of China into the conflict. The war eventually
bogged down into a bloody stalemate and produced
considerable public discontent in the U.S. In 1953, shortly
after the election of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, an
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armistice was signed which ended the conflict. The result
has been an enduring, if uneasy, peace on the peninsula.
President Eisenhower adopted a scaled-down defense
posture, which relied to a great extent on the new doctrine
of "massive retaliation," with its implied threat of resort
to nuclear weapons, in order to discourage Soviet
adventures in the Third World. Emphasis was placed on
getting "more bang for the buck" from defense spending. As
such, conventional military capabilities were reduced in
favor of increased procurement of, and reliance on, nuclear
weapons. This "New Look" defense saved money by cutting
land forces and the surface fleet. Defense planning during
this period was concerned primarily with the Soviet threat
and as such really did not contemplate the need for force
projection into the Third World until the late 1950s. Only
at the end of President Eisenhower's tenure, "with the 1958
U.S. landing in Lebanon and the accompanying Eisenhower
Doctrine (authorizing U.S. military action to prevent a
communist takeover of Middle Eastern countries), did he
envision a direct U.S. military role in regional,
nonnuclear conflicts" (Klare, 1992: 40).
1957-1973: The Era of High Intervention
By the early 1960s, the Dullesian doctrine of Massive
Retaliation was under attack. It was criticized as
irresponsible in a nuclear age, as well as ineffective in
fighting communist "liberation movements" in the Third
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World. Therefore, after 1960, the Kennedy Administration
sought a new doctrine that would not require engaging in
brinkmanship as a response to all provocations, regardless
of how small.
The solution to this policy dilemma was found in the
doctrine of "flexible response." Its major advocate,
General Maxwell Taylor, believed that, while the United
States was in a position to deter a general war, it should
be prepared to defeat smaller-scale, local aggression.
Therefore, in order to provide a credible, realistic
response to challenges arising in the Third World, there
should be a significant expansion of U.S. conventional
capabilities. This buildup would enable the president to
choose from a wide variety of alternatives, ranging from
nonnuclear to tactical nuclear options, the type of forces
that would constitute the optimal response to any challenge
(Kinnard, 1991: 42; Taylor, 1989: 206, 211, 214-215).
A key component of these expanded options was
Kennedy's special emphasis on the creation of counter
insurgency forces to respond to communist challenges in the
Third World. Modelled on the British experience in Malaya,
counter-insurgency's central purpose was to thwart
communist rebels by "winning the hearts and minds" of
potentially receptive peasants, while energetically
engaging the rebels themselves with direct military force.
In the early 1960s, Kennedy found a laboratory where it
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would be possible to try out these new ideas on low
intensity warfare: Vietnam.
American interest in Indochina dated back to the early
part of the Eisenhower administration. It was President
Kennedy, however, who authorized a substantial increase in
the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam. However,
despite its initial role as a laboratory for newly
developed weapons and counterinsurgency tactics, Vietnam
rapidly generated its own inertia, becoming increasingly
important as a symbol. "For, having designated Vietnam as a
proving ground for counterinsurgency, it became essential
for the United States to avoid defeat lest U.S. failure in
Indochina encourage revolutionaries in other countries to
undertake guerilla campaigns of their own" (Klare, 1992:
41-42).
There were also other international implications that
developed along with such policy concerns. As George C.
Herring points out in his America's Longest War, during the
Johnson Administration, Vietnam evolved into a showcase of
U.S. resolve and credibility to honor its security
commitments to current and potential allies. Herring
observed that "the United States intervened in Vietnam to
block the apparent march of a Soviet-directed Communism
across Asia, enlarged its commitment to halt a presumably
expansionist Communist China, and eventually made Vietnam a
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test of its determination to uphold world order" (Herring,
1986: 279).
The test of American resolve that Vietnam represented
was fought on a scale unprecedented for an undeclared war/
intervention. Although air sorties started earlier, the
first American ground forces, two battalions of Marines,
were landed at Danang in March 1965. Within a month, this
number was increased to 40,000 (Herring, 1986: 131-132). At
the peak of U.S. involvement, 543,000 service personnel
were present in Vietnam (Lomperis, 1993: 82).
The style of combat ranged from guerilla/
counterinsurgency to strategic bombing to conventional
warfare. Although U.S. forces never lost a major engagement
against the enemy (even the 1968 Tet offensive was a U.S.
military victory), by the early 1970s the situation was had
become a stalemate. American troops maintained their secure
points, yet were unable to fully stop communist activity in
the countryside or traffic along the Ho Chi Minh trail
(Herring, 1986: 191). The cost, however, was staggering.
Between 1969 and 1973, 20,553 American soldiers were killed
(Herring, 1986: 256).
While TJ,J5. troops were able to fend off communist
forces, the South Vietnamese regime was largely ineffective
in its efforts to engender any degree of internal
efficiency of operation or loyalty from its populace. South
Vietnamese government was a succession of dictators and
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military strongmen. Governmental infrastructure was rife
with corruption. The United States, utilizing techniques
covering the range from quiet diplomacy to outright
involvement in a coup d'etat (President Diem was deposed by
a U.S.-backed coup in 1963), sought to transform the Saigon
regime so that the "democracy" in the South that Americans
were dying for would, in fact, exist (Herring, 1986: 69-70,
77, 84, 105-107). Unfortunately, U.S. efforts at "nationbuilding" in Vietnam ultimately met vith failure.
Transformation of the political system, if it were to come
at all, was going to have to be organic. It never
materialized.
President Nixon, tiring of both criticism and long
casualty lists, in 1969 started the phased withdrawal of
U.S. forces. This policy, called "Vietnamization," was
designed to shift the brunt of the fighting (and
casualties) from U.S. forces to the South Vietnamese Army.
By 1972, Nixon had withdrawn all but 25,000 American
soldiers. The effect was a dramatic reduction in the number
of casualties (Lomperis, 1993: 82).
Faced with clear evidence that U.S. intervention had
long since reached a point of greatly diminished returns,
the Nixon Administration entered into negotiations to end
the conflict. The result was the 1973 Paris Peace Treaty.
As Herring observes:
Only by the most narrow definition can the
agreement be said to have constituted "peace with
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honor." It permitted American extrication from
the war and secured the return of the POWs, while
leaving the (Saigon) government intact, at least
for the moment. On the other hand, North
Vietnamese troops remained in the South and the
(communist rebels were) accorded a position of
status. The major question over which the war had
been fought - the political future of South
Vietnam - was left to be resolved later (emphasis
added)(Herring, 1986: 255).
For all of the parties concerned, such "peace with
honor" came at a very high price indeed. Although the U.S.
was not nearly as damaged by the conflict as was Vietnam,
the cost was nevertheless enormous. Total war dead for the
American side was a staggering 58,000. Furthermore, "the
war polarized the American people and poisoned the
political atmosphere as had no issue since slavery a
century before. Although Nixon had held out for peace with
honor in order to maintain America's position in the world,
the United States emerged from the war with its image
considerably tarnished abroad and its people weary of
international involvement" (Herring, 1986: 256).
1973-1980: Neo-Isolationism
To many Americans, both in Congress and the public-atlarge, Vietnam was a traumatic experience. This eleven year
debacle was America's longest military conflict, and her
first defeat. Regardless of their political persuasion,
Americans seemed to agree that the war and its outcome were
"the politicians' fault." Liberals, for example, argued
that President Kennedy was mistaken in involving the U.S.
in a land war in Asia. Furthermore, some of those on the
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left believed that President Nixon had sinister motives
behind his escalation of the conflict, especially the
Christmas bombing campaign of 1971-72 and the invasion of
Cambodia. Conservatives, on the other hand, argued that
President Johnson had compelled U.S. forces to "fight with
one arm tied behind their back" because of his rigid rules
of engagement and his refusal to carry the ground war into
the communist North.
What both camps had in common were concerns about
alleged executive blundering and its root cause: an
"imperial presidency."

In this style of leadership, the

executive could commit U.S. forces indefinitely under the
aegis of the constitutionally ordained power as commanderin-chief, thus bypassing Congress and the need for a formal
declaration of war. As a result, "U.S. citizens and
policymakers sought to prevent any repetition of such a
fiasco by imposing a number of important restrictions on
U.S. military involvement in regional Third World
conflicts. These restraints, inspired by the 'Vietnam
Syndrome' - a clear and pervasive reluctance on the part of
American citizens to support U.S. intervention in local,
Third World conflicts - included the abandonment of
conscription, a substantial reduction in U.S. military aid
to unstable Third World governments, and, under the War
Powers Act of 1973, a legislative ban on the extended
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deployment (without congressional approval) of U.S. troops
abroad" (Klare, 1992: 42-43).
During the administration of Gerald Ford (1974-1977),
this retreat from direct involvement in Third World
conflict became more pronounced. Except for the insertion
of U.S. Marines into Cambodia to liberate the USS Mavaguez
and her crew from their Khmer Rouge captors in 1975, there
was no direct American military intervention in the Third
World. However, covert action continued as the U.S.
attempted to curb Soviet and Cuban adventures in the Third
World, particularly in Africa.
In the Angolan Civil War (1975-1976) Washington
supplied the pro-Western National Front for the Liberation
of Angola (FNLA) and Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Covert aid was
supplied by the CIA which used friendly countries in the
region, primarily Zaire, as conduits through which arms and
supplies could flow. The timing of this aid, however, was
historically unfortunate. The first year of major U.S.
covert aid, 1975, was only two years after the American
withdrawal from Vietnam. Angola was a "far away" war,
involving people Americans knew, or cared, little about.
This fact, as well as its appearance to many to be a
conflict that had no end in sight, made the situation in
Angola appear to many to be a "second Vietnam." Because of
the powerful hold that the then-newly emergent "Vietnam
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Syndrome had on the American psyche, it was politically
impossible to help UNITA to the extent that the Ford
Administration wanted to” (Hyland, 1987: 15).
Consequently, congressional opposition increased with
each passing day. This culminated with the passage of the
Clark Amendment in 1975. By a margin of 55 to 22, the
Senate voted to cut off funds for the CIA Task Force on
Angola. It would be another five years before the U.S.
would undertake another such covert operation (Bridgeland,
1986: 155).
The Carter Administration was largely a period of
isolation from intervention in Third World conflicts.
However, as a result of Soviet aid and/or Cuban
intervention, both direct and indirect, the list of what
Washington often viewed as new Soviet client states
expanded with breathtaking swiftness. Ethiopia, Angola,
Mozambique, and Nicaragua were among the more prominent of
the new allies that Moscow gathered during this period of
U.S. inaction in the 1970s.
Eventually, the Carter Administration came to the
realization that a post-Vietnam reassessment of U.S.
foreign and military policy was needed. In 1979, against a
backdrop of the fall of two American clients, Anastasio
Samoza in Nicaragua and the Shah of Iran, the National
Security Council concluded that the time had come to
reassert American power and influence in the global arena.
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This new interventionist consensus was converted, in June
1979, into new programs by several key presidential
decisions. These initiatives included: "a commitment to the
use of U.S military power to protect key economic resources
in the Third World (especially oil); the activation of the
Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), an assortment of units from
all four military services earmarked for intervention in
the Third World; the acquisition of new basing rights in
the Indian Ocean area (Notably in Oman, Kenya, and
Somalia); and the permanent deployment of a carrier battle
group in the Indian Ocean" (Klare, 1992: 45). None of these
initiatives was announced until the 1980 State of the Union
message. Circumstances at that time, however, would give
that speech far greater importance than anyone ever
anticipated.
1980-1989: Neo-Interventionism and the Reagan Doctrine
On Christmas Day 1979, Soviet paratrooper and special
forces seized the airport, as well as several other
strategic locations in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan.
After executing the Afghan leader, Hafezullah Amin, the
Soviets installed the more reliable Babrak Karmal as a
puppet-dictator. Immediately, Soviet forces were "invited"
by the Kabul regime to "help" it suppress an increasingly
successful uprising by anti-communist tribesmen. Soviet
troops poured across the border, secured the major cities
and engaged rebel forces throughout the country.
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In his 1980 State of the Union address, President
Carter devoted most of the text to foreign policy and
defense concerns. He outlined a number of responses to the
Afghanistan crisis. Among these measures: (1) the U.S.
would impose an embargo on the export of grain to the USSR,
(2) Washington would curtail sales of high technology items
to Moscow, and (3) the U.S. would plan on boycotting the
1980 Moscow Summer Olympics (Goldman, 1994: 19).
The most important part of the speech, however,
reflected Carter's concern that Afghanistan was possibly a
prelude to a drive to dominate the Persian Gulf area
whether by further destabilizing Iran (where U.S. embassy
personnel were in their third month of captivity by the
Khomeini regime) or by an attempt at military intimidation
of Gulf States, if not outright conquest. "In this address,
Carter affirmed Washington's readiness to use military
force in protecting the oil flow from the Persian Gulf"
(Klare, 1992: 45). Articulating what would instantly be
dubbed the "Carter Doctrine," the President declared:
Let our position be absolutely clear. An attempt
by any outside force to gain control of the
Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on
the vital interests of the United States of
America, and such an assault will be repelled by
any means necessary, including military force
(New York Times. January 24, 1980, text of Carter
address).
To this day, this policy continues to serve as the
rationale for American military activity in the Persian
Gulf area.
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On April 24, 1980, in his only "major" combat
deployment of U.S. armed forces, President Carter sent a
commando team into southeastern Iran in an attempt to
rescue U.S. embassy personnel being held hostage by the
Islamic fundamentalist theocracy in Teheran (Tower, 1987:
157). Although ambitious, the plan was poorly executed.
"Desert One" resulted in eight Americans killed, much
equipment destroyed (including a C-130 transport) and
abandoned, and an enormous embarrassment for the United
States in general, President Carter in particular (Daggett,
1992: 203). To the public this episode seemed to underscore
conservative charges that Carter had, at the least,
neglected the maintenance of American military power and
called into question whether the U.S. was capable of
projecting force in defense of her vital national
interests.
Popular concern over both the fate of the hostages in
Iran and the general decline of U.S. power and prestige
loomed large in the 1980 elections. A renewed buildup of
the armed forces and a resolve to use them were major
themes of the victorious Reagan campaign. Once in office,
the new President wasted no time in keeping his campaign
promises.
In 1981, President Reagan initiated what would become
a $2 trillion military build-up. Under this program, the
highest priority was given to the development of expanded
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force projection capabilities. The focus of these
enhancements centered on elite army Special Forces units,
the navy's carrier and amphibious fleets, and the air
force's long-range airlift capacity (Klare, 1992: 45).
The Reagan military build-up was accompanied by a more
aggressive foreign policy posture, especially toward the
Soviet Union and its communist/left-wing clients. To
Reagan, the USSR was an "evil empire," based on a sinister
ideology: communism. In Reagan's eyes, it was clear that
Moscow desired to spread communism by destabilizing free,
or at least pro-Western, governments. The Soviets were
viewed, therefore, as at least indirectly behind the
terrorism threatening the West and "revolutionary" upheaval
in the Third World (Klare, 1992: 50).
In order to counter the Soviet threat to Europe, the
U.S. deployed a new generation of Pershing and Cruise
missiles. However, blunting the communist advances in the
Third World was going to be considerably more difficult,
given the then-still pervasive Vietnam Syndrome which
placed a practical limitation on the use of direct U.S.
force under such circumstances.
Given the limited options available. President Reagan
decided that perhaps the most effective way to engage the
Soviets and their clients was to pursue a strategy similar
to that which Moscow had long-used to its own advantage:
find a revolutionary group to back with both arms and money
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in an attempt to undermine, and press claims against, the
incumbent Marxist government.
The ideological justification for this policy found
its expression in what came to be known as the HReagan
Doctrine.” Its theme was simple: America is the leader of
the free world, and as such she must protect freedom where
it exists and spread freedom to where it does not. As a
practical issue, the Reagan Doctrine was this: ”the U.S. is
prepared to help others protect or restore their freedom
and independence, but not to assume responsibility for the
task” (emphasis added)(Kirkpatrick, 1985: 12). The object
was to help Third World peoples stop communism by aiding,
with both arms and money, viable anti-Marxist rebel
movements in a given country. As opposed to the traditional
Cold War doctrine of "we will do it for you," as was the
case in Vietnam, the Reagan Doctrine asserted "we will help
you to do it, but if you want freedom, you must fight for
it yourselves" (Kirkpatrick, 1985: 14) . The U.S. was
willing to give financial aid and military support, but
would not commit U.S. forces. Under the auspices of the
Reagan Doctrine, U.S. aid was given to anti-communist
rebels in Nicaragua, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and after the
1985 repeal of the Clark Amendment, Angola.
President Reagan's use of direct force as an
instrument of U.S. foreign policy also expanded. "Often
disregarding the cautionary advice of his military
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advisors, Reagan deployed U.S. troops and advisors to
Central America (El Salvador), Grenada, and Lebanon,
authorized air strikes against Libya, and sent a powerful
naval fleet into the Persian Gulf" (Klare, 1992: 46). This
conspicuous readiness, on the part of the Reagan
Administration, to use force in overseas conflict
situations seemed designed to send two distinct messages.
The first, intended for the American people, was that the
U.S. needed to reaffirm its leadership of the Free World
and in doing so begin to put the legacy of Vietnam behind.
The second, intended for other countries, friend or foe
alike, was that the U.S. was now ready to reassert itself
in the global arena and would actively pursue its interests
whatever and wherever they may be.
In a 1984 speech at the National Press Club, Reagan's
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger articulated
guidelines under which he believed U.S. uses of direct
military forces should be conducted. Weinberger argued that
American forces should be utilized only in defense of
"vital" interests. If a situation were sufficiently
important to warrant intervention, then the troops must be
sent "with the clear intention of winning." Furthermore,
American forces should utilized in pursuit of "clearly
defined political and military objectives." Consequently,
troop deployment should be limited to the levels necessary
to achieve those objectives. Moreover, there must be "some
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reasonable assurance" of popular support for such action.
Finally, "the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be
a last resort" (Carpenter, 1992: 158).
Weinberger's guidelines governed American military
intervention during the Reagan years (even if such force
was not always used as a last resort). There is evidence
that the Bush Administration was equally mindful of these
caveats on the use of American military power (Carpenter,
1992: 158). However, these principles were developed at the
height of what some referred to as "Cold War II," the
renewed hostility between the superpowers that followed the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Rooted as they were in an
assumption that potential adversaries would have the
backing of a hostile superpower, it remained to be seen
whether these principles would retain their relevance in
the post-Cold War era. As a practical matter, the Cold War
ended with the success of the "Velvet Revolutions" that
swept Eastern Europe in 1989. With the 1991 demise of the
USSR, the United States became more free to dedicate
greater emphasis, and resources, to the protection of its
interests in the Third World. While Secretary Weinberger's
guidelines showed considerable insight, they are still
quite general in nature. To develop specific pre-conditions
that would tend to favor the success of U.S. military
intervention is a task that, until now, has yet to be
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undertaken. The specification of such criteria is the task
of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER XII

A TYPOLOGY OF PRECONDITIONS FAVORING THE SUCCESS
OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Intervention Defined
To the practitioner of political science, the clarity
of terms is important. Words are his tools, so their
precise use is essential. The term "intervention" is one
that is particularly troublesome to pin down. Its meaning
dramatically shifts depending upon the context of use.
Eight common uses of this term in a political context may
be identified.
1. In general terms, intervention can be defined as
the involvement, by whatever means, of one state in the
domestic affairs of another state.
2. The term may also be used to denote the entry of a
previously uninvolved party into a conflict between states.
More specifically, the practice of intervention, in
this century, has added several connotations to this
elusive term, almost all of which carry the implication of
the use of armed force. Arranging them in a spectrum of
least-to-most violent, we have:^
3. Diplomatic Intervention: This idea in turn has two
variants. On the benign side, this is involvement of the
good offices of the diplomatic corps of a nation, acting as
an arbitrator or a mediator, to end a conflict e XthcjL
48
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between or within states. For example, in the 1970s, U.S.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger attempted, through
"shuttle diplomacy,11 to bring an end to the Arab-Israeli
conflict. In 1994 he again attempted to use his stature as
a respected diplomat to end violent conflict between
loyalists of the African National Congress (ANC) and
Inkatha Party in South Africa in the period immediately
before the post-apartheid founding elections in April 1994.
However, diplomatic intervention is not without its
more aggressive, or intrusive, side. In an effort to get
China to adhere to humane standards of human rights
conduct, the Clinton Administration dispatched Secretary of
State Warren Christopher to Beijing. Armed with evidence
that much of china's exports to the U.S. were manufactured
with forced labor, Christopher warned Communist authorities
that continued flouting of human rights would result in the
loss of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status with the
United States.

Furthermore, Clinton also endeavored to use

diplomatic means to get North Korea to curtail its nuclear
program, specifically to abandon further nuclear weapons
development, as envisioned by the terms of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty.
4.

Economic Intervention: this entails the use of

economic tools (often called "sanctions") by one state to
compel a change in the position and/or actions of another
state (Elliott, 1992: 97). A prominent example of this was
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President Carter's 1980 imposition of an embargo on grain
exports to the Soviet Union. Undertaken in reaction to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter sought to use the
embargo as a means of showing that "business as usual"
could not be conducted with Moscow under the circumstances
at that time. The policy was undercut when Australia,
Argentina, and France opportunistically filled in the void
created by the U.S. abandonment of its market share.
In 1986 economic sanctions were also placed by the
U.S. Congress on South Africa in an effort to persuade
Pretoria to dismantle its apartheid laws. The Clinton
Administration also placed minor economic sanctions on
Taiwan in order to encourage Taipei to restrain its
citizens who were trafficking in poached tigers and other
endangered species. This is believed to be the first time
that such measures have been used to advance purely
conservationist goals.
5.

Covert Intervention: this connotation is primarily,

but not limited to, the use by a state of its intelligence
agents to undermine the government of, or change the
political situation in, another country (Ransom, 1992:
113). Considerable evidence exists that in 1973, President
Nixon ordered the CIA to destabilize, and then assist the
Chilean military to overthrow, the Marxist-oriented, yet
democratically elected government of President Salvadore
Allende. According to some reports, another instance
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occurred when the CIA had printed, and distributed, a large
quantity of counterfeit Iraqi currency shortly before the
1991 Gulf War, so as to destabilize Iraq's economy and to
stir up popular discontent against dictator Saddam Hussein.
6. Coercive Diplomacy: this is more fully explored in
Chapter I, but for our purposes here, it may be defined as
the credible threat (perhaps underscored by the pre
positioning of military units) to utilize force for the
purpose of deterring an adversary from a course of action
(deterrence), or to undo an action already undertaken
(compellence). As Schelling notes: "coercion depends more
on the threat of what is yet to come than on damage already
done" (Schelling, 1966: 172).
This was the purpose behind 1990-1991's "Operation
Desert Shield."

Following Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait,

the U.S. and its coalition allies deployed their forces in
a defensive perimeter which paralleled the Iraq-Saudi
Arabia frontier. This operation was an effort to deter Iraq
from advancing farther into the Persian Gulf oil fields; it
was also intended to pre-position the forces and supplies
necessary to dislodge Iraqi occupation forces from Kuwait,
in the event that diplomacy and sanctions failed to do so
(as proved to be the case early in 1991).
7. Low Intensity Warfare: this is also referred to as
"coercion by proxy." It often involves, but need not be
limited to, the utilization by an outside power of a pre
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existing rebel group within a country in order to attain
the redress of grievances against, and/or the overthrow of,
the incumbent government (Antizzo, 1992: 11).
Fearful of the geostrategic implications of the 1979
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, under President Carter the
United States undertook to utilize the CIA to aid covertly
(and later overtly) Islamic rebels who were fighting both
the army of the Communist government, as well as Soviet
occupation forces (Schraeder, 1992: 137-8). Although they
did not necessarily share the same ultimate goals (the
rebels sought the overthrow of the communist government,
while the U.S. simply desired the withdrawal of Soviet
troops that were so close to the Persian Gulf and to allies
in the region, such as Pakistan) the U.S. and the rebels
enjoyed a nearly decade-long marriage of convenience,
wherein Washington supplied the arms and money and the
rebels supplied the manpower.

The 1989 withdrawal of

Soviet forces, resulting in the political mellowing of the
Kabul regime, fulfilled U.S. objectives, and aid to rebel
forces was terminated shortly afterward.
This pattern was repeated in Angola, Nicaragua, and
Cambodia (Schraeder, 1992: 141-149), where officials in
Washington thought that they could utilize pre-existing
rebel groups both to press claims against hostile
governments and simultaneously to counter Soviet abilities
to protect its clients.
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8.

Direct Military Intervention: this has evolved

into three distinct subgroupings: active, reactive, and
peacekeeping/order-restoring operations.
Active —

This occurs when forces of an outside

power intervene directly and forcefully in order to
seek to engage and defeat enemy forces. This was the
case when the United States intervened openly, and in
some cases massively, in Korea, Vietnam, Panama, and
the Persian Gulf area.
Reactive —

In this form of military

intervention, forces of the intervening power
establish a security zone within another state's
territory and seek to enforce its rules upon the
"host" country within the zone. An example was the
"no-fly" zones that the United Nations established in
Iraq and that NATO tried to enforce in Bosnia. It is
also illustrated by the security zone that Israel
established earlier in south Lebanon.
Peacekeeping/Restore Order —

This occurs when

forces of the intervening power (or powers) get
involved

out of largely, but not exclusively,

humanitarian concerns. Such operations often involve
separating belligerents, distributing food and medical
supplies to civilians, establishing "zones of safety,"
and building new, viable structures of state. Examples
of this include American and/or UN interventionism in
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Somalia (1992-1994), Lebanon (1983), and the efforts
to restore democracy to Haiti (1994) (Klare, 1992:
53) .
As this review has demonstrated, a great variety of
shades of meaning for the term intervention exists. For the
purposes of this study, we will be concerned specifically
with direct military intervention (#8 above), dealing with
any other forms only as they relate to the cases being
utilized.
This limitation of our discussion to direct military
intervention seems justified for a number of reasons, not
the least of which are personal interest and a desire to
fit this work into a single volume. First and foremost,
with the collapse of the Soviet Union there seems to be an
increased reliance by the United States on the use of such
direct force. Nowhere was this renewed enthusiasm for
military options more evident than in the adoption of an
uncharacteristically hawkish stance with regard to Haiti by
the uniformly liberal Congressional Black Caucus.
Second, while other forms of intervention (e.g. economic
sanctions) still have their place in the American arsenal
of options, it is evident that an increasing number of
dictators will respond only to military force. Whether this
is due to their ability to insulate themselves from the
effects of such sanctions, their fear that backing down in
a confrontation with the U.S. would result in a loss of
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face that would threaten their hold on power, simple
callousness, or possibly failure to comprehend their own
interests, tyrants in the post-Cold War era seem
increasingly intransigent and unresponsive to lesser forms
of intervention.
Finally, as noted earlier, there is a dearth of
literature identifying and examining those preconditions
favoring the success of direct military intervention.
Because of the advance preparations, as well as the heavy
investment of both military personnel and material,
required to undertake such operations, greater attention to
the preconditions for successful intervention is a matter
of great urgency and priority.
Hypothesis and Expected Findings
It is difficult to believe that there necessarily
exists any "science of war" that yields rules which, when
followed, automatically guarantee victory. However, when
experience with intervention is carefully examined
regularities emerge. The record of interventions carried
out in recent history demonstrates that, when certain
preconditions are present, military operations quite
clearly tend to be more successful than when such
preconditions are absent.
The demise of the Cold War was an important turning
point, not only in East-West relations, but no less because
of its implications for the pre-conditions that will affect
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future intervention by the United States in the Third
World. On one hand, Washington is now substantially less
fearful that its direct intervention will be met by
counter-intervention by another superpower. The chance that
global war between great powers would result is no longer a
risk. On the other hand, now freed of a need to respond to
all Third World crises reflexively lest Moscow gain
additional strategic footholds, the United States now has
the luxury to be more selective in where it chooses to
intervene. However, does the absence of a great power rival
with a comparable ability to project force abroad subject
Washington to greater temptation to give in to future
opportunities for intervention? This question is especially
pertinent because for the foreseeable future there will be
no other power able, or willing to oppose American action.
Considering the United States' post-Cold War military
involvement in places as varied as Panama, Iraq, Bosnia,
Somalia, and Haiti, a preliminary answer would seem to be
"yes" (Carpenter, 1992: 157-8).
Clearly, there is a greater potential for American
intervention in the post-Cold War era. This potential,
taken with the aforementioned circumstances, seems to
differentiate the nature of such military involvement today
from earlier, pre-1989 forms. Therefore, the specification
of pre-conditions favoring the success of interventionist
behavior acquires even greater importance. With this in
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mind, it may be anticipated that this study will find that
the following existing preconditions tend to be associated
with successful interventions in the post-Cold War era:
1. A clear and attainable goal of U.S. policy exists.
This can be defined,

for purposes of this study, as a

goal which is clearly and specifically articulated by
political and/or military leaders (e.g.to capture General
Noriega, to liberate Kuwait). The goal has clear criteria
which, once met, signals the time for the termination of
interventionist action. By "attainable," it is meant that
the goal does not require indefinite or ongoing military
action for its fulfillment. For example a major factor
leading to the failure of American policy in Vietnam was
the seeming inability of the Johnson and Nixon
Administrations to articulate such goals, even as the war
proceeded. The questions asked both on Capital Hill and
within the general public were "Why are we there?," and
"What are our sons dying for?" Such questions were never
satisfactorily answered by executive policymakers.
An ancillary concern is whether the political
leadership of the intervening power has established an
"exit policy," based on such proclaimed goals. It has
become clear that the public is weary of open-ended
commitments to be assumed by their sons and daughters
abroad. In order to placate and hold the support of public
opinion, silence congressional and media critics, and
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maintain his own clarity of purpose, the president and his
advisors at some point need to formulate a timetable for
the withdrawal of American forces. This schedule can be
derived either by chronology (e.g."the troops will be home
by Christmas") or by circumstances (e.g. "the troops will
be withdrawn when order is restored").
2. The intervention is not a peacekeeping operation.
Peacekeeping operations, by their very nature, require
an ongoing, open-ended commitment of U.S. forces.

This

reality has the potential of becoming a quagmire from which
the United States is unable to extricate itself. To a
significant degree, this danger derives from "peace
keeping's" overall lack of strategic objectives, as well as
nebulously defined goals which largely defy measurement or
exactitude. In general terms, how does one know when
"peace" has actually been achieved within a particular
society, meaning that military intervention is no longer
needed? More to the point perhaps, in volatile and
conflict-prone societies such as Lebanon, Iraq, and Haiti,
how does one know what "peace" really is?
Furthermore, experience has shown that in order to be
successful, peacekeeping operations require tremendous
restraint. For example, on several occasions American
troops used for such purposes have either been too lightly
armed or worse, not armed at all. The latter was the case
in Lebanon (1983), for example, when U.S. forces were
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issued guns but not allowed to load them. Their lightly
defended compound/barracks at the Beirut airport made the
Marines stationed there "sitting ducks." This point was
underscored when the barracks were car-bombed by an Islamic
fundamentalist faction. Shortly afterwards, U.S. forces
were recalled and the Reagan Administration was taken
strongly to task by Congress for the misadventure.
3. The intervention is not a b«manjfcarian mission within a
war zone.
Despite the most noble of intentions, humanitarian
interventionism often goes awry. For instance, in a
laudable pursuit of relieving privation in a foreign
society, an intervening nation is often confronted with a
problem that it did not originally foresee: the temptation
to deal with what it sees as the "root cause" (or causes)
of the problem. Since this "root cause" is often perceived
in the final analysis to be political, the result can be
that, deliberately or undeliberately, the intervening power
takes sides in what is essentially a tribal or civil war.
This development, in turn, clearly undercuts the
intervening power’s credibility as a "disinterested"
humanitarian provider of relief, as well as dragging it
deeper into a conflict that it neither wanted nor was
prepared to resolve.
A valid question to be asked of operations of this
kind is: "How do such humanitarian operations advance the
intervener’s interests?" What advantage accrues to the
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nation engaged in interventionism, making it worth the risk
of lives and the expense involved? Are not private relief
agencies sometimes better suited to provide such relief?
Alternatively, if relief distribution is being interfered
with by marauding paramilitary units within the society,
would the problem not be better dealt with by relying on
military protection provided by neighboring states more
directly threatened by the instability in the target
nation? Finally, how is the success, and thus point of
termination, of such operations determined?
4. United States forces are not subject to a multilateral
authority.
Great powers in general, and the United States in
particular, are fearful of being labeled "imperialist,"
regardless of the lack of substance of the charge.
Frequently, unilateral military action seems in the eyes of
critics to be de facto proof of such imperialistic intent.
Therefore, for its part the United States often seems to
seek multilateral backing for its large military
interventions as a means of acquiring a "fig leaf." That is
to say that there is often an attempt to rely on or exploit
multilateralism as a means of the legitimating, and
deflecting criticism from, the use of military force by
great powers. This was clearly the case, for example, in
1950, when the United States sought, and was granted,
United Nations sponsorship for its intervention in Korea.
Essentially, the conflict was a United States war effort
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(over 90% of the troops were American, with the whole
operation always under a U.S. commander) under the UN flag,
and this fact was satisfactory to Washington.
Yet over the last forty years, the UN has become
increasingly unresponsive to American wishes. By the end of
the Cold War the UN was more able to assert its own wishes
and goals when giving its authority in behalf of such
military enterprises. While U.S. commanders might still
enjoy some considerable discretion on the battlefield, the
scope of such discretion has gradually been eroded. A
cursory glance at such operations seems to indicate that in
recent years the UN Secretary General has become
increasingly involved in the micro-management of conflicts
that involve UN forces. For example, it had been argued by
members of the Senate that UN Secretary General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, by declaring Somali General Aidid a war
criminal and authorizing his capture by UN forces, had
effectively "hijacked" U.S. foreign policy by forcing
Washington to take sides in the fighting among Somali war
lords and factions. .Because of UN mandates, American forces
engaged in interventionism may be effectively beyond the
control of their Commander-in-Chief. The result is that
such mandates for the use of force, even if initiated by
Washington, may be exploited by the United Nations as a way
of securing maximum American participation, with a minimum
of U.S. control over the operation once it has commenced.
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Because they are subject to the scrutiny and approval
of the member nations, United Nations "use of force"
authorizations may present additional problems.
Specifically, the mandate may be so narrow that the
military action taken treats only the symptoms, and not the
cause, of the society's problems. As a result, Washington
may find that it has its "hands tied" politically: it is
unable to take the action that its leaders deem necessary
to resolve fully the situation that led to intervention
initially. During the 1991 Gulf War, for example, U.S. Army
General Norman Schwartzkopf believed that his forces could
have marched on Baghdad virtually unopposed and unseated
the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. However, President
George Bush stopped military action early in the ground
campaign, justifying his action by citing the U.N.
resolution authorizing the use of force. Bush noted that
the mandate was for the sole purpose of expelling Iraqi
occupation forces from Kuwait and nothing more.
Congressman Tom Lantos (D-Calif.) warned that because this
premature termination of the war allowed Hussein to retain
power and prevented America from rooting out and destroying
all Scud missiles and centers for the development (and
stockpiles) of chemical and biological weapons, it was a
virtual certainty that the United States will have to
return to "finish the job" in the near future.
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5. Force is used to defend tangible assets or other vital
national interests.
A definition of "vital national interests," as used
in our analysis is required. For our purposes it can be
conceived as any asset (e.g. oil), place (e.g. Europe) or
principle (e.g. the freedom of navigation in international
waters) the unavailability of which places a state at a
strategic or severe diplomatic disadvantage, if not
directly threatening its independence and/or national
security.

The most enduring legacy of the Vietnam War is

the universally held belief among Americans that as a
nation they are no longer willing to sacrifice lives
lightly for goals of dubious value (such as "nationbuilding"). Today, however, there is little debate that the
defense of some assets, of which oil is one of the most
important, is worth the commitment of forces, when
necessary.
It is clear that the defense of important assets such
as oil or strategic "choke points," such as the Panama
Canal, the North Atlantic sea lanes and the Straits of
Hormuz, is a priority for the U.S. The importance of such
assets to the national health, and perhaps to the very
survival of the nation, acts as not only a powerful
motivator to action, but also presents clear goals for
policy makers and military planners.
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6. The political situation in the target country is not one
of civil var.
This pre-condition requires answers for several
questions that speak to the issue of regime legitimacy.
Among these questions are: Is the government that the U.S.
proposes to support viable? Does it have the support of the
population that it purports to govern, and if so, are the
people willing to fight to defend it? Is U.S. support
necessary to turn the tide of battle decisively in the
favor of the government it is supporting or is such
intervention merely a prop which is delaying the inevitable
collapse of the client regime?

If the U.S. were to enter

the conflict, would it, during battle, be able to
distinguish "hostiles" from "friendlies?" Would American
soldiers be able to distinguish successfully combatants
from non-combatants, or would the line between them be
obscured, as was often the case in Vietnam? If most of the
answers to these questions are in the negative, then this
is probably the type of conflict that is likely to become a
quagmire from which Washington will find it increasingly
difficult to extricate American forces.
7. There is a strong probability of public support for
intervention, or at least indifference.
As was demonstrated during the Vietnam War, basic
differences within public opinion may lead to official
indecision

regarding the war effort. Attempts to rectify

this situation by efforts to balance interests (e.g.
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purchasing support for Vietnam with Great Society programs)
may lead to the war effort's being held hostage to domestic
concerns. Furthermore, the emergence of significant protest
may present two additional problems. First, it may convey
to the opponent that there is sufficient discontent within
American public opinion so that threats made by the
president need not be taken seriously. Second, there is the
real chance that the opponent may seek to exploit the
domestic situation in the United States for its own
propaganda purposes.
In an earlier era, the absence of overt opposition to
interventionism could be interpreted by the chief executive
as a kind of tacit support for the action, on the theory
that: "if no one is complaining, then it must be all
right". However, in this newer age of electronic media,
especially with such sophisticated news organizations as
CNN that broadcast 24 hours a day, a commitment of direct
U.S. force on any scale is most unlikely to escape media,
and thus public, scrutiny as might have been the case
earlier.
Even today, however, it may be possible to present the
public with a fait accompli, especially if the
interventionist operation is narrow or limited in scope.
For example, in the case of the invasion of Grenada in
1983, the operation was well underway before the public
ever became aware of it. The mission was complete before
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any organized opposition could challenge it, and protest
was largely limited to a handful of college campuses.
Similarly, it is not inconceivable that the president can
bypass congressional opposition by commencing an operation
while Congress is in recess.
Nevertheless, as a general rule, it may be impossible
to overestimate the power of the media in shaping public
opinion either for, or against, particular interventions.
Because of the emotional power of the images beamed into
living rooms across the country, television especially can
be decisive in determining whether intervention will be
pursued as a policy option. On the one hand, television may
present pictures so horrifying and/or pathos-evoking that
the state is dragged by public outcry into a conflict that
leaders wish to avoid. Comparable considerations led to
pressure brought to bear on Washington to get involved in
Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti.
On the other hand, stories and/or pictures of
extensive carnage (especially if it comes from a "least
developed" country) may so horrify the public that
intervention is made more difficult. The people may become
afraid of getting deeply involved in a situation that may
become a morass for intervening forces. Despite stories and
pictures of the genocide taking place in Cambodia after the
communist victory there in 1975, for example, the American
people were loath to do anything about it. This also
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appeared to be the case with public opinion toward possible
involvement in Rwanda and Liberia.
8. The proposed intervention has the support of the
military leadership.
Support of the military, as usually manifested by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, is a necessity for two reasons.
First, it generally signals that the military has been able
to formulate several possible military options, capable of
bringing military power to bear in pursuit of the proposed
objective. Second, the military is generally much more
cautious in urging the president to use force than critics
of the military establishment often imagine.

Such an

endorsement would, therefore, seem to indicate a strong
probability of success, as assessed by those who study and
engage in warfare as a career.
9. A willingness exists to support forces in the field.
During the debate in Congress over the authorization
of the use of force, which resulted in the 1991 de facto
declaration of war on Iraq, opponents of the measure went
to great pains to emphasize that once hostilities
commenced, they would vote to see to it that American
forces were given everything needed in order to ensure a
rapid and complete victory. This position may have been due
to sensitivity in Congress over charges that it was the
"politicians” who lost the war in Vietnam. Clearly,
throughout the Persian Gulf crisis, there was a desire by
congressional liberals to avoid being seen as somewhat less
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than patriotic in a time of crisis.

However, most members

of Congress contended that such a position was not taken
for reasons of political opportunism, but stemmed from the
need to convince the enemy that America was unified and
that legislative support for President Bush's policy was
not to be underestimated.
Such a show of unity is important not only to preserve
high morale both among the troops and the general public,
but it is also an influential propaganda tool that may
unnerve actual or potential adversaries.
On a more practical level, if they are to accomplish
their mission, the armed forces must be adequately
supplied. There must, therefore, be a commitment to provide
the troops with what they need when they need it. As one
illustration of the principle, in Somalia, Secretary of
Defense Aspin's rebuff of a field commander's request for
additional armor seems to have lead to the military defeat
of a company of U.S. Army troops. This defeat appears to
have emboldened the Somalian warlords as well as prompting
a movement at home seeking the sudden recall of U.S. forces
similar to the public outcry that followed the bombing of
the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983.
10. A recognition must exist that air strikes alone mav not
be sufficient to accomplish the policy goals
established.
Since the 1980s, the military option of choice has
normally been the use of air strikes, usually carried out
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by carrier based F-14s. This is largely because such
missions require a minimum of preparation and entail a low
level of risk. Due to the incredible accuracy and
destructive power that "smart bombs" and cruise missiles
possess, thus revolutionizing conventional air warfare, the
term "surgical air strike" has acquired renewed relevance
in the layman's military lexicon. Video presentations of
the apparent success of such weapons, especially in the
Persian Gulf War, seems to have solidified the appeal of
air strikes among the military options available to
political leaders. A recent example of this appears to be
the rapidity with which the Clinton Administration chose to
publicly threaten

Bosnian Serb forces with NATO air

strikes if they fired on U.N. peacekeeping forces.
However, it should be clearly evident that air power
is not without its limitations. First, often certain
targets, such as Scud missiles in Iraq or artillery pieces
in Bosnia, are highly mobile. Given the propensity of
American leaders to give warnings before bombings, often
the weapons are moved out of harm's way before they are in
danger. Any personnel or material left behind either can be
camouflaged so as to avoid detection or placed into
hardened bunkers so as to heighten their survivability.
Iraq also made skillful use of decoy Scud launchers so as
to divert U.S., British, and French bombers from their true
targets.
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Second, often the situation on the ground requires the
introduction of ground forces in order to "clear and claim"
a disputed area or asset. For example, even after a
withering two- month air war, it still was necessary to
launch a ground offensive to drive the Iraqi occupation
army from Kuwait in 1991.
Third, air strikes are not without propaganda value to
the enemy. At the least, because of their destructiveness
(often against civilians) they can be used to rally support
around an otherwise unpopular ruler and thus harden the
enemy's resolve to resist. They can also be used in an
attempt to rally international public opinion against the
intervening power. Perhaps the most famous example of this
was the Iraqi protest of the bombing of a "baby formula"
plant in Baghdad by U.S. forces during the 1991 conflict.
Once American armed forces have been committed abroad,
certain other requirements must be met if they are to
accomplish their mission:
11. A willingness exists to utilize ground forces if
necessary.
Since this issue is largely discussed above, let it
suffice to say here that to preclude specifically the use
of ground forces before an operation begins is to give what
may be a decisive advantage to the enemy. The enemy knows
at once that there are limits upon how much force the
intervening power is willing to commit in order to
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accomplish its objectives; and thus, the opponent can
tailor his strategy of resistance accordingly.
12. The war is limited in geographic scope.
Most of the armed conflicts being fought today can be
described as civil warfare. If such hatred-fuelled
conflicts can be said to have a "good" side, it is that
they rarely seem to become broadened in scope by "spillingover" international boundaries.
Greater care must be taken if the intervention being
considered is international, that is between states (as
opposed to civil war). If, for example, the region
concerned is perceived by other major powers to be
strategically important, the chance of counter
intervention, either by neighboring countries or other
outside powers, will almost certainly rise dramatically.
This prospect was a fear leading to the Carter Doctrine
(1980) which was a clear warning to the USSR that if it
attempted to move beyond Afghanistan into the Persian Gulf
area, Washington would consider this a direct threat to its
vital interests.
Finally, prudence must be used in attempting to
intervene in nations bordering other great powers. The
nature, scope, and intensity of the Korean War changed
dramatically from Washington's original expectations when
the People's Republic of China believed its vital interests
were jeopardized and counter-intervened.
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13. There is a willingness by officials in Washington to
c o m m i t adequate forces to accomplish the e s t a b l i s h e d
goals.
This speaks to the scale of the intervention. Are the
number and nature of the troops being utilized sufficient
to complete the job asked of them in a timely manner? Much
of the discussion concerning the point was covered in
points 9, 10, and 11 above.
14. Theater commanders must be allowed input into decisions
related to the conduct of the war effort.
It would seem clear that no one is more intimately
acquainted with the war theater conditions or with the
progress of the fighting than the field commander. His
advice should be sought before final decisions are made on
how to conduct the war. The requirement for the theater
commander's input is not tantamount to turning over the
formulation of national policy to military leaders; their
suggestions are not necessarily binding on the political
leadership. Rather, this principle recognizes that
experienced military leaders will have important insights
concerning how most effectively to pursue the mission. Such
a unique perspective may not otherwise be available either
to civilian leaders, who may have had no military
experience or to White House military advisors who are
removed from the arena of conflict and unfamiliar with
conditions there.
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15. The theater commawdftr must be allowed discretion in the
pursuit of the war effort.
In effect, this criterion is a plea for liberal rules
of engagement. Although civilian political leaders must
remain in ultimate control of the military, there is
sometimes a real danger that civilian officials will become
prone to "micro-manage" the war effort. The resultant
effect is to tie the hands of field commanders, who often
must be in constant contact with Washington before
returning fire. Obviously, it is not in the national
interest to allow over-zealous or excessively nervous
commanders to engage in hostilities unilaterally. However,
when such hostilities have already commenced, and a certain
level of violence is considered acceptable by the political
leaders, it would seem to be in the interest of all
concerned to allow the theater commander to carry out his
assigned mission with a minimum of interference by civilian
leaders in the actual prosecution of the war. The evidence
provided by the war effort in Vietnam, the denial of
permission by the Reagan White House allowing the Marines
in Lebanon to carry loaded weapons, and the extensive
political involvement by civilian officials in military
operations in Somalia all provide prima facie evidence of
the need to permit field commanders flexible rules of
engagement with the enemy.
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Format/Research Questions
In order to most completely and expeditiously examine
the case studies, it is necessary to utilize an appropriate
common format. Accordingly, a common framework consisting
of fifteen research questions will be applied to the case
studies. Each of these questions will serve as the heading
for a principal section within each case study. These basic
questions are as follows:
1. What were prevailing conditions initially within
the "target” country?
2. Why did the United States choose to get involved?
3. What were the intended results, or objectives, of
American intervention?
4. What was the nature of the operation? (i.e.
peacekeeping, humanitarian, nation-building)
5. What was the American domestic political climate
(public and congressional mood about the particular
case) during this crisis?
6. What was the position of the military leadership
regarding the operation? (i.e. the Joint Chiefs of
Staff)
7. How was the operation actually carried out?
(i.e. unilaterally, multi-laterally, air strikes
only, ground warfare, naval blockade, peacekeeping
duties only)
8. What types and quantities of forces were used?
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9. Was the conflict limited in scope? (no spillover
into the territory of other states)
10. What was the nature of the theater commander's
power and influence? (was his advice sought and/or
heeded? How much discretion was he given on the
battlefield)
11. Was there an "exit strategy?" If so, was it
adhered to?
12. What were the immediate results of the
intervention?
13. What was the long-term situation? (perhaps oneyear later or more)
14. What elements about this case are unique?
15. Was the intervention "successful?" (As well as a
discussion on how success or failure is determined
in each case)
The answers gleaned from these questions can then be
compared against the hypothesized pre-conditions listed
above. In doing so, the validity of the typology can be
assessed, and if needed, alternatives can then be
suggested.
Justification of Cases Selected
As noted in Chapter One, the cases selected for
detailed consideration are, in chronological order, Panama
(Operation "Just Cause," 1989), Iraq (Operation "Desert
Shield/Desert Storm," 1990-91), and Somalia (Operation
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"Restore Hope," 1992-94). These three have prima facie
similarities which seem to make them the best cases
available for this study.
First, they all involved the commitment of U.S. forces
in armed conflict. Second, all three have occurred in the
period since the 1989 "velvet revolutions," which
effectively destroyed communism and ended the antagonisms
that marked the cold war. Third, unlike past interventions,
no ideological (East-West conflict) justification was given
for why intervention was necessary.
A fourth, and related point of commonality is that in
none of these cases was there any real fear that entry into
the conflict would prompt counter-intervention by any other
great powers (i.e. the Soviet Union). Fifth, official
justifications for using armed force seemed to center on
humanitarian impulses. Perhaps it was a desire to end human
suffering (Somalia), or punish "baby-killing, incubator
smashing sadists" (Iraq), or to bring to justice a "key
figure" in the international narcotics trade (Panama).
Sixth, and finally, implicit in the objectives of each
operation seems to have been a neo-Wilsonian concern with
the development of a more stable and democratic system
within the "target" country, which would, in turn, lead to
the development of a "New World Order" of peacefully
coexisting democratic states.
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CHAPTER IV

Operation Just Causes The Invasion nf

pmbmm

Introduction
At 1:00 A.M. on December 20, 1989, six United States
military task forces went into action in Panama, seizing
control of the country within hours. This invasion of
Panama was the culmination of nearly three years of decay
in the relations between the two states, ones that
traditionally enjoyed a close, if not always smooth,
relationship. This action was, at the time, the United
States' largest military undertaking since Vietnam.
However, it also marked two equally, if not more notable,
"firsts." It was the first time that a drug indictment
against a foreign head of state had been used (at least
partially) as a justification for deposing that leader. It
was also the first use of American direct military
intervention in the post-Cold War era.
1. What were the prevailing conditions initially within the
"target" country?
With the death of long-time Panamanian dictator
General Omar Torrijos in 1981, the way was paved for the
rise to power of a new strongman: Manuel Antonio Noriega.
Noriega, who in 1983 assumed the command of the Panama's
armed forces, the National Guard, was able to use his
position to secure his control over the nation.
77
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The Reagan administration believed that U.S.Panamanian relations would continue to be cordial. This
assessment seemed to be well-founded, especially
considering the assistance that Noriega gave to "various
U.S. covert initiatives in the region, including the Contra
war, training Central American forces in Panama, and
Panamanian cooperation in Israeli covert operations"
(Scranton, 1992: 347). To Washington, Noriega seemed to be
a frontline soldier in the Reagan administration's war on
drugs by "providing assistance in disrupting drug
trafficking operations" which were then using Panama as a
conduit to the American market (Drohan, 1992: 25). For the
United States, Panama also proved to be "a strategic asset
in its interventionist policies in Central America. This
process was facilitated by Noriega's firm control over the
expanded and renamed Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF)"
(Scranton, 1992: 347).
During the mid-1980s, however, Noriega became an
increasingly greater source of embarrassment for
Washington, one from which the Reagan administration was
eager to distance itself. "Opposition to Noriega among U.S.
officials had been growing since 1985, when Panamanian
activist Hugo Spadafora was brutally murdered by the PDF
and President Nicolas Ardito Barletta, who antagonized the
PDF by calling for an investigation of the murder, was
removed. Of greater concern to the Reagan administration,
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however, was a growing scandal surrounding Noriega's
involvement in the Iran-Contra affair, particularly
Panama's central role in international narcotics
trafficking and money laundering" (Scranton, 1992: 347).
The Reagan administration quickly came to the
realization that it was time for Noriega to go. Starting in
1987, Washington attempted to use quiet diplomacy in order
to persuade Noriega to depart gracefully. Using officials
perceived by the Panamanian dictator to be "friendly,"
American emissaries met with Noriega, urging him to
continue Torrijos' transition to democracy. Ultimately,
these efforts proved to be fruitless. The reason for
failure, it seemed, was that Washington wanted to preserve
Panamanian stability; it was not willing to reinforce
diplomacy with the coercive measures that might have forced
Noriega to come to the conclusion that he had no choice but
to depart (Scranton, 1992: 349).
On February 4, 1988, U.S. federal grand juries in
Miami and Tampa, investigating Noriega's activities issued
two indictments against him and 14 others for involvement
in drug trafficking (Keesing's, April 1988: 35817). Noriega
was accused of turning his country into a "vast criminal
enterprise." Specifically, he was charged with helping a
Colombian drug cartel to ship more than 4,000 lbs. of
cocaine into the United States via Panama. Furthermore, he
was accused of conspiring to import over $1,000,000 worth
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of marijuana into the USA. For his efforts, Noriega was
said to have received $4,600,000. If convicted, the general
faced a possible 145 years in an American federal prison
(Keesing's, April 1988: 35817). At the time, however,
prosecution was highly unlikely because U.S. law
enforcement agencies did not have any legal authority to
take him into custody unless he was within United States
jurisdiction.
Another concern for Washington was the direction of
Panama's foreign policy. As United States-Panamanian
relations deteriorated, Noriega drew closer to the
communist regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua, states which were
loath to align themselves with the United States on any
issue. American animosity was increased by reports that
Panama was seeking closer ties with

Libya and the Soviet

Union (Keesing's, April 1988: 35817).
The Crisis Escalates
In response to the criminal allegations and Panama's
increasing diplomatic isolation, on February 25, 1988
Panamanian President Eric Arturo Delvalle dismissed General
Noriega as PDF commander. In a televised address, Delvalle
delivered the decree authorizing the firing as well as
announcing his replacement by Chief of Staff of the Defense
Forces Col. Marcos Justines.

(Keesing's, April 1988:

35818). Noriega's Legislative Assembly promptly responded
by dismissing the President. President Delvalle promptly
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went into hiding and vowed to fight to return to office.
The Reagan administration made it clear that it considered
Delvalle still to be the legitimate leader.
On March 1, 1988, the Reagan administration tightened
the noose on Noriega when it "decertified" Panama under a
1986 law requiring the executive to "certify" the countries
cooperating with the United States against drug trafficking
and to impose sanctions against those that do not. The U.S.
then acted to block loans to Panama by international
organizations.
The pressure was intensified when, on March 11,
Washington ordered the suspension of all U.S. payments to
Panama, including $7,000,000 in Panama Canal fees due that
month, as well as preferential trade arrangements with
Panama (Keesing's, April 1988: 35818). The White House
announced that it would direct the placement of all U.S.
payments due to Panama into an escrow account controlled by
President Delvalle (Watson and Tsouras, 1991: 203).
Throughout 1988, continuing widespread Panamanian
domestic opposition and American economic sanctions failed
to dislodge Noriega from power. In March, faced with a
general strike, Noriega was able to use the coercive means
at his disposal to break the action and jail its leaders.
Having rallied some support in his country and
throughout Latin America, Noriega felt emboldened to begin
taunting the United States. On June 16, 1988, a U.S. Army
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private and his 18-year-old wife were assaulted by a
probable member of the PDF. The American soldier was beaten
and locked in his car's trunk while his wife was raped.
This was to be only one of several such incidents in the
increasing war of nerves between Washington and Noriega
(Watson and Tsouras, 1991: 204).
By April, 1988, American concern about the situation
in Panama led Washington to send an extra 1,500 troops to
supplement the 10,000 already stationed there. Despite this
enhanced presence, Noriega managed to resist American
pressure. In May 1988, negotiations between Washington and
Noriega collapsed, leaving the General in control
(Keesing's, October 1988: 36215).
The 1989 change of administration in the United States
brought no change in U.S. policy. Almost immediately,
President Bush authorized funds ($10 million) for covert
aid to encourage a possible coup by PDF members tiring of
Noriega and his increasingly paranoid behavior. In
maintaining continuity with his predecessor, Mr. Bush
refused to re-certify Panama as "cooperating fully" with
American anti-drug efforts, as well as renewing all of the
existing economic sanctions imposed by the United States on
Panama (Watson and Tsouras, 1991: 205).
The 1989 Elections
Under escalating international pressure, as well as
ever-increasing political isolation, Noriega consented to
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holding general election on May 7, 1989. An international
team of election observers, led by former United States
President Jimmy Carter, was on hand to make sure that the
elections were fairly conducted. On election day, 90
percent of those Panamanians eligible to vote did so
(Keesing's, Kay 1989: 56645).
Exit polls taken forecast a 3-to-l margin of victory
for the opposition over Noriega's hand-picked candidates
(New York Times. May 5, 1989: article by Lindsay Gruson).
However, when the votes were being counted, about 4,3 00
voting tally sheets, certified by both the government and
the opposition, were removed, "sometimes at gunpoint, and
substituted with faked tally sheets" (Keesing's, May 1989:
36645). One observer noted that Noriega never considered
the prospect that people would "vote against him in such
numbers" (Keesing's, May 1989: 36645).
President Carter was quick to denounce the fraud.
Carter told the international press: "The Government is
taking the election by fraud. It's robbing the people of
Panama of their legitimate rights" (New York Times. May 5,
1989, article by Lindsay Gruson).
Guillermo Endara, the opposition candidate for
President, declared himself president-elect on May 9 and
appealed to the international community for recognition. At
a rally on May 10, Endara and his two vice-presidential
running mates, Guillermo "Billy" Ford and Ricardo Arias
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Calderon, were severely beaten by paramilitaries of the
pro-Noriega Dignity Battalions. Fearing for their lives,
opposition leaders went into hiding (Keesing's, May 1989:
36645).
On May 11, President Bush announced a seven-point plan
dealing with Panama. "The plan provided for co-operation
with and support for initiatives taken by Latin American
governments through the OAS (Organization of American
States) and other channels; the recall of the U.S.
ambassador from Panama, and the reduction of U.S. embassy
staff; the immediate removal of U.S. employees and
dependents to safe housing in Panama; a call to U.S.
businesses in Panama to move employees' dependents outside
Panama; the continuation in force of economic sanctions;
the assertion and enforcement of U.S. treaty rights in
Panama under the Canal Treaties; and the dispatch of 'a
brigade-size force,' described as about 2,000 troops, to
Panama to augment military forces already there with the
possibility of 'further steps in the future'"(Keesing's,
May 1989: 36645-6).
Events Accelerate
A turning point in the crisis came on June 21, 1989,
when the United States Department of Justice issued an
opinion "that granted the president legal authority to
direct the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to abduct
a fugitive residing in a foreign country for violation of
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United States law, even if the arrest was contrary to
customary international law" (Leonard, 1993: 103). Armed
with such authority, President Bush privately ordered the
Pentagon to undertake a review of existing military options
in Panama.
The Bush administration soon got an opportunity to
move against Noriega. On October 2, rebel officers within
the PDF, led by Major Moises Giroldi, attempted a coup
against the General.

Giroldi sought American help,

requesting that U.S. forces block major roads into Panama
City in order to prevent troops loyal to Noriega from
interfering with the planned coup.

In addition, the Major

appealed to the United States to provide sanctuary for his
wife and children (Leonard, 1993: 104). Although safety for
Major Giroldi*s family was granted, SOUTHCOM commander,
General Maxwell Thurman, believed the "coup" to be a trap
laid by Noriega and, consequently, recommended against
involvement with the coup plotters.
Once initiated, the coup failed miserably. The central
objective of the coup, the apprehension of Noriega, was
accomplished by the rebels, and he was held captive for
four hours (Keesing's, October 1989: 36971). They could not
agree, however, on what to do with him. Noriega was allowed
by his captors to telephone his mistress, who in turn
called for troops to rescue him. (Scranton, 1991: 190).
Troops loyal to Noriega, specifically the praetorian
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Battalion 2000, quickly responded. The rebels were
surrounded and, after several hours of fighting, they
surrendered later that morning (Keesing's, October 1989:
36971). The coup leaders were captured, tortured, and
killed (Scranton, 1992: 355).
It was later acknowledged by Secretary of Defense
Richard Cheney that American troops had blocked certain
roads for the coup plotters, as well as launched U.S.
aircraft and helicopters for possible direct U.S.
intervention. Cheney disclosed that, as the attempt came to
an end, the U.S. gave no response to a rebel request to
help defend routes to the military headquarters which they
had seized. The reason for this silence was that the rebels
had refused a demand from a U.S. officer to hand over
Noriega, preferring him to retire in Panama rather than
face charges in the United States (Keesing's, October 1989:
36971).
On October 8, Secretary of State Baker confirmed that
General Thurman had been authorized by the new Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, to seize
General Noriega if it could be done "without risking
bloodshed, significant loss of American life and without
open military involvement" (Keesing's, October 1989:
36971). Unfortunately, the coup attempt had failed before
the directive could be carried out.
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Congressional reaction to the failed coup and Baker's
disclosures was swift and furious. Democrats especially
criticized the Bush administration for its inaction and
subsequent failure to capture Noriega when the opportunity
had evidently presented itself (Leonard, 1993: 105).
Conservative and well-respected Democrats such as Senators
Sam Nunn (D-GA) and David Boren (D-OK) faulted the
administration for failing to construct contingency plans;
blaming top advisors in particular for poor decisionmaking.
Furthermore, they criticized Bush, Cheney, and others for
keeping appointments scheduled for that day rather than
focusing their attention on the unfolding events in Panama
(Scranton, 1991: 191). From the Republican side of the
aisle, scathing criticism came from Sen. Jesse Helms (RN.C.) who, in lengthy floor speeches, challenged the Bush
administration's version of the events (Scranton, 1991:
191).
The sting of the overwhelming criticism from both
parties on Capitol Hill, as well as from the press,
prompted President Bush to review all of his options,
especially military ones. General Woerner, the S0UTHC0M
commander until September 30, had been opposed to direct
military involvement. However, in light of the failed coup,
such action had renewed appeal. The administration even
reassessed the ban on the assassination of foreign leaders,
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as no policy option was left unconsidered (Scranton, 1991:
193-4).
General Thurman, SOUTHCOM's new commander, was charged
with developing a new contingency plan. The existing plan,
•'Operation Blue Spoon," was a multi-phase plan intended to
be implemented over the course of several days. Thurman and
Powell were able to compress the plans into an overnight
operation (New York Times. December 24, 1989, article by
Michael R. Gordon and Andrew Rosenthal). Bush, however,
choose not to give immediate approval.
In November and December 1989, the tension between the
two sides reached a crescendo. Panamanian authorities
harassed and provoked American personnel in Panama. For its
part, the United States ran readiness exercises in Panama
on virtually a round-the-clock basis. This was done largely
to prepare, but also served to mask a massive U.S. troop
build-up as well as the actual time of H-Hour (Crowell,
1991: 68).
On December 14, 1989, the National Assembly defiantly
declared General Noriega to be "Maximum Leader," confirming
his dictatorial status. The following day, the legislative
body issued a declaration of war on the United States, thus
intensifying the conflict (Leonard, 1993: 106).
The final straw came on December 16 when a U.S.
soldier, Lt. Robert Paz, was killed by PDF soldiers at a
roadblock. Another American soldier and his wife, both of
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whom had witnessed the incident, were arrested. While in
custody, the soldier was beaten, and his wife was sexually
intimidated (Scranton, 1991: 198-9). On December 17,
President Bush decided that "enough is enough." The order
was given to initiate the invasion (Leonard, 1993: 107).
2. Why did the United States choose to get involved?
The proximate cause of United States intervention in
Panama was the murder of U.S. Army Lt. Robert Paz by PDF
soldiers at a roadblock and the subsequent detention of an
American couple who had witnessed the killing (New York
Times, December 20, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon).
This incident was the climax of a policy of systematic
violence and psychological warfare being waged by the
Noriega dictatorship for over a year. There were, however,
several far more basic and serious interests at stake that
eventually would compel the United States to act.
First, and perhaps most importantly among these
interests, was a concern for the future security of the
Panama Canal. Despite the inability of the Canal to
accommodate the very largest of U.S. warships, its
importance to American commerce made it one of the United
States' principal commercial assets (Watson and Tsouras,
1991: 19). Consequently, there was a nagging fear among
policymakers in Washington, specifically: to whom would the
U.S. have to turn over the Canal in 2000 when the Panama
Canal Treaties mandated its return to Panama? The thoughts
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of relinquishing control either to a hostile military
dictatorship or to a state experiencing revolutionary
turmoil were equally unpalatable to the Bush administration
(Drohan, 1991: 19-22).
The second major concern was Panama's increasingly
prominent role as a center for drug trafficking and
associated money laundering activities. For years, Noriega
benefitted financially from his arrangements with Colombian
drug cartels to allow his country to serve as a transit
point for massive drug operations

(Scranton, 1991: 80) .

A third major concern was the need "to defend
democracy in Panama" (New York Times. December 21, 1989,
transcript of President Bush's press conference). It is
indeed difficult to say that real democracy, as it is
commonly understood in western societies, ever fully
existed in Panama. However, the "stolen" May 1988
elections, with their massive turnout and evidently
decisive results, showed that Panamanians were willing
finally to embark down the path to democracy in a
meaningful way. The blatant fraud during the election, and
the subsequent nullification of its results, served as both
a powerful rallying point for the democratic opposition, as
well as a powerful propaganda instrument for Washington in
its battle with Noriega for world public opinion. Noriega
gave himself an additional public relations "black eye"
when his Dignity Battalions viciously beat victorious
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opposition leaders at a post-election rally (Keesing's, May
1989: 36645). As of May 1989 there was now at least the
potential for democracy, and there finally existed
legitimate democratic leaders for Washington to support.
The political and psychological power of the image of the
United States acting to uphold democracy in Latin America
clearly provided an impetus for action.
A fourth major concern was regional security. Panama
and the United States have always enjoyed a uniquely close
relationship, mostly owing to the presence of the Canal and
the American role in Panamanian independence in 1903.
Although there was some resentment of "Yankee imperialism"
because of a long history of U.S. involvement in Panamanian
politics and the presence of a virtual American colony in
the form of the Canal Zone, most Panamanians, at least by
Latin American standards, had a favorable view of
Americans. A reservoir of good will existed among
Panamanians due to their access to employment with the
Canal Company and U.S. military installations. This good
will received a strong boost with the 1977 Panama Canal
Treaties which provided for a phased return of the Canal
and the Canal Zone to Panamanian jurisdiction.
As the crisis leading up to the invasion deepened,
United States-Panamanian relations became strained. Groping
for support, Noriega pursued an increasingly anti-American
foreign policy, which ingratiated him with the Soviet Union
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and radical Arab states like Libya. Most alarmingly,
however, was Noriega's increasingly tight embrace of fellow
Latin American tyrants Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and
Cuba's Fidel Castro (Keesing's, April 1988: 35817). By
playing his "leftist card" Noriega signalled a willingness
to shift alliances that perhaps gained him some support,
both politically and financially, in the short term
(Scranton, 1991: 15-16).
Noriega himself is largely believed to be a reason for
Bush's decision to intervene. There was a well documented
personal animus between President Bush and General Noriega.
This mutual enmity can be traced back to their common
connection with the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as
a personal meeting when the then-Vice President visited
Panama in 1983 (New York Times. December 24, 1989, article
by Maureen Dowd). During the crisis, Bush was said to have
become angry and frustrated by Noriega's intransigence in
negotiations and by the General's defiance. A source close
to the White House told the New York Times that Bush felt
that Noriega "was getting more and more abusive and that at
some point he would have to be dealt with..." (New York
Times. December 24, 1989, article by Maureen Dowd).
Noriega acted as a virtual "human security leak."
There is evidence that he used his position for profit by
allowing Panama to be used by interested parties to evade
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"the U.S. embargo on technology sales to communist nations"
(Drohan, 1991: 25).
Furthermore, the General clearly acted as a double
agent. Although he was originally considered an asset by
Washington for his support for U.S. and Israeli
intelligence operations (a fact that Bush was made aware of
during his tenure as CIA director), evidence shows that he
also spied on the United States (Drohan, 1991: 23-4). These
charges were documented in a 1985 series of articles by
Seymour Hersch in the New York Times. "He also bought arms
from Cuba and sold them to leftist guerrillas in El
Salvador" (Leonard, 1993: 98). [For a more detailed
account, see Rother, Larry, "America's Blind Eye: the U.S
for Years has Ignored Corruption in Panama," The New York
Times Magazine. May 28, 1988].
Finally, there were factors personal to President
Bush. Clearly by December 1989 the president and his
closest advisors had come to the conclusion that
negotiations had failed and that economic sanctions only
were hurting the Panamanian people. It was concluded that
all options had been exhausted and that it was impossible
to accomplish anything further without the resort to force
(New York Times. December 21, 1989, text of President
Bush's speech).
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3. What were the intended results, or objectives, of
American intervention?
The intended results of the invasion of Panama can
best be understood by dividing them into two categories:
the "political" and the "operational."
The political objectives were clearly articulated by
the President in his December 20, 1989 address on Panama.
During the speech he stated: "the goals of the United
States have been to safeguard the lives of Americans, to
defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and
to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty" (New
York Times. December 21, 1989: text of President Bush's
speech). Not specifically mentioned, but certainly implicit
was also the apprehension of General Noriega on drug
trafficking charges. Since most of these goals have already
been discussed, they require no further elaboration here.
In pursuit of the political goals, several operational
goals were established in the invasion plans developed by
the military. First and foremost, American forces were to
destroy quickly the combat capabilities of the Panamanian
Defense Forces. This was to be accomplished by rapidly
striking strategic points throughout Panama and
overwhelming the PDF.
The second operational goal was to seize facilities
related to the operation of the Panama Canal. This was
necessary so as to prevent sabotage of the Canal, as well
as to protect and defend civilians associated with its
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operation. Early seizure of the Canal also would help keep
the interruption of traffic through the waterway to a
minimum.
A third, and final, operational goal was to apprehend
Noriega and to liberate political prisoners being held by
government forces (Crowell, 1991: 69-70). (The details of
Noriega's apprehension are discussed later in this
chapter.)
4. What was the nature of the operation?
The nature of Operation Just Cause is difficult to
classify. It exhibits elements of both a humanitarian
mission and efforts aimed at nation building.
The concern of the Bush administration with human
rights and the suppression of liberties within Panama
certainly indicates a humanitarian motivation. The
President was very clear in his conviction that it was
necessary to allow democratic norms a chance to become
established (New York Times. December 21, 1989, text of
President Bush's speech). Human rights organizations,
notably Amnesty International, had long reported on the
sharp increase of human rights abuses since the beginning
of the crisis in Panama in 1988. Such violations involved
arbitrary arrests, torture, harassment, and sexual abuse
(Keesing's, April 1988: 35819).

It became increasingly

clear that the only way a democratic transformation of
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Panama would occur was if Noriega were forced from power by
an American invasion.
This intervention, however, also exhibited
characteristics indicative of a nation-building enterprise
in the sense that democratic institutions were to be
restored. One of the main goals was to allow the results of
the May 1989 elections to be reinstated. As one of the
first acts of U.S. intervention, the Endara government was
installed, thus fulfilling its electoral mandate and
bringing 21 years of military dictatorship to a close.
Key among Washington's objectives was the destruction
of the Panamanian Defense Forces. This was not sought to
render Panama permanently dependent on the United States
for its defense. Rather, American concern with the PDF was
focused on its traditional role as a power base, the
institutional support for, and "cradle" of, Panamanian
dictators. If it were not eliminated as a source of power
independent from civilian control, it would continue to be
a potential threat to any embryonic democracy. A successful
intervention would undoubtedly have the result of giving
Panama a "clean slate" by allowing for civilian-directed
change far wider than otherwise would have been possible
(Scranton, 1991: 227).
5. What was the American domestic political climate during
this crisis?
The Bush administration was very secretive about any
intention to intervene in Panama. In fact, during a press
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conference held only hours after hostilities commenced,
Secretary of State Baker stated: "The President made his
decision [to intervene] last Sunday" (New York Times.
December 21, 1989: transcript of Secretary of State Baker's
press conference). This places the decision at two days
before the act. While an invasion was always a possibility,
the conventional wisdom was that it was unlikely. This
impression was reinforced by the incremental approach
toward applying diplomatic and economic pressure pursued by
the Bush administration. Only with the events of December
1989, however, was it finally apparent that only a use of
force would bring the situation to a final resolution
favorable to the United States fNew York Times. December
21, 1989: text of President Bush's speech).
When Americans awoke on the morning of December 20 and
heard the announcement of the invasion on the morning news,
most were surprised, which is just the way the Bush
administration seemed to want it. This need for surprise
stemmed from two important reasons. First, the military
wanted to be able to surprise the PDF so as to keep
casualties low. Any discussion of plans to invade would
have cost lives on both sides. Secondly, the secrecy would
allow the administration to deal a fait accompli to both
the public and critics in Congress. Once the invasion
started, the public would support it, due to the usual
"rally around the flag" effect. Members of Congress,
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reluctant to appear even remotely unpatriotic, would not be
able to express any displeasure with the action as long as
American troops were in combat (for Congressional reaction
see New York Times. December 24, 1989, article by Maureen
Dowd).
Before the invasion, the public mood had generally
been anti-interventionist. Any time that the prospect of
intervention was raised, the public would shy away, fearful
of "another Vietnam." Opinion polls conducted around the
time of the aborted May 1989 Panamanian elections, however,
show the beginning of a change in American public opinion
regarding a possible invasion. A New York Times/ CBS News
poll showed that "Americans grew much more supportive of
the use of United States troops to restore order if
necessary" in Panama (New York Times. May 13, 1989,
dispatch by Adam Clymer). When President Bush announced
that he was sending 2,000 additional troops to Panama as
the crisis worsened, 53% of those who said that they had
heard about the situation supported the President's
actions. This same group was evenly divided on whether
troops should be sent in to restore order if violence
occurred (New York Times. May 13, 1989, dispatch by Adam
Clymer). While the poll seemed to indicate rising support
for intervention, the public showed little general
enthusiasm for ousting dictators. Asked "should the United
States try to change a dictatorship to a democracy where it
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can or should the United States stay out of other countries
affairs?" 29 percent supported intervention and 60 percent
favored staying out. (These were basically the same numbers
that emerged from a 1986 poll taken during political
turmoil in the Philippines.) Intervention tended to be more
popular among those with higher incomes, Republicans,
veterans and Southerners. Those from the Northeast and
college graduates were most critical of engaging in such a
policy (New York Times. May 13, 1989, dispatch by Adam
Clymer).
Congressional interest in the situation in Panama
dated back to 1986, when conservative Senator Jesse Helms
(R-N.C.) first conducted hearings into Noriega's
activities. These hearings, in turn, spawned others such as
those headed by Senator John Kerry (D-MA), whose
international narcotics subcommittee later launched an
exhaustive investigation covering Panama and the Medellin
cartel (Scranton, 1991: 97) .
Concern over Noriega, Panama, and the Canal was not
the exclusive domain of any particular political party. One
of the first signs of this solidly bipartisan approach to
Panama came on June 26, 1987 when Senate Resolution 239 was
passed by a vote of 84 to 2. This resolution called on
Noriega and his cronies to step down from power, and it
expressed American "support for human rights and the
evolution of genuine democracy in Panama" (Scranton, 1991:
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111). Although it was non-binding, the passage of the
resolution showed how few friends Noriega had in Washington
(Scranton, 1991: 111).
As the crisis intensified, congressional liberals and
conservatives would repeatedly find common cause against
Noriega. For example, in May 1988, while negotiations were
underway that would have resulted in the dropping of drug
charges against Noriega if he were to step down, the Senate
passed a resolution opposing such a deal by an 86-10 vote
(Scranton, 1991: 150). Throughout the 1988-89 period, this
"full spectrum" coalition gained strength. In both the
House and Senate, this group frequently proposed
resolutions to urge the White House to take stronger
action, including the use of military force against
Noriega. Such resolutions, however, seldom garnered
majority votes on the floor (Scranton, 1991: 136).
The mood of Congress seemed to become considerably
more hawkish after U.S. forces failed to act in support of
the failed October 1989 coup by PDF officers. Congressional
critics severely criticized the White House for its
apparent inaction. Despite this, even on the eve of the
invasion, there seemed to be no consensus on Capital Hill
in favor of the use of force. In the wake of the Dec. 17
murder of a U.S. Marine by the PDF, the voice of caution
could still be heard loud and clear in the halls of
Congress. Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT), a prominent

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

101

liberal and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee's subcommittee dealing with Western Hemispheric
affairs, urged President Bush not to act abruptly in
responding to Panamanian provocations. Recalling earlier
criticism that his colleagues had leveled at Mr. Bush, Dodd
stated: "My concern would be that some of the political
advisors around him are reminding him of those [critical]
headlines and may cause him to act precipitously here" (New
York Times. December 20, 1989, article by Michael R.
Gordon).
As noted above, the preparations for the December 20,
1989 invasion were so secret that most of Congress,
including its leadership, was kept uninformed. President
Bush told the public that he had "contacted the bipartisan
leadership of Congress...and informed them of this
decision" to intervene on the night before the operation
was initiated (New York Times. December 21, 1989:
transcript of President Bush's speech). This assertion,
however, was disputed by Speaker of the House Thomas S.
Foley (D-WA), who said on the night of the invasion that he
had not been alerted by the White House (New York Times.
December 20, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon). In either
case, the President had, for all practical purposes,
bypassed Congress in his decision to intervene in Panama.
With the invasion, the legislative branch had been dealt a
fait accompli to which it could do little more than react.
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6. What was the position of the military leadership
regarding the operation?
In the case of Panama, the position of the military
toward possible intervention was literally a tale of two
(perhaps three) generals. The answer to this question can
be discovered by examining the views of Generals Frederick
Woerner, Maxwell Thurman, and Colin Powell.
General Woerner was the commander of SOUTHCOM (U.S.
forces in Panama) from June 1987 until September 1989.
Throughout his tenure, Woerner was "reluctant to support
large-scale military action in Panama" (New York Times.
December 24, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and Andrew
Rosenthal). It was his position that the only durable
solution to Panama's situation was for the Panamanians to
solve their own problems without outside interference from
the United States. During an interview he stated that: "the
only chance that democracy really had in Panama was for the
Panamanians to go through the catharsis of removing
Noriega" (Woerner interview in Scranton, 1991: 194). In
September 1989, when General Woerner advised President Bush
how to proceed in Panama, he was quite straightforward: "I
can tell you how to go in. What I cannot tell you is how to
get out of it and leave behind something worthwhile"
(Woerner interview in Scranton, 1991: 194).
The failure of the coup made it obvious that
irrespective of the existing strategy to get rid of
Noriega, a military coup, along with U.S. aid to the
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rebels, was unlikely to work. By late 1989, Noriega had
become too well entrenched for such an option to have a
realistic chance of success (New York Times. December 24,
1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and Andrew Rosenthal).
At the end of September 1989, the military awarded two
promotions that were to have a profound influence on United
States policy toward Panama, especially with regard to
military options. On September 30, General Maxwell Thurman
replaced General Woerner as the commander at SOUTHCOM. The
next day, General Colin Powell assumed the position of
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Powell was both the
youngest chairman in history (age 53) and the first black
to hold the post (Leonard, 1993: 103). A trait that the two
generals had in common is that they tended to be more
"hawkish" toward Panama than was General Woerner. Powell,
in particular, had begun to review the existing military
plans for Panama and found them deficient. Those plans, as
one administration official put it, "would have kept us
from doing anything. It would have taken so long to
assemble a large force that by the time you got it
together, it would be impossible to do anything" (New York
Times. December 24, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and
Andrew Rosenthal).
Thurman, as commander in Panama, was not just given
input into the planning, but he was instrumental in the
drafting of a new plan. Thurman and Powell's new strategy
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compacted the existing plans for a large-scale attack down
into an overnight timetable (New York Times. December 24,
1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and Andrew Rosenthal).
7. How was the operation actually carried out?
In updating the existing military plans for use by the
Bush Administration, General Thurman developed three usable
options. Option One relied on the use of massive force. Its
goal was to

overwhelm Noriega with numbers so that he

would have to conclude that he had "no realistic chance of
survival" (Crowell, 1991: 68). Option Two was to use
Special Forces in a raid to seize Noriega, with support
from U.S. troops already stationed in Panama. The Third
Option was to utilize Panama-based troops to seize PDF
headquarters.
When the decision was finally made, President Bush
selected Option One. This was dictated by several factors,
the most important of which was a fear of prolonged
resistance by Panamanian forces. Bush was concerned to keep
casualties low on both sides of the conflict. Inflicting
massive casualties on Panamanian forces would have had the
potential of needlessly stirring up nationalism within the
country; and this in turn could prolong resistance and have
damaging long-term effects on U.S.-Panamanian relations.
Secondly, the Bush administration wanted to avoid a
prolonged engagement that would almost certainly have
brought a firestorm of domestic and international criticism
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and pressure. Finally, Options Two and Three would have
depended on perfect intelligence and surprise for success.
Anything less would have allowed Noriega to evade capture;
and his apprehension was, after all, of central importance
to American policy toward Panama. Furthermore, Option One
would almost certainly have the result of quickly
eliminating the PDF as a power in Panamanian politics (New
York Times. December 21, 1989, dispatch by Bernard E.
Trainor).
As carried out, the United States intervention was a
unilateral military action. Under SOUTHCOM were 13,000
United States troops permanently stationed in Panama. In
preparation for action, reinforcements from bases
throughout the United States were airlifted to Panama,
boosting the American presence to 23,000. It was an
integrated operation, that is to say that General Thurman,
as SOUTHCOM commander, had access to units from all
branches of the armed services. The operation was to be
carried out by the "simultaneous application of
overwhelming military force against all significant centers
of Panamanian resistance" (New York Times. December 21,
1989, dispatch by Bernard E. Trainor).
For weeks, massive C-130s had been transporting in
additional troops and equipment. In the days immediately
before the intervention, these C-130s and C-141s flew
around the clock, bringing men and material, including
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tanks and attack helicopter gunships (New York Times.
December 24, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and Andrew
Rosenthal). When the attack finally was to commence,
American units already based in Panama would isolate and
capture General Noriega's headquarters and neutralize other
Panamanian forces in Colon. Paratrooper, ranger, and light
infantry units flown from the United States, meanwhile,
would launch surprise air assaults on outlying units (New
York Times. December 21, 1989, dispatch by Bernard E.
Trainor).
There were two keys to success that American forces
could count on: night operations and complete air
superiority. U.S forces were unchallenged in the air; the
PDF had no aircraft. An ability to fight at night, provided
by accessories such as infra-red gunsights contributed to
the element of surprise critical to low-casualty success in
the urban environment presented by Panama City (Crowell,
1989: 75).
Generally, American intelligence was quite good. The
failed October 1989 coup proved to be a boon to military
intelligence officers. An analysis of the rebels' actions
pointed out the primary targets that U.S. forces would
later attack. Also, because of the presence of American
bases in Panama, invading troops had a tremendous advantage
in that many soldiers were already familiar with both the
target sites and local roads (Crowell, 1991: 79-80). There
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were, however, some gaps in the intelligence. The most
damaging of these was the "lack of precise, reliable
intelligence information, in this case pinpointing the
location of Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega" (New York Times.
December 21, 1989, dispatch by Bernard E. Trainor).
Deception was skillfully exploited by U.S. forces. For
weeks, readiness exercises were frequently held. As the
invasion date approached, exercises were held around the
clock. This disguised both the scope of the operation to
come and H-Hour (New York Times. December 20, 1989, article
by Michael R. Gordon). Although news reports and careless
conversation between soldiers on December 19 gave the
Panamanians a tip that "something" was planned, the actual
date and time of H-Hour were never divulged.
The United States intervention force was organized
into six task forces. Each group was given a set of goals
to accomplish when H-Hour arrived. Below is a quick summary
of each task force and its duties:
Task Force Black was assigned to rescue imprisoned
Americans held at PDF prisons. It also had the
responsibility to raid sites Noriega was believed to be at.
Although it failed to capture Panama's "Maximum Leader," it
successfully cut-off possible air and sea escape routes. It
later cornered him at the Papal Nunciature.
Task Force Bayonet immediately moved on the
Commandancia (PDF Headquarters) and other strategic points
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in Panama City. Tanks and Apache helicopter gunships, many
of them flown into Panama especially for the invasion,
provided massive firepower used to "soften-up" the
Commandancia before the final assault.
Troops from Task Force Bayonet also captured PDF
installations at Fort Amador. Navy SEALs attached to this
battle group were dispatched to Patilla Airport in order to
cut off a possible Noriega escape route. The SEALs were
able to accomplish their mission by destroying Noriega’s
plane. SEALs also secured boats in Panama Harbor to prevent
an escape by sea.
Task Force Atlantic defeated a PDF force at the
coastal city of Colon. At Gamboa, it moved to seize canalrelated facilities.
Task Force Red was composed mostly of soldiers flown
in from the United States. Stealth fighters dropped 2,000
lb. bombs near PDF barracks at Rio Hato, which so
disoriented the Panamanian defenders that they ran for
their lives. Rangers units then parachuted in. Fighting was
fierce, but successful. With support from AC-130 gunships,
the Rangers were able to take Tocumen/ Torrijos
International Airport. Later, they linked up with Task
Force Red to cut-off reinforcement routes utilized by the
PDF's elite Battalion 2000.
Task Force Semper Fi, as its name implies, was
composed of Marines. The Marines secured U.S. military
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installations from possible PDF attack or sabotage. Later,
they joined with forces from Task Force Bayonet to secure
the Bridge of the Americas.
Finally, Task Force Pacific was flown overnight from
Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina in 20 C-I41s. This
group staged a jump at the international airport and the
Madden Dam in order to reinforce U.S. forces there
(Crowell, 1991: 83-92).
Mop-up and the Apprehension of Noriega
Within eighteen hours of the start of Operation Just
Cause, organized resistance ended as the PDF was defeated
(Scranton, 1991: 203; Crowell, 1991: 94). However, Dignity
Battalions, a pro-Noriega militia, continued resistance for
several more days. Yet by the seventh day of the invasion,
Panama was pacified (Scranton, 1991: 204).
Nevertheless, General Noriega eluded capture. He
managed to evade his pursuers for four days. On Christmas
Eve, Noriega showed up at the residence of the Papal Nuncio
in Panama City with ten of his followers (Scranton, 1991:
205). Begging for asylum, Noriega and his entourage were
admitted. When the American command discovered that Noriega
had been granted sanctuary, troops were dispatched to the
embassy and the building was surrounded. Papal ambassador
Monsignor Laboa refused calls to turn the General over to
the USA to face charges in Florida. A stand-off ensued.
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The American troops could not violate the sanctity of
an embassy, so they tried to coax Noriega out. Soldiers
set-up bright lights to shine into the Nuncio. Loudspeakers
placed around the building blasted loud hard rock music in
order to make life miserable for Noriega.
In early January 1990, Noriega received assurances
from the USA that he would not be subject to the death
penalty for his crimes. This guarantee, along with
Monsignor Laboa’s argument that asylum in a third country
was not a viable option, began to work on Noriega's mind
(Keesing's, January 1990: 37181). On January 4, 1990 at
8:45 P.M., Noriega surrendered to U.S. forces. Although
General Thurman was present, he did not allow a formal
military surrender. Noriega was taken into custody as a
criminal (Keesing's, January 1990: 37181 and Scranton,
1991: 207).
8. What types and quantities of forces were used?
Operation Just Cause was, at the time, the largest
operation of its kind since Vietnam. It was the intention
of General Thurman to overwhelm the 5,000 man Panamanian
Defense Force with both superior numbers and firepower.
Therefore, in order to supplement forces already in Panama,
a massive airlift brought an additional 9,500 troops in
from bases across the United States (Keesing's, Dec. 1989:
37112). At its peak, 26,000 soldiers were committed to the
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American intervention in Panama (New York Times. December
24, 1989, dispatch by Lindsay Gruson).
Not only were massive numbers of troops used, but also
a wide variety of forces were employed, drawn from the full
range of the armed services. This section will present a
brief overview of this broad cross-section that was
utilized. Forces were organized according to type,
geographic area of use, and by their assigned objectives
(Crowell, 1991: 70-1).
Air Units
The then-top secret F-117 Stealth Fighter got its
first combat test in the early stages of the invasion. Six
of the planes were called in from their air base in Nevada,
two of which dropped 2,000 lb. bombs near PDF barracks in
Panama (McConnell, 1991: 35). The use of the F-117 was part
of a plan which called for using ultra-high technology
weapons systems in order to selectively prepare the ground
for the assaults that would follow. (McConnell, 1991: 31,
35) .
In support roles, SOUTHCOM relied on helicopters. As
noted earlier, American forces enjoyed the advantage of
uncontested control of the skies. Therefore, helicopter
gunships, including such advanced models as the Apache as
well as AH-1 Cobras, were used as aerial artillery
platforms to pound enemy forces in anticipation of the
impending surface attack. Other helicopters, such as the
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UH-1 Huey and the UH-60 Blackhawk were used to transport
troops, for firepower, and for observation purposes. In
addition, some fixed wing aircraft, specifically A-7
fighter-bombers were used. On December 20, a 20 mile by 20
mile square of airspace over Panama City was crowded with
"111 transports, 7 AC-130 gunships, 173 helicopters, 21 OA37s, 6 A-7s, and 6 F-117s" (Crowell, 1991: 76-78).
Ground Units
Impressive firepower was not limited to the aircraft.
Indeed, tanks had been moved into Panama "several weeks
before the invasion was launched" (New York Times. December
24, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and Andrew
Rosenthal). Originally intended to support a possible coup
attempt by PDF officers, the tanks also were included in
military intervention preparations. Plans called for tanks
to be used in conjunction with the Apache gunships to
freeze the Panamanian military in place (New York Times.
December 24, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and Andrew
Rosenthal).
Ground forces were drawn from across service lines,
many of them among the most elite units that each branch
had to offer. The Army sent Special Forces teams, totalling
3,500 men. They drew the assignment of tracking and
attempting to capture Noriega, as well as quickly seizing
strategic locations throughout Panama. The 82nd Airborne
and various Ranger units were dropped in to seize airports,
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Canal facilities, and other strategic assets. Delta Force,
the United States' quick reaction force was also dispatched
to Panama and saw action. Other elite units participating
were the Marines (Task Force Semper Fi) and Navy SEALs (see
the preceding section)(Crowell, 1991: 72-3).
Of particular interest was the use of Psychological
Operations Groups. Trained in psychological warfare and
fluent in Spanish, these soldiers would attempt to reason
with PDF forces they faced before a ground assault was
launched. Often they were able to convince the Panamanians
of both the hopelessness of their position and of the good
intentions of the American intervention. Consequently, they
managed to persuade many PDF units to surrender without
firing more than a few shots. (Crowell, 1991: 90, 94).
Sea Units
Not much information is available about the role of
naval forces in Operation Just Cause beyond the use of
SEALS and frogmen to disable vessels that could have been
used by Noriega to escape. There is good reason to believe
that carrier-based planes provided air cover for transports
en route from bases in the United States to Panama
(Crowell, 1991: 75).
9. Was the conflict limited in scope?
The answer to this question is a simple "yes." The
fighting never spilled over the borders of Panama. As a
matter of fact, the overwhelming force utilized helped to
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bring about such a rapid victory that it is highly unlikely
that other governments or political groups could have acted
in support of Noriega, even if they wanted to.
There was, in the minds of Thurman, Powell, and
others, a concern about the possible interdiction of U.S.
transports by Cuban and/or Nicaraguan jets. However, as
mentioned earlier, the United States utilized carrier-based
air cover to deal with this problem in the unlikely event
such interference occurred (Crowell, 1991: 75). The threat
never materialized.
10. What was the nature of the theater gftmnmnder1s power
and influence?
Throughout the Panama crisis, the SOUTHCOM commander's
opinion was given great weight by the White House. During
General Woerner's tenure as SOUTHCOM, the Bush
administration heeded the General's admonition against
intervention. When Woerner was replaced by Maxwell Thurman
at the end of September 1989, the new commander's advice
was equally well heeded. As a case in point, even at the
very start of his tenure at SOUTHCOM, Thurman was able to
convince his superiors not to get involved with Major
Giroldi and other rebel PDF officers during the October
coup. (McConnell, 1991: 10).
General Thurman was a key player in the development of
new plans to get Noriega. Thurman and Powell reworked the
existing plans, taking into account a broad range of
possible responses (New York Times. December 21, 1989,
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dispatch by Bernard E. Trainor). President Bush was advised
that a "surgical" strike to grab Noriega would accomplish
very little, and warned him that it could prove quite
embarrassing if it failed (New York Times. December 24,
1989, article by Maureen Dowd). As was noted above, General
Thurman compacted Blue Spoon down into an overnight
operation (see above and Scranton, 1991: 196 for more
details.) (New York Times. December 21, 1989, dispatch by
Bernard E. Trainor).
The President withheld immediate approval, and Thurman
had nine weeks to refine his plan. On the morning of
December 17, 1989, Thurman phoned General Powell in
Washington with the recommendation that the plan be
executed. Bush and Powell agreed with Thurman's assessment,
and the order was given for Thurman to proceed (McConnell,
1991: 19).
Freedom on the Battlefield/Rules of Engagement
In formulating the rules of engagement, General
Thurman was given one guideline to follow: to find a
balance in the use of force that would both hold down U.S.
casualties and Panamanian deaths and destruction to a
minimum while successfully destroying the PDF's combat
capability (Crowell, 1991: 81). There were two main reasons
for this. First, in the interest of good long-term
relations, the Bush administration felt that it was
imperative to accomplish operational objectives with as
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little destruction, and as few casualties, as possible.
Second, it was thought by those in Washington that if some
sort of restraint were not practiced there would be a
backlash against the new Endara government, and this would
exacerbate legitimacy problems that surely would be present
due to its installation by force of U.S. arms.
The commanders and planners of "Just Cause,"
consequently, laid down strict rules of engagement (ROE).
General Thurman, as SOUTHCOM commander, ordered "the
minimum use of power required" to achieve battlefield
victory (Crowell, 1991: 81). In practice, Thurman ordered
that no one below the rank of Lt. Colonel could order the
use of indirect fire weapons such as artillery, mortars,
aerial strafing, or bombing. One of Thurman's subordinates,
General Stiner, acted to place even more stringent
limitations on American forces. He restricted the use of
artillery and bombing in Panama City by requiring the
approval of a Major General for artillery, himself for
bombing (Crowell, 1991: 81).
Thurman also ordered that infantry units attacking PDF
barracks be accompanied by Psychological Operations teams.
Although discussed earlier, it bears repeating that, using
their training and Spanish language skills, members of
these teams would call on PDF soldiers to surrender within
15 minutes. If the demand was not complied with, a small
burst would be fired as a warning and the demand repeated
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with a new time limit. If this second deadline passed,
field officers were instructed to call senior officers for
authorization to use greater firepower.
Bombing, when used, was usually near, not on, targets.
F-117 Stealth fighters dropped their bombs near PDF
barracks, a tactic which caused a minimum of damage and a
maximum of confusion and panic among enemy forces.
Surrender was swiftly obtained. These measures were highly
successful in reducing Panamanian losses without raising
American casualties (Crowell, 1991: 80-82).
11. Was there an "exit strategy?11 If so. was it adhered to?
The answers to these questions are a simple "yes" and
"no." There was no formal exit plan because none was
needed. Some 13,000 of the U.S. troops are permanently
stationed in Panama in accordance with the provisions of
the 1977 Panama Canal Treaties.
As a matter of politics, the answer was "yes." As
President Bush declared: "The United States intends to
withdraw the forces newly deployed to Panama as quickly as
possible" (New York Times. December 21, 1989: transcript of
President Bush's speech). In accordance with this pledge,
on January 3, 1990, 300 troops were sent home to bases in
the USA. By January 7, the total of the recalled forces had
reached 3,300 (Keesing's, January 1990: 37818).
It was Washington's intention to turn over authority
to Panamanian civilian leaders as quickly as possible. A
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key element of this transition was a need to allow the new
Endara government to assume the duties associated with the
maintenance of public order.

However, the new Endara

regime faced a problem similar to that encountered by Lenin
in Russia in 1917: What does the new government do when the
only personnel with the necessary training to carry out
such an essential task are those most closely associated
with the old regime? The need to use at least some former
PDF officers as the foundation of a new national police
force tarnished the new government (Scranton, 1991: 227).
The result was that American troops had to remain in a
constabulary capacity for an extended period. During 1990,
U.S. troops were involved in stopping looting, restoring
order, and were even called on to put down a new coup
attempt fNew York Times. December 21, 1990: Editorial).
This extended role for American troops was not
completely unwelcome by the Panamanian public. A January
1990 CBS News poll taken in Panama revealed that 78 percent
believed that the United States should stay at least six
months or "as long as necessary" (New York Times. January
6, 1990, dispatch by Michael R. Kagay).
12. What were the immediate results of the intervention?
The intervention left the United States in control of
Panama. Washington's central concern in Panama, the Panama
Canal, was secured within hours. Although the invasion
forced the Canal's closure for the first time ever, the
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interruption of traffic lasted only one day. This minor
inconvenience was more than offset by the successful
protection of the Canal and its associated facilities. The
primary objective of the invasion, the capture of General
Noriega was accomplished by January 4, 1990. He was
promptly sent to Miami, Florida to face trial on drug
charges. Finally, on December 20, 1989, just as the
invasion began, Guillermo Endara and his new government
were sworn in at an American military base.
To Americans watching news reports of the invasion, no
image was more gratifying than that of U.S. forces being
welcomed by the people of Panama. Crowds that greeted
American troops throughout the country hailed them as
liberating heros (Scranton, 1991: 207). As previously
noted, Panamanian public opinion was pro-interventionist. A
January 1990 CBS News poll reported the following results:
92% approved of the invasion, with 64% strongly approving;
67% said that they wished that the United States had
intervened at the time of the failed October 1989 coup.
Seventy-four percent of the respondents believed that
American troops had used the right amount of force and 87
percent said "the price paid by Panama to overthrow the
Noriega regime was worth it" (New York Times. January, 6,
1990, dispatch by Michael R. Kagay). Panamanians seemed
very optimistic about their country's future, with 90%
predicting that their nation's situation over the next few
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years would improve as a result of the invasion, and 88
percent expressing confidence that Panama would remain a
democracy" (New York Times. January 6, 1990, dispatch by
Michael R. Kagay).
There were, however, several unanswered questions
surrounding the Endara government. Clearly it was legal,
but was it legitimate? After all, some argued, it needed an
invasion by a foreign power to put it in office. After the
conclusion of the U.S. intervention, the new Panamanian
regime still relied on American troops to control looting
and maintain order (Scranton, 1992: 357). Some critics
suggested that, in order to leave no doubt as to its
legitimacy, Endara should have re-submitted his government
to a popular vote (New York Times. December 21, 1990,
Editorial). It should be noted, however, that much of this
criticism did not garner support from the Panamanian
people, most of whom supported letting Endara finish his
term before holding new elections. Furthermore, as noted
earlier, there was concern about the inclusion of former
PDF members in the new national police (Sullivan, 1991:
169-170).
Although the invasion was extremely popular in Panama,
the United States was roundly criticized by the world
community. For the first time ever, the USA was condemned
by a resolution from the Organization of American States
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(OAS), which held that the invasion was a violation of
international law (Scranton, 1991: 207).
Washington faced similar troubles at the United
Nations. On December 30, 1989 the UN General Assembly
passed a resolution "deploring the American intervention by
a vote of 75 to 20, with 40 abstentions" (Goldman and
Biggers, 1991: 182). While formally condemning the
invasion, Moscow did not seem troubled by it. Soviet
objections seemed rather perfunctory, as they indicated
that the intervention would not stand in the way of the
improvement of East-West relations.
Latin American reaction, however, proved to be much
more strenuously opposed to the invasion. Peru, in
particular, seemed quite upset. Peruvian President Alan
Garcia condemned the U.S. intervention as "brutal,
excessive, and arrogant." Venezuela's President Perez,
while critical of the invasion, also assessed some blame
upon the Latin American community for lacking "the
necessary determination to force the Panamanian de facto
government to change its stand and permit the free exercise
of the people's sovereignty." Perez reassured the Endara
government that formal relations would be restored when
American troops were withdrawn (Goldman and Biggers, 1991:
183) .
On January 18, 1990, President Endara appealed to the
world community for international aid. In response, on
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January 25, President Bush announced a $1 billion aid
package to help Panama recover. Half of these funds were
earmarked for housing, public works, and economic
assistance. The remainder consisted of export assistance
and trade benefits (Keesing's, January 1990: 37181). In an
effort to provide immediate assistance, the United States
offered $6,500 per family in emergency aid to those in the
"El Chorrillo" neighborhood, which had been particularly
devastated by the fighting. However, the distribution of
this aid proved to be a long, frustrating process
(Scranton, 1991: 215).
13. What was the long-term situation?
From a political perspective, although Guillermo
Endara did serve his full term as President, his popularity
declined. His government came to be seen as white and upper
class, either unwilling or unable to reach out to Panama's
poor, colored majority. It certainly did not help that the
coalition ruling Panama after the American intervention had
no governing experience. Once the common enemy, namely
Noriega, was gone, the coalition began to splinter.
(Leonard, 1993: 111).
Panama's infant democracy faced a critical problem:
How do you socialize people to embrace democratic norms,
when they never have had any real exposure to a democratic
system? Despite popular desire for democracy, questions
remained about how well it had taken root. In 1990, police
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officers staged what was widely characterized as a coup
attempt. American troops had to be called in to suppress
the unrest (New York Times. December 21, 1990, Editorial).
Another problem that plagued the new government is
that it was seen not only as excessively pro-American, but
also too dependent on U.S. advisors. Opposition leader
Miguel Bernal summed up the views of many: "If you want
something done, you talk to the Americans. Then they tell
the government what it needs to do. That's a source of deep
shame to the Panamanian people" (Scranton 1991: 228). This
image was reinforced by the fact that, as much as a year
later, U.S. troops were still patrolling Panamanian streets
(New York Times. December 21, 1990, Editorial).
There is reason to believe that, even with all of the
trouble that it has had to deal with, Panama has finally
completed the transition to democracy with the peaceful
transfer of power, as a result of the 1994 general
elections. On May 8, left-of-center businessman Ernesto
Perez Balladares of the Democratic Revolutionary Party
(PRD), was elected president with a 33.3% vote plurality.
An opposition leader, Mr. Balladares was quite open in
identifying himself with the legacy of the late General
Omar Torrijos Herrera, national hero and founder of the PRD
(Keesing's, May 1994: 40003).
Mr. Balladares' successful campaign benefitted from
popular discontent with the austerity policies of the
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Endara government. The new President's successful platform
pledged an attack on poverty, corruption, and unemployment,
as well as advocating higher social spending. Furthermore,
Balladares promised to honor his country's debt obligations
and to maintain tight fiscal policies. He vowed to prevent
a return to the militarism of the past, as well as
promising continued good relations with the United States
(Keesing's, May 1994: 40003).
Conducted under the watch of some 2,000 local and
international observers, among them former U.S. President
Jimmy Carter, the voting was judged to be free and fair
(Keesing's, May 1994: 40003). ''Panamanians turned out in
large numbers early in the day and the process was widely
reported to have been orderly" (New York Times. May 9,
1994, dispatch by Howard W. French).
Also held on May 8 were legislative elections to send
representatives to the 71-seat Legislative Assembly.
Balladares's PRD won 21 seats. The right-wing Arnulfist
Party (PA) finished second with 12 seats; Papa Egoro
(center-left) won 6 seats and MOLIRENA (center-right) won 5
seats. The other seats were won by minor parties. It is
perhaps interesting to note that "of 1,500,000 voters
eligible, 26.33 per cent abstained" (Keesing's, May 1994:
40003).
From the viewpoint of Panama's police force, the
United States was faced with a dilemma in the immediate
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post-invasion period. Washington did not desire an openended commitment as a constable in Panama, nor did it want
the old PDF to continue to act in any police function.
After all, the elimination of the PDF as a power in Panama
had been a goal of the United States and the Panamanian
democratic opposition. But what alternatives were
available?
Some in Panama advocated abolishing the PDF and
replacing it with a "national police," based on the Costa
Rican model. Such a force would serve a police function,
but the military role would be abandoned. An alternative
proposal called for a "dual force" structure which provided
for a national police which would be supplemented by
specialized para-military units that would serve an anti
terrorism function. The Costa Rican model was adopted,
however; a fast reaction anti-terrorism/anti-crime unit was
established in August of 1990 in the wake of a series of
major bank robberies (Scranton, 1991: 218).
The United States and Panama agreed that it would
benefit both countries if the use of American MPs were
phased out. However, a dearth of trained police without
connection to the old regime compelled a decision to allow
members of the former PDF to serve in the new national
police, with the worst elements, of course, screened out by
the American authorities in Panama. Nevertheless, there was
criticism over the decision to reemploy so rapidly those
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who simply declared their loyalty to the new government.
This apprehension was reinforced by comments made by police
officers that were rumored and reported in the press, such
as, "when the gringos go home, we'll take over again"
(Scranton, 1991: 221). As a result, many Panamanians came
to view the police as little more than the PDF minus 410
pro-Noriega officers (Leonard, 1993: 115).
In order to calm public fears, as well as to maximize
civilian control of the armed forces, the roles of the
service branches were redefined. A prime example was that
the air force and navy were relegated to performance of
transport services only. The government sought to abolish
the army outright; however a November 1992 referendum on
this issue was defeated at the polls.
On August 23, 1994, the Legislative Assembly passed a
constitutional reform abolishing the army. The members of
the legislative body defended their move by arguing that it
was essential to avoid a return to militarism. (Keesing's,
August 1994: 40138).
A key question in the wake of the abolition of the
army was: who will defend the Canal when it reverts to
Panamanian sovereignty? A partial answer may have been
found in a June 1992 poll, in which it was reported that 70
percent of Panamanians wanted the United States to maintain
a military presence in the republic beyond 2000. For its
part, the U.S continued to act as if it were "sovereign
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regarding the Canal's defense" (Leonard, 1993: 117). What
the final settlement will be remains to be seen.
14. What elements about this case are unique?
Perhaps most striking about this case is the extremely
close relationship that has been the hallmark of United
States-Panamanian relations. Panama came into existence in
1903 because of the exercise of American gunboat diplomacy
against an intransigent Colombian government (See Chapter
II). The United States has always been involved in
Panamanian politics. As a result, Panamanian leaders have
always believed that they could solicit the USA as an
arbiter in their affairs. Over the years,

Washington came

to be viewed as the provider of a political "safety net"
for Panamanian politics. Central to the relationship has
been the Panama Canal, arguably America's most important
interest in Latin America. The treaties under which the
Canal was built and operated had long given certain rights
to the United States, not the least of these being the
right to intervene in Panama to defend the Canal. As a
practical matter, such provisions have given the U.S. a
legal justification to get involved in Panama whenever its
interests have been threatened. Although the 1977 Panama
Canal Treaties greatly reduced the degree of American
"sovereignty" over Panama, the provisions of the treaty
dealing with the defense of the canal allowed considerable
latitude in interpretation. The practical result of the new
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pact was to leave the basic relationship between the two
countries unchanged. In addition, Washington has frequently
been called on to supervise Panamanian elections (Scranton,
1992: 343-47).
A byproduct of this close relationship was the
enthusiastic support Panamanians gave to United States
intervention in 1989. Because of Washington's long
standing, tacit support for dictatorship in Panama, an
invasion was seen by many Panamanians as an attempt by the
United States finally to correct a wrong that it had
created. America's military intervention was seen as an
acceptable price for getting rid of Noriega, a dictator who
currently has the dubious honor of being the most hated
leader in Panamanian history. As noted earlier, public
opinion polls indicted that the invasion was welcome and
that an overwhelming majority of Panamanians favored an
American presence for "as long as necessary" (New York
Times. January 6, 1990, article by Michael R. Kagay).
A second variable that makes this case unique was the
fact that this was not an "invasion" in the conventional
sense. Unlike the 1983 Grenada invasion, wherein all troops
were shipped in, Panama had been serving as host to over
13,000 U.S. troops permanently stationed there in
accordance with the Panama Canal Treaties. This presence
lead to an important advantage for American forces.
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Officers attached to SOUTHCOM were able to draft effective
invasion plans due to a first-hand familiarity with Panama.
Likewise, the troop presence helped to screen the
American force build-up and invasion preparations. General
Thurman was able to use "routine" maneuvers as a cover for
U.S. invasion rehearsals. Such exercises served an
additional purpose. Round-the-clock movements without any
incidents lulled Noriega into a false sense of security,
thus effectively concealing the exact time of H-Hour.
Washington was able to maintain the element of surprise.
The presence of U.S. forces in Panama accrued other
benefits as well to the invaders. Officers were already
familiar with most of the targets selected. Because of
their intimate knowledge of Panama, SOUTHCOM intelligence
officers were able to directly observe, and thus more fully
analyze, the October 1989 coup. The result was that those
targets considered most important were identified and the
invasion plans were formulated to take them into account,
giving them top priority (Crowell, 1991: 79). A third
factor was that the United States had complete control of
the air. American superiority was never challenged. Thus,
Washington was able to make use of slower flying aircraft,
such as Apache helicopter gunships, as mobile artillery.
(Crowell, 1991: 67, 75).
A fourth variable unique to this case is the Canal
itself. Its importance to United States commerce is clearly
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evident. Because it cannot be moved or easily replaced, it
must be carefully safeguarded. This need for defense by the
USA has been codified by the 1977 Panama Canal Treaties,
which oblige Washington to defend the Canal until 2000.
Owing to the provisions of the treaty, there is a legal
basis for American intervention that may not exist in other
cases.
Fifth, and perhaps one of the most striking things
making Panama a unique case is that it is believed to be
the first time ever that drug indictments against a foreign
leader were used as a legal justification for military
intervention. On June 21,1989, the Justice Department
issued an opinion that granted the president the legal
authority to direct the FBI to abduct a fugitive residing
in a foreign country for violation of U.S. law, even if the
arrest was contrary to customary international law
(Leonard, 1993: 103). This opinion cleared the way for the
use of military force to obtain jurisdiction over General
Noriega (Drohan, 1991: 25).
A final unique element was the personal animus between
President Bush and General Noriega. According to a report
in the New York Times, this invasion was largely based on
visceral feelings Bush had about Noriega and a belief that
all diplomatic means to resolve the crisis had been
exhausted. The enmity between the two leaders dated back to
the early 1970s when Mr. Bush was CIA director under
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President Nixon, and a personal meeting between the two in
1983. Noriega's name became synonymous with doubts about
the President's judgement. Some have argued, "why was
Noriega not dealt with while Bush was at the CIA?" (New
York Times. December 24, 1989, dispatch by Maureen Dowd).
Early in his administration, Bush was tagged with a
"wimp" lable for his failure to deal sternly with foreign
crises, Panama being the most prominent among them
(Scranton, 1992: 358). This was compounded by Noriega's
harassment of U.S.personnel in Panama. The result was an
escalating war of nerves between the two leaders (Scranton
1991: 39-41).
15. Was the intervention "successful?"
There are two ways to assess the success of American
intervention in Panama.
level.

The first is on the operational

In other words, did the operation actually work

out as planned?

The other is on the political level.

Did

the intervention accomplish those goals that prompted its
undertaking?
Operationally, Operation Just Cause was almost
flawlessly successful.

As observed earlier, nearly all

operational goals were accomplished within the first 18
hours of the initiation of the mission. Furthermore, the
principal object of the invasion, General Noriega, was
cornered by U.S. forces at the Papal Nunciature by December
24, 1989, and was captured on January 4, 1990.

He was
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sent back to the United States to face his drug indictments
and was eventually sentenced to 40

years in a federal

prison (New York Times. May 9, 1994, article by Howard W.
French).

Shortly afterward a Panamanian Court tried and

convicted Noriega in absentia for murder (Keesing's, March
1994:

39910).
The best way to assess the success of Operation Just

Cause in a political sense is to evaluate it in terms of
the fulfillment of President Bush's stated objectives.

In

a December 20, 1989, speech to the nation, the president
outlined his

objectives: to safeguard American lives, to

defend democracy in Panama (and bring Noriega to justice),
to combat drug trafficking, and to protect the integrity of
the Panama Canal Treaties (New York Times. December 21,
1989, transcript of President Bush's speech).
In terms of safeguarding American lives, the operation
was a resounding success.

Once the invasion commenced,

only 3 of 35,000 U.S. civilians in Panama died.

Even

military casualties were much lower than expected: Only 23
U.S. servicemen died in action, and 323 were wounded.
Panamanian casualties too were low, considering the scale
of the operation.
wounded.

The PDF experienced only 314 dead, 124

American estimates put Panamanian civilian

casualties at 500-1000 (Scranton, 1991: 204).
The second goal, the defense of democracy in Panama,
would seem ostensibly to have been fulfilled.

Within
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hours, American troops had deposed the dictatorship and the
democratically-elected Endara government was installed.
The Panamanian military, a traditional impediment to
democracy, was at first restrained and, in 1994, abolished.
A national police force now exists, although questions as
to its loyalty and integrity may still remain due to the
presence of former PDF officers within its ranks.
fair elections were held in 1994.

Free and

This marked the first

peaceful transfer of civilian power since 1960, and only
the second time in Panamanian history. While the prospects
for the survival of democracy appear to be favorable, it is
the next national elections which will provide a truer
measure of its endurance.
The third goal was to combat drug trafficking.
Obviously, the capture of General Noriega had a serious
effect on the drug trade.

First, it established the

precedent that the United States would act, even against a
foreign head of state, if the charges were sufficiently
serious, documented, and apprehension was possible.
Secondly, the elimination of Noriega removed the Panamanian
state from the drug business.

Unfortunately, the effect

has not been as long-lasting as everyone would have liked.
In 1990, the United States ambassador to Panama complained
the no drug cases were prosecuted by the Endara government.
There were even signs that matters were in fact getting
worse.

"During 1991, numerous commentators asserted that
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the drug trade had not only resumed but actually reached
levels higher than before the invasion" (Scranton,
228).

1991:

As regards this criterion, the intervention was less

than a complete success.
A final articulated American goal was "to protect the
integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties" (New York Times.
December 21, 1989, transcript of President Bush's address).
As discussed above, the canal was secured almost instantly
by U.S. forces.

No damage was done to canal facilities and

the fighting only forced the closure of the waterway for
one day.

The successful installation of a democratic

government has been reassuring to both Panamanians and
Americans concerned with the final implementation of the
Canal Treaties on December 31, 1999.

The 1994 abolition of

the Panamanian military by the nation's Legislative
Assembly has, however, posed some questions about Panama's
ability to defend the canal when it takes control at the
turn of the century.

There is the possibility that events

since the 1989 invasion have only increased Panama's
dependence on the United States to solve its problems
(Sullivan, 1991: 173-6).

Oddly, this dependence on its

benefactor is not unwelcome to most Panamanians.

A poll in

1990 showed that 70% of Panamanians want a joint U.S.Panama administration of the canal (New York Times. January
6, 1990, dispatch by Michael R. Kagay).

Although the

official position of the United States is to fulfill the
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treaty "as is," there has recently been sentiment to review
the defense provisions of the agreement and allow an
extended U.S. role in the waterway's defense.
Finally, a goal not articulated by the Bush
administration, but certainly not unwelcome, was its effect
on the President's political fortunes.

The invasion was

instrumental in helping Bush shake his "wimp" label.

To

most Americans, the president finally appeared as a
decisive leader in the foreign policy realm.
President's popularity skyrocketed.

The

The action was so

popular that even an adversarial Democratically-controlled
Congress generally supported the action.

Senator Gore went

so far as to send his congratulations to the President.
Only those on the far left of the political spectrum, like
Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY), expressed criticism.

Clearly

this intervention was a turning point in President Bush's
administration. In terms of popular perception of his
leadership, Operation Just Cause was a great success (New
York Times. January 5, 1990, article by Michael Oreskes;
December 21, 1989, article by Thomas L. Friedman).
In conclusion, Operation Just Cause seems to have been
an impressive success by almost any standard.

However, the

goal of stemming the flow of drugs through Panama may have
been too ambitious, given both the weakness of the new
democratic government, and the pervasiveness of drug
activities globally.

This failure notwithstanding, U.S.
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intervention seems, on the whole, to have been a success
and Panama is much better because of it.
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CHAPTER V

IRAQ: OPERATION DESERT STORM

Introduction
For most of the decade following the proclamation of
the Carter Doctrine in 1980, it was taken for granted that
any threat to the Middle East that would trigger an
American military response would surely come from the
Soviet Union. During the 1980s, the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism in Iran appeared to emerge as another
serious threat to friends of the United States in the
Persian Gulf. In order to contain Iran, as well as to
present the possibility of prying an ally away from Moscow,
the Reagan and Bush administrations tilted United States
policy in the region toward Iraq. Despite his clearly
aggressive and militaristic nature, few in Washington
seemed to foresee the possibility that Iraq's President
Saddam Hussein would turn his war machine on a fraternal
Arab nation, especially one that had supported Iraq during
its eight-year war against the Teheran theocracy. For this
reason, when the dormant border dispute between Iraq and
Kuwait was revived in 1990, few expected that armed
conflict would be the result. The world community was,
therefore, taken off guard when on August 2, 1990 Iraqi
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troops poured across the border and conquered its hapless
neighbor.
1. What were the prevailing conditions initially within the
"target" country?
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was prompted by a number
of considerations. One such concern, which had been
festering for nearly thirty years, was Baghdad's claim that
Kuwait was a "lost" nineteenth province of Iraq. According
to the Baathist dictatorship, Kuwait had been carved out of
the former Turkish province of Basra by the British
following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Spencer,
1994: 87). The dispute was ostensibly settled by the
recognition of Kuwait by the Baathist regime in 1963.
Tensions over the territorial dispute again flared in
the late 1980s, as the border had split the valuable
Rumalla oil fields between the two states. Consequently,
Iraq charged that Kuwait was cross-drilling the oil fields
in such a way that the emirate was stealing millions of
dollars worth of crude oil. Baghdad charged that, after its
"theft," the oil was being dumped on the international
market, an action which depressed oil prices below OPEC
targets. These actions robbed Iraq of the hard currency
that it needed to finance its war with Iran and subsequent
rebuilding.
Therefore, in 1990, a dispute flared-up when Kuwait
refused Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's demand for
reparations which included: up to $10,000 million in aid;
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"$2,400 million in compensation for 'stolen' oil; the
cancellation of 10,000 million in debts; the renunciation
of Kuwaiti claims to the southern section of the Rumalla
oil fields; and a long-term lease on the islands of Bubiyan
and Warba, both of which lay off Iraq's short Gulf coast"
(Keesing's, August 1990; 37632).
Another motivating factor was most likely Saddam
Hussein's thirst for personal power and influence. He
craved to be acknowledged as leader of the Arab world.
Hussein openly sought to become the "New Nasser."

Only as

such a great leader could he be assured that he would be
accorded respect and that his demands would be taken
seriously. To have his demands so flatly rejected by his
peers was both personally infuriating and frustrating, no
doubt motivating him to action.
Such power could be achieved most effectively and
rapidly by bold, specifically military, action to seize
what Saddam saw as rightfully his. To gain control over
Kuwait would give Hussein over 20% of the world's known oil
reserves and thus grant him tremendous influence over oil
prices should he choose to exercise his prerogative. For
Saddam, the invasion of Kuwait would simultaneously force
reluctant Middle Eastern leaders to recognize his "destiny"
to lead all Arabs, while giving him access to the
tremendous wealth that would allow him to "fulfill his
anti-Western, anti-Israel ambitions" (Brune, 1993; 21).
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When it finally commenced on August 2, 1990, the Iraqi
offensive was swift and decisive. Advance elements of
Baghdad's army reached Kuwait City within 3 1/2 hours of
the start of the operation. Spearheaded by elite Republican
Guard units, the invasion proceeded along a three-prong
battle plan (Watson and Watson, 1993: 15). One army
proceeded directly down the main highway, straight to
Kuwait City. The second prong swept west, seizing Kuwait's
inland oil fields. The third group moved directly to the
Kuwaiti border with Saudi Arabia. The ultimate purpose of
this particular drive, at that moment, was unknown.
The invasion was completed by the fourth day of the
operation. On August 8, 1990, Kuwait was formally annexed
by its conqueror (Keesing's, August 1990: 37635).
The swiftness of the invasion and the resultant
proximity of the world's fourth largest army to the Saudi
Arabian border was of great concern in capital cities both
on the Arabian peninsula and around the world. A fearful
Saudi Arabia mobilized its armed forces on August 4. In
support, British and French warships in the region moved
into the Persian Gulf (Blair, 1992: 13). In a highly
unusual move for the monarchy, Saudi Arabia welcomed
American offers to arrange a deployment of United States
troops onto its soil to defend the Kingdom from a possible
Iraqi invasion. Negotiations between Riyadh and Washington
quickly produced an agreement. With the consent of the
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Saudi Ulemma, the deployment of American forces on Saudi
soil began immediately (Brune, 1993: 57).
In Kuwait, the initial post-invasion situation was
fairly calm. Highly disciplined republican guard units
maintained order. Such units, however, were soon relieved
by the Iraqi General Army, conscripts who lacked the
professionalism of the more elite units. Almost
immediately, this "uniformed rabble" began to engage in
atrocities and various crimes against their newly
incorporated countrymen (Rezun, 1992: 72-3).

Women, both

Kuwaiti and foreign alike, were subject to a vicious orgy
of rape. Soldiers also engaged in widespread looting,
particularly in affluent Kuwait City, much of it organized
by the Baghdad government. Between $3 and $5 billion in
gold, foreign currency, and goods were transferred from
Kuwait to Iraq. Finally, and perhaps most ominously, the
Iraqi secret police dispatched operatives to Kuwait City in
order to round up Iraqi opposition exiles, focussing on
Communist and fundamentalist Shia opposition figures
(Keesing's, August 1990: 37633).
In order to intimidate civilians and discourage
resistance, torture became a prominent feature of Iraqi
occupation. In one particularly heinous episode, Iraqi
secret police cornered a prominent Kuwaiti banker in his
house and gouged his eyes out, while shouting insults and
ridicule at him. In a final act of disdain, the Iraqis
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chainsawed him in front of his family, tossing his
dismembered head into the gutter (Rezun, 1992: 73). The
story that most outraged world opinion, however, was the
one told before a United States Congress committee, in
which Iraqi troops removed Kuwaiti infants from their
hospital incubators, only to have the machines wantonly
destroyed. The accuracy of this tale was subsequently
called into question, but its effect was decisive in
galvanizing world opinion against Iraq.
The reaction of the world community to the invasion
was outrage. The problem was immediately brought before the
United Nations in search of a peaceful resolution through
diplomatic pressure. Between August 2 and November 29,
1990, the UN Security Council passed 12 resolutions aimed
at securing an Iraqi withdrawal. The first was UN Security
Council Resolution 660, which passed unanimously, with
Yemen not participating. This resolution demanded the
immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi
forces from Kuwait, as well as calling for negotiations to
settle outstanding issues. This was the diplomatic
"cornerstone" upon which all subsequent resolutions would
be based. The more important of these resolutions included:
UNSC Res. 661 (Passed 13-0, with Cuba and Yemen
abstaining). This resolution imposed mandatory sanctions
against trade with Iraq and occupied Kuwait.
UNSC Res. 662 (Passed unanimously) This act voided the
Iraqi annexation of Kuwait.
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UNSC Res. 665 (Passed 13-0, with Cuba and Yemen
abstaining). This allowed the use of military force to
enforce the embargo. (Keesing's, August 1990: 37639).
The resolution with the greatest potential effect on
the situation, however, was UNSC Res. 678. This resolution
set the deadline for the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait on
January 15, 1991, after which time the world body
authorized allied military action to eject the invaders. It
was generally understood that January 15 was the deadline
at which time military operations would in fact commence if
the resolutions were not complied with (Keesing's, January
1991: 37934).
Military Build-Up
Within days of the Iraqi invasion, President Bush and
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher met at Aspen,
Colorado, where Thatcher convinced Bush of the seriousness
of the situation and of the need to send troops to head off
a possible Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. The Prime
Minister believed that only the United States was capable
of projecting enough force, with sufficient rapidity, to
deter Saddam from proceeding farther. The President agreed,
but needed to get support from within the Gulf region
before he could deploy the ground forces necessary to
contain the invaders (George et al., 1993: 21).
The Saudi Arabian Ambassador was consulted by
Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and General Colin
Powell in an effort to secure approval to station American
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troops on the Saudi frontier with Kuwait. Although
traditionally reluctant to allow foreign troops on their
soil, the Saudis were convinced that it was necessary when
they were presented with reconnaissance photos showing a
massive Iraqi build-up on their border.
Once Saudi Arabia granted permission for troop
deployment on its territory, other states promptly followed
suit: Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. The next task for the
United States was to begin to forge an alliance of nations
to face down Iraq. This was done not just to avoid the
appearance of the deployment as a case of American neo
colonialism, but also to distribute the burden, both
fiscally and militarily, of deterring Hussein among those
nations which would benefit from doing so. Furthermore, the
formation of such a coalition would make it unmistakenly
clear to the Iraqi dictator that it was the entire world
community that stood against him (George et al., 1993: 22).
The number and variety of forces committed to
Operation Desert Shield varied greatly. Nonetheless it is a
tribute to the diplomatic skills of President George Bush
that he was able to forge an alliance of some 34 nations,
spanning six continents (Blair, 1992: 125). Although the
largest and most operationally diverse forces came from the
major powers (the United States, United Kingdom, France,
Canada, and Italy), it is indeed important to note that
other nations also sent fairly large contingents. The fact
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that Egypt provided 40,000 troops and Syria some 20,000 men
made it substantially more difficult for Saddam Hussein to
rally support from other Arab governments by portraying the
standoff as Iraq defending Arabs and/or Islam from
"American imperialism." Rather, the scope of the coalition
underlined to the Iraqi dictator that he was indeed
isolated, an international pariah. Only Jordan and the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would offer Saddam
any support.
Immediately after the invasion, President Bush ordered
a carrier group to the Persian Gulf (CQWR, August 4, 1990,
article by Carroll J. Doherty, 2533). On August 13, 1990,
allied warships in the region began enforcing a naval
blockade against all Iraqi shipping violating UN-imposed
sanctions.
On August 7, Defense Secretary Cheney announced the
dispatch of United States aircraft to Saudi Arabia. These
planes were to be based principally at the Saudi air base
at Dahran, near the Kuwaiti border. That same day, the
first U.S. ground troops began to arrive. The largest
American deployment since Vietnam was underway (Keesing's,
August 1990: 37636).
By August 25, over 86,000 allied troops had arrived in
Saudi Arabia, over 40,000 of which were American.
Meanwhile, a massive show of United States naval power
began to develop in the waters surrounding the Arabian
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peninsula. Four carrier groups poised for action should it
prove necessary: The USS John F. Kennedy in the eastern
Mediterranean Sea, the USS Eisenhower in the Red Sea near
Suez, the USS Saratoga, also in the Red Sea, and the USS
Independence off the coast of Oman (Keesing's, August 1990:
37634).
In order to free more troops for possible action in
the Persian Gulf, yet maintain deterrent strengths at other
American vital points (i.e. Germany, Korea), President Bush
issued an executive order which called up reservists. Such
mass mobilization had not occurred since 1968, the height
of the Vietnam War.
The projection of American air power from the
continental United States and Europe to the Middle East, in
terms of both time and distance, was the largest in
history. The deployment of warplanes entailed some 46% of
the total combat force based in the United States. The
airlift of personnel and munitions was equivalent to one
1948 Berlin airlift occurring every six weeks (Alonso et
al., 1993: 61).
Air power was deployed in two phases. Phase One, which
lasted five weeks, gave the coalition forces superiority in
both defensive and offensive aircraft. Phase Two, which ran
from November 8, 1990 through January 15, 1991 succeeded in
doubling the number of coalition aircraft present in the
Kuwait theater (Alonso et al., 1993: 62).
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As the January 15, 1991 deadline approached,
diplomatic efforts to break the impasse failed. Saddam
Hussein was intransigent and the increasing international
pressure seemed only to stiffen further his resolve to
resist. By the deadline, however, the coalition forces were
in place. The allies were poised for war.
2. Why did the United States choose to get involved?
The most obvious reason why the United States chose to
get involved in this crisis is that the Middle East is
considered to be a region vital to the national interest,
indeed to national survival. The magnitude of this
commitment was underscored by the enunciation of the Carter
Doctrine during the 1980 State of the Union speech. During
this address, the President made it clear that any attempt
to disrupt the free flow of oil by any power would be
considered an act of war which would, if necessary, be
responded to with military force (Brune, 1993: 52) (For a
more detailed discussion of the Carter Doctrine and the
circumstances prompting its formulation, see Chapter II.)
This 1990 episode was particularly threatening to
American interests because the conquest of Kuwait raised
Iraq's control of total known oil reserves to 20%. If
Saddam's army were to overrun Saudi Arabia, the dictator
would then hold some 60% of the world's most important
commodity. Even without the conquest of Saudi Arabia,
Hussein's share was sufficient that he could effectively
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disrupt the free flow of oil at market prices; an action
that would play havoc with the economies of the Western
democracies, and thus the world (Brune, 1993: 53).
Another reason for United States involvement was the
need to check Iraqi aggression. With the rise of democracy
in Eastern Europe, and elsewhere, it was hoped that a "New
World Order" was emerging, at least in the sense that
nations would shun war as a policy instrument. Hussein's
naked aggression was, therefore, an apparent attempt to
"swim against the current" of recent history. Considering
its implications for the U.S. economy, as well as stability
in the Middle East, President Bush was determined that,
regardless of the means employed, Iraqi aggression must be
rolled back. As he stated in a September 11, 1990 speech to
a joint session of Congress:
America and the world must stand up to
aggression. And we will...An Iraq permitted to
swallow Kuwait would have the economic and
military power, as well as the arrogance, to
intimidate and coerce its neighbors, neighbors
who control the lion's share of the world's
remaining oil reserves. We cannot permit a
resource so vital to be dominated by one so
ruthless and we won't.
Recent events have surely proven that there
is no substitute for American leadership. In the
face of tyranny, let no one doubt America's
credibility and reliability (CQWR, September 15,
1990, transcript of address by President Bush:
2954).
To the world, and now to official Washington, Saddam
was a monster, or as President Bush put it: "another
Hitler." It is common knowledge that Hussein's Iraq is in
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an "elite" group of nations (along with the likes of Iran,
North Korea, and Cuba) that has set the standard by which
political repression and human rights violations are
measured. Thousands of opponents have been killed or
exiled. Hussein's most "outstanding" achievement, however,
has been the use of chemical weapons on his own subjects
during the suppression of a Kurdish rebellion in the 1980s.
His existing reputation for ruthlessness was magnified when
he detained foreigners in Iraq, as well as kidnapping
Kuwaiti civilians, for use a "human shields" so as to
discourage retaliation for his aggression (Brune, 1993:
66). When President Bush, therefore, compared Saddam to
Hitler, and the situation in the Gulf to that on the eve of
World War II, many in the public agreed that there should
be no accommodation for Hussein, no Middle Eastern Munich
Pact (Rezun, 1992: 76).
In the immediate aftermath of the invasion there was a
genuine fear of Iraqi military capabilities with regard to
the Persian Gulf region. With 1,000,000 men under arms,
Iraq possessed the world's fourth largest army; an army
that had become seasoned by eight years of war with Iran
(Keesing's, August 1990: 37633). As awesome as such a large
military force was, it paled in comparison with the threat
posed by Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Although its
original breeder-reactor was destroyed by a 1981 Israeli
air raid, by 1990, Iraq's nuclear program was sufficiently
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advanced that experts predicted that an operational nuclear
device was within three years of completion.
Soviet-built Scud missiles, modified to increase their
range, would allow Baghdad to hit targets throughout the
Middle East and Turkey. Furthermore, Iraq was developing
significant chemical and biological warfare capabilities.
Polling data showed that most Americans favored war if Iraq
posed a nuclear threat (Brune, 1993: 67).
This fear of Iraqi capabilities lead to a concern
that, if the United States did not get involved in the
crisis, Israel might be tempted again to knock-out Saddam's
ability to produce weapons of mass destruction. After all,
it was a virtual certainty that this arsenal was developed
with the intention of eventual use on the Jewish state.
Reasons for the Offensive War
The discussion above has outlined the reasons for
initial American involvement in the Persian Gulf. Operation
Desert Shield, however was ostensibly a "defensive"
deployment. There are several additional reasons why it was
decided that offensive operations should be undertaken in
January 1991 to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
The most prominent reason was a belief that, after six
months of an extremely tight embargo, sanctions were not
having their desired effect; all that they in fact
accomplished was to starve the poor. In the view of
American military experts, the expected degradation of
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Iraqi military readiness never came (U.S. News and World
Report [U.S. News], 1992: 187). Although some in the White
House (principally General Powell) argued for more time,
perhaps up to a year more, for sanctions to work, other
concerns more than offset their arguments.
The most important of these arguments was that the
international coalition, composed as it was of extremely
disparate states, could not be held together indefinitely.
The state of readiness of coalition troops was a second
factor. Because of the need to "rotate out" forces,
readiness could not be maintained under the operational and
environmental conditions imposed by Desert Shield for a
prolonged period. Furthermore, if Saddam managed to turn
the situation into a Arab-Israeli conflict during the
additional waiting period, there was a real possibility
that the coalition could be shattered by essential Arab
participants withdrawing their forces (Brune, 1993: 97;
Hilsman, 1992: 84).
There was also a concern about the effect of the
weather on military operation against Iraq. Optimal
conditions for warfare on the coalition's terms would exist
only for a brief period between mid-January and mid-March.
To launch offensive operations any later would put the
coalition at a disadvantage due to summer heat (Tsouras and
Wright et al., 1993: 89).
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There was a cultural factor that affected the timing
of the ground war. Ramadan, the Muslim holy month of
fasting and repentance, was scheduled to begin on March 17.
To fight during this period would cause undue friction
within the coalition, as well as allowing some propaganda
advantage to accrue to Saddam in the eyes of fellow
Muslims.
Finally, it was President Bush's strong conviction
that negotiations had reached an impasse. Any further talks
were viewed as a cynical attempt by Saddam to stall for
more time (Hilsman, 1992: 92-3).
All of these factors, combined with the growing
realization that sanctions alone would not force Hussein
from Kuwait, lead to the decision to launch the offensive
fCOWR. January 19, 1991, transcript of address by President
Bush: 197). Desert Shield would now become Desert Storm.
3. What were the intended results, or objectives, of
American intervention?
During an August 8, 1990 address, President Bush
enumerated those goals which would form the basis of United
States policy regarding Iraq. These goals included (1) the
immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces
from occupied Kuwait, (2) the restoration of the legitimate
Kuwaiti government (the al-Sabah monarchy), (3) the
protection of the lives of U.S. citizens in Iraq and Kuwait
[as noted above, many were being held as "human shields"],
and finally (4) the establishment of regional security and
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stability in the Persian Gulf basin (Keesing's, August
1990: 37638).
There seemed to be, however, an additional, hidden
objective. The fourth goal, the one concerning regional
stability, seemed to indicate the specific goal of removing
Hussein from power and neutralizing Iraq’s war machine, as
well as its stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. This
was at least partially confirmed by Bush himself during his
January 16, 1991 address from the Oval Office when he
stated:
We are determined to knock out Saddam Hussein's
nuclear bomb potential. We will also destroy his
chemical weapons facilities. Much of Saddam's
artillery and tanks will be destroyed (COWR.
January 19, 1991, transcript of address by
President Bush: 197).
Although Bush would later deny any intent to kill or
remove Saddam, it was made clear by the selection of
certain targets, in particular a bunker that he was known
to use, that the Iraqi dictator was a target. The air force
even developed, and used, a new "bunker-buster" bomb that
could penetrate layers of concrete and reinforcement (for a
detailed discussion, see U.S. News, 1992: 3-6).
Bush's speech also revealed a fifth, more long-term
objective: the establishment of a "New World Order." In the
aftermath of the Cold War, Bush envisioned a world system
that recalled Kissinger's A World Restored: international
relations guided by certain principles that were enforced
by the world community at large. In Bush's conception, the
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United Nations would fulfill this role as a global enforcer
in order to insure compliance. As the President stated:
Out of these troubled times...A New World Order can emerge: a new era - freer from the threat of
terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and
more secure in the guest for peace, an era in
which the nations of the world...can prosper and
live in harmony fCOWR. September 15, 1990,
transcript of address by President Bush: 2953).
Later, he defined the New World Order as "a world
where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs
the conduct of nations." Furthermore, Bush foresaw "an
order in which a credible United Nations can use its
peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise envisioned of the
UN's founders" fCOWR. January 17, 1991, transcript of
address by President Bush: 197).
The Bush objectives were largely, although not
totally, codified into UN policy by UNSC Res. 678 which
authorized the use of force to enforce the earlier UN
resolutions concerning Kuwait. Specifically, it was the
"enabling legislation" which would allow enforcement of
Resolution 660. It was careful, however, to limit the
United Nation's commitment simply to eject Iraq from
Kuwait. Given the broader American objectives, however,
there seemed to be a tension between Washington's and New
York's objectives. The most obvious question emerging from
this tension was: could the armed forces of the United
States "legally" remove Hussein from power during the
course of the war? [The full text of all U.N. resolutions
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can be found in the appendix of U.S. News and World Report,
1992].
Operational Goals
The operational goals for the Gulf War were developed
by the Central Command (CENTCOM) commander General Norman
Schwartzkopf and his staff as early as 1990. The first
phase of the war was going to be an extensive air campaign.
The allies were to establish air superiority at the
earliest possible time. If command of the skies could be
quickly achieved, it would have the dual effect of both
simplifying the achievement of the other operational
objectives as well as reducing coalition casualties
(Hilsman, 1992: 84).
The initial air campaign would not be aimed at Kuwait,
but rather against Iraq itself. This is because it was
considered important to "blind" the enemy by destroying
radar facilities and to knock out the Iraqi command and
control system, much of it located in Baghdad. By
destroying these command facilities, it was hoped that
enemy forces could largely be immobilized. Since the
bunkers where these facilities were located also would be
the place that Hussein would most likely be once
hostilities commenced, it was hoped that air strikes
against them would, perhaps, yield the added benefit of
killing the Iraqi dictator (Brune, 1993: 108).
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The next operational goal would be to neutralize the
Iraqi army in Kuwait by disrupting supply lines, as well as
destroying both armor and artillery. Such intense bombing
would also have the ancillary effect of demoralizing Iraqi
conscripts who made up the bulk of the occupation army in
Kuwait (Alonso, 1993: 64). The third goal would be to
destroy industrial targets essential to the war effort,
such as factories, warehouses, and communications
facilities, as well as infrastructure targets such as
bridges roads, and railways (Hilsman, 1992: 96).
Finally, once the ground campaign had begun, coalition
armies would swing around the far side of Kuwait and cut
off Iraqi forces from their reinforcements. The liberation
of Kuwait would then be achieved with a direct drive of
coalition forces from northeastern Saudi Arabia to Kuwait
City.
Once hostilities began, however, priorities shifted
slightly. Going to the top of the list was the destruction
of chemical/biological/nuclear weapons facilities and the
hunt for both stationary and mobile Scud missile launchers.
The latter was especially important because success would
mean destruction of a capability to deliver weapons of mass
destruction against coalition bases and/or urban centers.
Failure to achieve this goal, however, would leave open the
possibility that the Scuds could be used as a V-2 style
terror weapon against Israel. If that were to occur,
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Jerusalem's entry into the conflict would dramatically
change the scenario.
4. What was the nature of the operation?
Operation Desert Shield was a multilateral operation.
The coalition forces were drawn from 34 nations, united
under the auspices of the United Nations. Despite the
official classification as a UN mission, the command of
military forces was clearly under American leadership. It
should be noted, however, that because President Bush
sought, and obtained, a use of force authorization from the
world body, he was now bound to act within the parameters
allowed by the resolutions that the Security Council had
passed since August of 1991.
Getting the blessing of the United Nations had both
advantages and disadvantages. In the months leading to
January 1991, Bush was able to use the UN resolutions as
both a tool to rally domestic and world opinion and as a
means to coerce (or embarrass) the Congress to grant him a
use of force resolution (which was passed in January 1991).
However, once committed to the UN, Bush was reluctant to
exceed the mandate that provided the legal basis for the
use of force.
Although the public rationale for action was rather
Wilsonian, specifically the desire to roll back aggression
and restore Kuwaiti sovereignty, clearly there was a
deeper, underlying motive. It is a matter for debate
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whether the major powers, which dominate the UN Security
Council, would have been as concerned about the admittedly
naked aggression, and the subsequent "death" of a UN member
state, if these were the only reasons for involvement.
Clearly the commitment of over a half million American
soldiers would have been difficult, if not impossible, if
it were not rooted in healthy self-interest, in this case,
access to the region's oil at market prices. There is no
doubt that there was clear outrage and disgust over
humanitarian concerns, especially the heinous and flagrant
disregard of human rights by Iraq within occupied Kuwait.
This, however, seems to have been more of a rallying point
for public opinion, rather than a motive to action.
5. What was the American domestic political climate during
this crisis?
Throughout the crisis, President Bush's handling of
the situation enjoyed majority support in public opinion
polls. Although it was at its peak in August of 1990, the
President's approval rating for his management of the
Persian Gulf crisis never dropped below 50 percent during
the months leading to war fCOWR. January 5, 1991, article
by Holly Idelson: 14). ABC News/Washington Post polls taken
during the crisis showed continuous support for military
action, if that was what the situation required.
Furthermore, support for such action never fell below
65% during the crisis. On the eve of war, it was recorded
as high as 74% (Mueller 1994: 217). As a matter of fact, it
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is believed that the slippage of Mr. Bush's personal
approval rating in mid-to-late 1990 was due to two other
factors. First, some of the reduction in popularity can be
attributed to a "spillover" effect from the public's
impatience with the President (and Congress) during
acrimonious fighting over the budget. One may recall that
1990 was the year that the President broke his famous "read
my lips" pledge and allowed congressional Democrats to
impose what was, at that time, the largest tax increase in
United States history (Mueller, 1994: 116). The second
force acting to depress the president's polling numbers
were those hawks, generally more politically conservative
voters, who did not think that Mr. Bush was going fast, or
hard, enough in pressuring Saddam Hussein. They demanded
more militaristic rhetoric and stepped-up preparations for
action (COWR. January 15, 1991, article by Holly Idelson:
16).
However, as is the case with all polling data, and
consequently a weakness of quantitative methods, by
changing the phasing of a question, the pollster can
manipulate its results. For example, in an NBC News poll
taken in early December 1990, respondents were asked:
"Would you favor or oppose the U.S.' going to war against
Iraq if Iraq does not withdraw its troops from Kuwait by
the United Nations deadline of January 15?" The answer was
54 percent in favor, 34 percent opposed, with 12 percent
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undecided. However, when given a choice between force and a
continued embargo, there was an almost even split.
Presented with yet a third scenario, should the United
States go to war if other nations did not contribute
"significant military forces," the numbers dropped to 34
percent in favor, 58 percent opposed, and 8 percent
undecided. The same poll showed that the dovish position of
getting an agreement that would get Iraq out of Kuwait, but
in return give Baghdad some control of the disputed oil
fields, had the support of a slim majority of Americans.
However, in another poll, 49% said that a successful United
States policy must not only secure Iraqi withdrawal from
Kuwait, but also remove Saddam from power, a position more
hawkish than articulated U.S. policy goals (CQWR, January
5, 1991, article by Holly Idelson: 15). Because of shifts
such as these, pollsters cautioned against using any single
polling question as a definitive reading of the public
mood. (For a more detailed account of various polling data
and their interpretation, see Mueller, 1994).
Congressional Mood
In the immediate aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait in August 1990, there was strong bipartisan support
for the President's policies regarding the Persian Gulf
crisis. Even liberal Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT)
conceded: "My own view is that at some point military
action is probably going to be necessary" (COWR. August 4,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

161

1990, article by Carroll J. Doherty: 2533). The House gave
its solid support to a hard-line policy against Iraq by
passing a tough sanctions bill by a vote of 416-0. Although
the Senate declined to sign on to that particular measure,
it did pass a resolution essentially endorsing the policy
of the Bush administration. Passing by a vote of 97-0, the
resolution urged the President to seek a diplomatic
solution, while conceding that a multilateral military
action "may be needed to maintain or restore" regional
stability. It should be noted that both houses did pass
anti-Baghdad sanctions as amendments to farm bills irj late
July fCOWR. August 4, 1990, article by Carroll J. Doherty:
2533).
Democrats, however, admonished the President that
their support in the early stages of the crisis was not a
blank check to engage in military operations without
congressional consent. Senate Majority Leader George
Mitchell (D-ME) stated "approval for past actions isn't
blanket approval for all future actions" (Doherty,
September 1, 1990: 2777). This sentiment was echoed by Rep.
Dante Fascell (D-FL), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee: "Nobody wants to give the administration an
open-ended commitment" (COWR. September 8, 1990, article by
Carroll J. Doherty: 2838).
Some Democratic critics of President Bush were
concerned, even early in the crisis, that the
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administration should act, if at all, only with allied
military and financial support for the action guaranteed.
One such voice was that of Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-CO):
"I have real questions obviously about what we're doing to
get some real substantial support from our allies besides
votes in the United Nations" (CQWR, September 1, 1990,
report by Carroll J. Doherty: 2777). Senator Claiborne Pell
(D-R.I.), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee was more adamant, stating that he would not give
advance authorization for "unilateral" American military
action, advocating instead a multilateral approach fCOWR.
October 20, 1990, report by Carroll J. Doherty: 3536). Even
influential Republican Richard Lugar (R-IN) advocated the
establishment of an international "United Way" fund to
underwrite the costs of deploying U.S. troops in the region
(COWR.

September 8, 1990, article by Carroll J. Doherty:

2839).
There were, however, equally vocal critics who faulted
Bush for not going far enough. Rep. Stephen Solarz (DN.Y.), normally one of the most liberal members of
Congress, insisted that the only acceptable American policy
toward Iraq was one which results in the removal of
Hussein. Solarz called any resolution that left the Iraqi
dictator in power a "Pyrrhic Victory." In early September,
Solarz told Secretary of State Baker that he could count on
congressional support "for whatever steps are deemed
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essential in order to liquidate the consequences of this
aggression” (COWR. September 8, 1990, article by Carroll J.
Doherty: 2839).
Most in Congress seemed to agree with House Majority
Leader Richard Gephardt that the United States was the only
nation capable of putting together and leading an alliance
to compel Iraq to leave Kuwait. Speaking for his party in
the response to the President's September 11, 1990 address
to a joint session of Congress, Gephardt said: "America is
still the leader - the only power capable of summoning a
grand and global alliance on the scale we have seen in
Operation Desert Shield” (COWR. September 15, 1990,
transcript of address by Representative Gephardt: 2956).
As noted earlier, Congress passed resolutions
supportive of deployment for Operation Desert Shield and
the Bush policy. There was, however, a nagging fear among
some in Congress that such on-the-record statements of
support might be interpreted by the Bush administration as
a 1990 edition of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which was
used by President Johnson to dramatically escalate American
involvement in Vietnam (COWR. September 29, 1990, article
by Carroll J. Doherty: 3140). Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD),
for example, spoke of his "strongly held view (that) the
commitment of American forces by the President in a major
assault to drive Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait would require
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an authorization from Congress" (COWR. October 20, 1990,
article by Carroll J. Doherty: 3535).
There was also a concern that the President might
attempt to present Congress with a fait accompli by not
consulting with the congressional leadership until after
the inflow of casualties began (COWR. October 13, 1990,
article by Carroll J. Doherty: 3440). This feeling had some
basis in fact when key members of Congress [specifically
Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and William Cohen (R-ME)] were not
consulted regarding the deployment of the United States
armed forces. Nunn, in particular, claimed that he found
out about the initial deployment only "after the fact."
The clamor to compel the President to invoke the War
Powers Act as a means of obtaining a de facto declaration
of war, however, was not universally acclaimed. Some
members, including Rep. Fascell, were fearful that to do so
would tie the President's hands during the crisis and
embolden Saddam Hussein, a dictator free of such
constraints (COWR. September 29, 1990, article by Carroll
J. Doherty: 3142).
A constant refrain heard on Capitol Hill was "no more
Vietnams." There seemed to be, however, no consensus about
the meaning of the slogan as its meaning shifted from
member to member (COWR. January 5, 1991, report by Holly
Idelson: 14). For liberals it meant that the government
should not engage in a war without first developing strong
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public support, although these members seem to have
forgotten that Vietnam was quite popular up until 1967-68
and the Tet offensive. For conservatives, the phase meant
that if the country were to commit itself to military
action, America should go in "to win." Specifically, this
meant giving the army all that it believed it needed to
carry out its mission, and then allowing it to do so
without the war effort being micro-managed from the White
House.
In the months leading up to January 1991, President
Bush would not acknowledge the need to invoke the War
Powers Act and congressional Democrats were exceedingly
reluctant to press the issue (Keesing's, January 1991:
37934). Up until the final debate on a use of force
resolution, the attitude of Democrats in both houses toward
the impending war was unclear. This was, no doubt, due to a
no-win situation that they saw themselves in. If they were
to sanction the use of force, the public would hold them as
co-responsible with the administration if the war turned
into a debacle for American forces. However, if the
Democrats were to vote against the resolution, it would be
yet another time they would appear unpatriotic, a charge
that Republicans had used, with some success, during the
Cold War. The split in the Democratic ranks became very
obvious when the liberal Stephen Solarz not only became a
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leading advocate of war, but also a co-sponsor of the use
of force resolution.
After passionate debate, the House approved House
Joint Resolution 77 (the use of force resolution) by a vote
of 250-183. As was the case in the early Reagan years, the
winning side was a nearly unanimous Republican vote (all
but 3 representative or 98% of House Republicans) and the
preponderance of Southern Democrats.
In the Senate, the vote for Senate Joint Resolution 2
was much closer, passing 52-47. There, 95 percent, or all
but 2 GOP Senators voted to approve the resolution. They
were joined by 10 Democrats including Senator Albert Gore
(D-TN)

(COWR.

January 19, 1991, report by Rhodes Cook,

Ronald D. Elving et al.: 190). (For an outstanding account
of the vote and a breakdown of vote categories, please see
Cook and Elving, et al., in COWR. January 19, 1991: 190195.)
6. What was the position of the military leadership
regarding the operation?
The initial deployment for Operation Desert Shield had
the strong support of the senior military leadership. The
operation largely conformed to a pre-existing Pentagon
contingency plan: Plan 1002-90. This provided for a
commitment of forces to defend Saudi Arabia, but provided
for no offensive capability (U.S. News, 1992: 42-3). The
plan called for the deployment of two combat divisions,
plus air force planes and naval vessels. The total
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commitment of manpower under the plan was 200,000 troops.
It was estimated that it would take 17 weeks to mount this
defensive operation (Brune, 1993: 60-1).
A controversial element of the plan as it was
originally conceived was that it called for naval aircraft
to carry out retaliatory air raids against the aggressor.
Such strikes could inflict damage on the enemy, but
unfortunately probably could not be sustained without a
larger military presence. Early in the crisis, JCS Chairman
General Colin Powell declared his opposition to such raids.
Believing that such actions would either accomplish nothing
meaningful, or worse, actually provoke an invasion of Saudi
Arabia, Powell stated: "There was no point in doing a
retaliatory strike...You either reverse an invasion or you
don't. But to go pinprick at something had no relevance”
(U.S. News, 1992: 51). During the Fall and Winter of 199091, Powell continued to favor the strategy essentially
envisioned in plan 1002-90, that is, militarily
"containing” Hussein's forces, while allowing the sanctions
to slowly exact their toll (U.S. News, 1992: 157).
General Norman Schwartzkopf, the CENTCOM commander,
however, was working on new plans. Such planning, even as a
contingency, was necessary because both military and
political leaders agreed that a decision on whether to take
the offensive would have to be made early so as to allow
for a sufficient military build-up in the theater.
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Schwartzkopf placed his faith in a group of "young
Turk" military planners nicknamed the "Jedi Knights."
Their philosophy was that military action should
concentrate on the maximum use of speed and mobility in
order to defeat a larger enemy force. Haunted by the
specter of Vietnam, CENTCOM planners decided that any
ground campaign "must be short, sharp, and decisive, with
minimum casualties." They believed that this could be
achieved by making use of the allies' technological air
superiority to soften-up Iraqi forces before the offensive
(Tsouras and Wright et al., 1993: 89).
By October 1990, Schwartzkopf was finally comfortable
with his defensive position in Saudi Arabia. At this time,
President Bush ordered the build-up called for in the
offensive plans to commence (Brune, 1993: 61).
Upon receiving the President's order, Powell asked
Schwartzkopf, as theater commander, to define what forces
would be required for a successful offensive (Brune, 1993:
61). Powell and Secretary of Defense Cheney then went about
the business of planning the outlines of the shape that the
offensive would take. Because the Iraqis had heavily
fortified the Kuwaiti border with Saudi Arabia, the duo
decided to simply bypass the Iraqi defenses. In a maneuver
dubbed the "left hook," allied forces would swing west,
into the desert interior of Saudi Arabia and cross directly
into Iraq. Then, armor would speed across southern Iraq and
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cut off Iraqi occupation forces from their reinforcements
in Basra. This move, if successful, would force the
Republican Guard to race back to Basra lest Saddam's second
largest city fall to coalition forces.
Schwartzkopf, as the theater commander, would be given
free reign to "fill in the blanks" of the actual execution
of the operation as he saw fit (U.S. News, 1992: 168-9).
The final plan was presented to President Bush by General
Powell on December 1, 1990 and the President accepted it
almost immediately (U.S.News, 1992: 168).
One point must be clarified, to the extent possible.
General Powell and other military leaders seem to have been
in basic agreement that force was necessary, although there
was disagreement regarding its timing and nature. It
appears from most versions of the deliberations that
Schwartzkopf believed that the conditions for action would
be optimal in the winter, especially January and February.
General Powell, however, argued that sanctions should be
allowed more time to work. The result of a continued
"siege" of Iraq would be that the enemy would become
increasingly hard pressed to obtain spare parts and food,
thus greatly reducing his readiness. Bush, pressed by
political considerations, endorsed the earliest possible
start of the offensive after the expiration of the UN
deadline. The stage was set for war.
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7. How vas the operation actually carried out?
The long anticipated offensive, code named Operation
Desert Storm, began on January 15, 1991 with a massive air
attack (Keesing's, January 1991: 37936). Schwartzkopf's
strategy, as was noted earlier, was to use the air war as a
means of wearing down the enemy. This was especially
appealing for four reasons. First, Iraq presented a targetrich environment. Second, Iraq had no experience against
such a massive, concentrated air attack. Third, the
availability to the coalition forces of sophisticated
munitions gave the allies technological superiority that
would maximize the damage inflicted while minimizing
casualties. Finally, the relentless pounding would, as it
later became evident, destroy morale in the enemy rear
(Rezun, 1992: 80).
The first priority of the air campaign was to destroy
Iraq's command and control facilities. This began
immediately at the start of the conflict at midnight
Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). Allied forces made use of their
advantages, especially nightfighting capabilities (Hilsman,
1992: 97). The opening salvos of the war were fired by F117A Stealth fighters and by navy frigates in the Persian
Gulf and the Red Sea which launched Tomahawk cruise
missiles at targets in and around Baghdad.
The F-117A and Tomahawk strikes were aimed at "cutting
off the head" of the Iraqi military so that it would be
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unable to transmit orders effectively to its troops in the
field, thus making coordinated action difficult, if not
impossible.
The second priority was to blind radar installations
and surface to air defense missiles (SAMs). Helicopter
gunships struck these sites almost immediately.
The third priority was to destroy factories,
laboratories, and depots, as well as inflicting heavy
losses on elite troops dug in the Iraqi rear, along with
their supporting tanks and artillery. A final goal was to
hit telephone and electrical facilities (Rezun, 1992: 8993) .
The air war was the most intensive air operation in
history. During the first 72 hours, coalition forces
averaged one sortie per minute (Brune, 1993: 108). Allied
aircraft averaged a total of 3,000-4,000 sorties per day
(Rezun, 1992: 91). Air forces involved units drawn from the
United States, United Kingdom, France Canada, Italy,
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (Alonso et al., 1993: 65).
Coalition forces rapidly gained control of the skies
over Iraq. Part of the reason for this was that allied
quantitative and qualitative advantages allowed the
coalition to dominate the inferior Iraqi air force. As a
result, Saddam simply conceded the skies to the coalition.
After a drubbing in dogfights with coalition aircraft early
in the air war, Hussein simply withdrew his aircraft from
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the battle zone. About 700 planes were moved to safety in
northern Iraq or sent to seek refuge in Iran. The only
defenses remaining were anti-aircraft guns and largely
ineffective Soviet-made SAMs (Keesing's, January 1991:
37936).
During the course of the war, air to air combat losses
were stunningly one sided; the Iraqis lost 35 planes, yet
the coalition lost none (Alonso et al., 1993: 70). Total
aircraft loss figures were equally impressive. Iraq had 127
planes confirmed as destroyed, 141 estimated losses, and
148 flown to refuge in Iran, for a total of 416 aircraft
lost. Coalition forces lost only 63 planes, of which only
24 were American planes lost due to combat (Alonso and
Watson, 1993: 228-230).
After destroying major strategic targets in Iraq, the
focus of the air war shifted to Iraqi troops stationed in
Kuwait and the routes used to supply them. Republican Guard
units, 120,000 strong, were heavily attacked at their
fortified positions just north of the Iraqi border with
Kuwait. By February 3, 25 of the 30 bridges leading to
Kuwait had been destroyed. The resulting bottlenecks
allowed allied air forces to wreak havoc on the Iraqi
supply and communication lines.
The bombing had a devastating effect. By mid February
1991, Iraqi forces had lost an estimated 750 tanks, 650
artillery pieces, and 600 armored personnel carriers in the
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Kuwait theater of operations (Keesing's, February 1991:
37983-37984).
Ground Offensive
The allied ground offensive began at 4:00 A.M. local
time on February 24, 1991. The coalition launched a threeprong attack over a 480 km. front. The bombing campaign had
its intended effect as the allies encountered only light
resistance. (Keesing's, February 1991: 37983-37984).
The goal of the allied strategy was to use its
superior speed and firepower to engage the enemy in a short
war with few casualties by utilizing flanking movements
(U.S.News, 1992: 275).

Iraqi forces were initially frozen

into place by coalition diversionary tactics. Iraqi
conventional wisdom was that the allies would open the
ground war with an amphibious assault on coastal Kuwait,
done with the aim of liberating Kuwait City as soon as
possible. Schwartzkopf encouraged this belief by faking the
preparations for such an operation. With Iraqi forces thus
occupied, the allies were free to execute their strategy
(COWR.

March 2, 1991, article by Pat Towell, 552).

One prong of the three-prong offensive, composed of
Arab divisions and U.S. Marines breached the so-called
"strip of death" and drove toward Kuwait City. The advance
forces were aided by Iraqi POWs who alerted field
commanders as to the location of minefields and other
defenses (Keesing's, February 1991: 37985).
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Most of the coalition's forces were committed to the
"left hook" or the "Hail Mary," as it was popularly known.
Rather than attack Kuwait and deal with the elaborate World
War I vintage defenses, most of the allied forces were
positioned west of Kuwait so as to outflank enemy forces.
This second prong consisted of the bulk of allied armor.
Outflanking the main enemy lines, these units drove
straight into southeastern Iraq. There they engaged
Republican Guard units which were dug in just south of
Basra.
The third prong, consisting of French and American
units, swung far to the west, advancing on the Iraqi city
of Nasiriyah on the Euphrates River. Armored units
destroyed an Iraqi division near the junction town of As
Salam. Once the area was secured, 400 helicopters were used
to set up an allied supply base 60 miles inside Iraq
(Brune, 1993: 115).
The net result was a rapid, overwhelming victory for
the coalition. The first prong liberated Kuwait City on
February 27, 1991. The second prong engaged Republican
Guard units and soundly defeated them in an intense tank
battle. Coalition forces then drove north to lay siege to
Basra. The third prong successfully cut off reinforcements
from entry into the theater of operation (Brune, 1993:
117). The Iraqis were so quickly and decisively defeated
that Schwartzkopf would later assert that if he had turned
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his forces northward, nothing could have prevented the
capture of Baghdad.
The one-sided nature of the ground war can largely be
attributed to the tactics that each side employed. The
styles of warfare contrasted so greatly that it has been
said that the Iraqis were fighting World War I while the
coalition campaign resembled World War III. The reliance of
the Iraqis on inferior Soviet weaponry and a war of
attrition may have worked against Iran in the 1980s, but
they proved no match for a modern army. The coalition's use
of movement and its technological superiority virtually
guaranteed an allied victory (Rezun, 1992: 94). The war's
final major battle was to graphically illustrate this
point.
Iraqi forces, ordered to surrender by the coalition,
instead chose to retreat northward along the main highway
that connected Kuwait City with Iraq. The slow-moving
columns, heavily laden with captured booty, were spotted by
allied aircraft. In what was described by the press (and
some pilots) as a "turkey shoot," the Iraqis were hit on
all sides by allied aircraft. The resulting panic caused a
traffic jam which allowed attacking aircraft to inflict
heavy casualties. The result was a three mile long "highway
of death," a near apocalyptic scene of burned out tanks and
trucks, along with perhaps thousands of charred bodies
(Brune, 1993: 188; Keesing's, February 1991: 37985-6).
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Although these airstrikes were criticized as causing
needless deaths, it could have been prevented if Hussein
had ordered a proper surrender. An angry Schwartzkopf
defended the action by reminding his critics that the
allies would not attack any Iraqi soldiers who left their
vehicles and offered to surrender. Those who chose to flee
in tanks or any other military vehicles were to be
considered as legitimate targets if they did not comply
(U.S. News, 1992: 395-6).
The coalition victory was so overwhelming that
President Bush, perhaps taking the sensitivities of his
Arab coalition partners into account, decided to end the
ground war nearly two days ahead of schedule. Bush declared
an informal ceasefire, to take effect at 5:00 A.M. GMT on
February 28 (Keesing's, February 1991: 37986).
8. What types and quantities of forces were used?
The total of allied forces committed in Operation
Desert Storm numbered 700,000 (Keesing's, February 1991:
37986). The United States contingent was the largest by
far, as 532,000 American soldiers were deployed to the
region. Although information concerning allied aircraft and
carrier groups were provided above, it bears mentioning
that the United States also dispatched 2,000 tanks to the
Kuwait theater of operations.
The positioning of coalition forces in general, and
American troops in particular, allowed the allies to strike
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at Iraq from virtually every direction. As noted earlier,
carrier groups were maintained in the Red Sea, the Persian
Gulf, and the eastern Mediterranean. Likewise, land-based
aircraft were flown from bases in Saudi Arabia (principally
the airbase at Dahran), eastern Turkey, and the island of
Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean (Tsouras et al., 1993:
241). Diego Garcia had been site for the prepositioning of
equipment, as well as a base of operation for massive
American B-52 bombers (Brune, 1993: 54; Hilsman, 1992:
115) .
Once war had been decided upon, President Bush
committed himself to providing the armed forces everything
that the theater commander requested (U.S. News, 1992:
172). A wide variety of forces were used in unprecedented
numbers, some seeing combat for the first time ever. The
types of units deployed can most efficiently be reviewed by
outlining the major weapons used. Units of note included
the following:
The M1A1 was perhaps the most advanced tank on the
battlefield. Given Iraqi chemical warfare capabilities, the
M1A1 was especially valuable because its pressurized cabin
would have rendered Iraqi poison gas useless in stopping an
allied advance. It also has tougher armor than other tanks
used (U.S. News, 1992: 166). The MlAl's most important
asset was its superior firepower and maneuverability. Its
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longer range cannon prevents an enemy from getting close
enough to effectively engage the M1A1 (Brune, 1993: 177).
Another weapon that was highly effective against Iraqi
armor was the A-10 Thunderbolt. Affectionately called the
"Warthog" because of its ugly appearance, the A-10 had the
ability to spend up to 45 minutes over a target. This
attribute made it ideal for hunting Scud launchers. The
"Warthog” was built to fly even if it were heavily damaged.
The A-10's real value, however, was in its two major
attributes. First, it was a proven tank-killer. Its 30 mm
nose cannon fires heavy shells made of depleted uranium and
it can carry up to eight tons of ordinance. Among the
weapons that it can utilize are lazar-guided bombs and
Maverick anti-tank missiles.
Second, the A-10 provides effective close ground
support for troops. By flying at a relatively slow 420 mph,
it is ideal for ground cover. These planes are able to
remain "at station" for two hours on battlefields up to 250
miles from base. While there were only 144 such planes in
the Kuwait theater, the A-10 flew approximately 30% of all
combat sorties and accounted for more than 50% of the
destruction of Iraqi field equipment (U.S. News, 1992: 160,
322) .
The F-117A Stealth fighter again saw action in the
Gulf. This time it was more extensively used than had been
the case in Panama, and it proved to be extremely lethal.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

179

Despite its classification as a fighter, it acted as a very
effective penetrating bomber (U.S. News, 1992: 239). Due to
its "stealth," that is to say its radar-proof contours, it
was consistently able to elude Iraqi air defenses. No F117As were lost during the air campaign, despite the
fighter's central role in destroying enemy air defenses
(Brune, 1993: 174).
Although it comprised only 2.5% of the air forces used
in the war, the F-117A was responsible for hitting 31% of
all Iraqi targets on the first day (Rezun, 1992: 64). The
Stealth fighter, however, was not without its
disappointments. First, it did not prove to be as effective
at hunting Iraqi Scuds as expected (Brune, 1993: 111).
Second, the laser-guided bombs that the F-117A used were
only 60% accurate, rather than the 90% originally reported.
This lower figure, however, still represented a vast
qualitative improvement over the conventional bombs
utilized during Vietnam (Brune, 1993: 178).
The war in the Gulf marked the first major combat use
of so-called "smart bombs." Originally developed as a
weapon for use against Soviet forces in the European
theater, they come in both laser and optically (using
television images) guided models (Alonso et al., 1993: 75).
There have been major disputes over how effective such
weapons are. This is because, contrary to video presented
to the press during the war, such weapons are not 100%
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effective. However, while laser-guided bombs accounted for
only 7-10% of all ordinance dropped during the conflict,
they hit their targets an impressive 80% of the time
(Hilsman, 1992: 157).
Another Cold War weapon that saw its first combat use
was the Tomahawk cruise missile. Originally developed as a
highly accurate drone that could deliver nuclear warheads
deep within Soviet territory by flying below defense radar,
the Tomahawk was perhaps the most technically sophisticated
weapon in the coalition arsenal. Fired from navy missile
frigates, these missiles have on-board computers that
contain electronic maps which help the Tomahawk closely
follow topographical contours and allow for extremely
specific targeting. It is reported to be so accurate that
it can be programmed to fly through a building's window to
strike at an internal target (Rezun, 1992: 84; U.S.News,
1992: 222). A total of 284 Tomahawks were fired during the
38 day air war.
Originally believed to be able to hit its target as
much as 85% of the time, some of the Tomahawk's critics
contend that its accuracy was probably closer to 50
percent. However, as is the case with smart bombs, even
this lower figure indicates an improvement in missile
accuracy (Brune, 1993: 108, 179).
A major advantage of cruise missiles, like the
Tomahawk, is that they greatly reduce pilot exposure over

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

181

heavily defended targets, especially during daylight hours
(Alonso et al., 1993: 64). Used as a means of destroying
enemy airfields, it was also said to have been more
effective than bombs in destroying hardened bunkers. The
effectiveness of the Tomahawks was further improved when
they were used in conjunction with unarmed drones which
diverted and confused enemy defenses (U.S. News, 1992:
223) .
The weapon that is perhaps most closely associated
with the Persian Gulf War is the Patriot Missile. Presented
to the public during the war as an anti-missile, it was
originally to be used as the ground-based component of the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or "Star Wars"). During
the conflict, it was deployed as a defense against Iraqi
Scud missile terror bombing against Saudi Arabia, and
later, Israel (Rezun, 1992:84). Patriot battery operators
man radars that track incoming missiles and then fire
Patriots to destroy them.
In assessing the success of the Patriot, it is
difficult to draw definitive conclusions. During the war
itself, the weapons achieved an almost mythical fame as a
sort of "silver bullet" that would always successfully
intercept and destroy incoming missiles. Although some
damage resulted due to falling debris, the Patriot acted as
a powerful psychological tool when the United States
deployed batteries in Israel. As such, it may have provided
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essential reassurance to the Israeli public, thus keeping
Jerusalem from retaliation which could have threatened the
unity of the coalition.
9. Was the conflict limited in scope?
In a word, the answer to this question is '’yes.” The
war was successfully confined to the Kuwait theater of
operations which included Kuwait, southeastern Iraq and
northern Saudi Arabia. There were, of course, several
attempts by Saddam Hussein to expand the war (Keesing's,
February 1991: 37984). The most important of these attempts
was the use of Scud missiles to strike civilian centers in
Israel as a means of goading Jerusalem into intervening
against Iraq. Saddam was convinced that by getting Israel
to respond, he could split the coalition by transforming
the conflict into an Arab-Israeli war. Israel, bowing to
pressure from the United States, did not take the bait and
this gambit failed miserably.
Although it is unclear whether this was the case, it
is possible that the flight of Iraqi aircraft to Iran was
actually an attempt to draw Teheran into the war as
Hussein's ally. One can only speculate whether coalition
violation of Iranian airspace to pursue the fleeing Iraqi
planes would have induced the Iranians to respond.
10. What was the nature of the theater commander's power
and influence?
In planning the prosecution of the Gulf War, the
influence of the theater commander, General Norman
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Schwartzkopf, was great indeed. As noted earlier, Joint
Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Colin Powell was in favor
of the initial deployment for Operation Desert Shield (U.S.
News, 1992: 65). As for the actual planning of the options
to be used later, Powell assigned the duty to CENTCOM
commander Schwartzkopf since the Middle East fell under his
purview. Although the Pentagon already had a contingency
deployment plan, which allowed Desert Shield to be
activated as rapidly as it was, Schwartzkopf's staff
believed that this plan provided for too small a force to
engage in an operation capable of expelling Iraq from
Kuwait should such action prove necessary (U.S. News, 1992:
65) .
By mid-October 1990, General Schwartzkopf was
comfortable with the defensive position of the coalition
forces in Saudi Arabia. When the President was informed of
the status of allied forces in the region, he ordered plans
and preparations to be readied for a possible offensive. At
this time, Powell requested Schwartzkopf to define the
nature and number of forces that he believed would be
required to undertake offensive action (Brune, 1993: 61-4).
General Powell believed that the key to victory would
be the use of overwhelming force, relentlessly applied. Put
differently, coalition troops should go "all out," defeat
the enemy, and get out quickly (Hilsman, 1992: 96). The
plan eventually adopted reflected Powell and Defense
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Secretary Cheney's outline for victory: a massive air
campaign, followed by a "left hook" ground offensive (see
above)

(U.S. News, 1992: 168-9).

For his part, once he was given the general concept to
follow, Schwartzkopf was given free reign to "fill in the
blanks" in his actual prosecution of the war (U.S. News,
1992: 170, 400). The "Jedi Knights," Schwartzkopf's inner
circle of planners, believed in mobility and speed as
essential elements of any ground campaign (see above)(U.S.
News, 1992: 159-160). The resulting refinement of the
Powell/Cheney plan reflected the new tactics advocated by
Schwartzkopf and his staff. It called for a four week air
offensive, followed by a massive ground assault. This basic
pattern, which would be followed during Operation Desert
Storm, had been decided upon by October 1990 (Brune, 1993:
108).
The specter of Vietnam clearly had a strong influence
on the planning of the offensive. Once it was underway, the
offensive would be short, sharp, and decisive. The main aim
was to secure a rapid victory, while keeping casualties as
low as possible. It was considered essential by
Schwartzkopf that the war be initiated only after the
coalition had achieved both quantitative and qualitative
superiority in the Kuwait theater of operations (Tsouras
and Wright et al., 1993: 89). President Bush greatly
sympathized and consequently authorized General Powell to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

185

grant Schwartzkopf anything he needed to achieve a rapid
victory (U.S. News, 1992: 172).
The political decision to use force was, essentially,
an executive decision made by President Bush. It was a
decision made contrary to the advice of General Powell, who
argued against an offensive, pleading for sanctions to be
given more time. But, for the reasons outlined earlier,
Bush was convinced that the war must be initiated. Bush did
not seek advice from his military commanders regarding the
actual decision to go to war. The President made up his
mind after having consulted his most trusted advisor,
National Security Advisor Admiral Brent Scowcroft (Hilsman,
1992: 249-50). Once the choice to begin the offensive was
made, Bush conferred with Powell and Cheney about the exact
time when the operation could be undertaken. They advised
the President that the air war could commence as early as
12:01 AM on January 16, 1991, which it did.
As for the actual prosecution of the war, General
Schwartzkopf was given carte blanche to act as he saw fit.
Gone was any residue of Vietnam and the micro-management of
the war that had characterized the Johnson administration.
Liberal critics of President Bush's policy of non
interference in the conduct of the offensive argued that
his failure to supervise the military more carefully was an
abdication of his role as the commander-in-chief which
would undoubtedly result in the unnecessary deaths of Iraqi
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civilians during the course of the fighting. As one analyst
put it: "The long-term political consequences of a decision
to bomb particular targets are not the responsibility of
military leaders, nor is the military equipped to make such
judgements by either training or experience" (Hilsman,
1992: 210).
As it turned out, however, while there were some
regrettable civilian casualties, they were not on the
horrendous scale that some academics had predicted. In any
case, the President was more concerned with the opinion of
the American public than with Iraqi sensibilities.

The

public, in turn, was concerned with very little except that
American casualties remain low.
Not much seems to have been revealed about any
limitations placed on engaging the enemy. The only publicly
known restriction seems to have been that American pilots
were required to positively identify their targets so that
damage to civilians was kept to an absolute minimum (Alonso
et al., 1993: 65). The liberality of the rules of
engagement were revealed after the so-called "highway of
death" incident, when it was announced that only if Iraqi
forces abandoned their equipment and laid down their arms
would they be allowed to surrender. Otherwise, they were to
be considered as hostile and dealt with accordingly.
General Schwartzkopf1s original plan envisioned a 144hour ground offensive. However, after consulting with his
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theater commander, President Bush decided to call a
ceasefire after only 100 hours. There seems to have been
several reasons for the decision to* terminate the
hostilities. The most obvious was the "turkey shoot"
incident alluded to earlier. There was a real fear that
such carnage might split the alliance, with Arab forces
refusing to participate further if it meant slaughtering
brother Arabs (Brune, 1993: 118; U.S.News, 1992: 395-6).
The second major reason was a desire on the part of
the Bush administration not to exceed the United Nations
mandate, which was the legal basis for Operation Desert
Storm. The UN use of force resolution simply provided for
the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Once this was
achieved, there was a sense of pressure on the United
States to end the war as quickly as possible (Rezun, 1992:
118). Much of this pressure came from Soviet President
Gorbachev, who himself was under increasing pressure from
hardliners in his own military. It was feared that, if
Baghdad were destroyed, these elements in the military and
the KGB might use it as the excuse to topple the Soviet
leader (U.S. News, 1992: 401).
A third reason for terminating the war was a fear that
if Iraq were too severely weakened, it could no longer
serve as a buffer against the spread of Islamic
fundamentalism. The power vacuum that would be created
would almost certainly be filled by Iran. As bad as Saddam
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Hussein was, to Washington, the alternative was worse
(Brune, 1993: 119).
Finally, there was a certain appeal, in a public
relations sense, in ending the war at precisely 100 hours.
When asked his opinion about the earlier than expected
cease-fire, Schwartzkopf was quoted as having replied: "I
have no problem with that" (U.S. News, 1992: 396-7).
Other accounts seem to suggest that, his public
professions notwithstanding, Schwartzkopf was indeed
unhappy about the President's decision. An aid to the
General said that Schwartzkopf asked Mr. Bush to give him a
few more hours so the Republican Guard units near Basra
could be surrounded. Schwartzkopf was also said to have
desired to clarify the situation on the battlefield. There
was confusion about the location of key units and no
provision had yet been made for the establishment of a
demilitarized zone to separate the two sides (U.S.News,
1992: 396).
In a broadcast interview, the General claimed that he,
in fact, wanted to continue the war and remove Saddam
Hussein from power, but that President Bush had ordered him
to stop. Shortly afterward, this statement was recanted,
with Schwartzkopf calling Bush's decision courageous and
"very humane" (Brune, 1993: 118-119).
Clearly, in terms of the actual prosecution of the
war, the theater commander had complete authority and his
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opinion carried great weight at the White House. However,
the more political choices regarding whether to go to war
and when to declare a ceasefire were made by the President,
although some consultation with the theater commander was
engaged.
11. Was there an "exit strategy?11 If so. was it adhered to?
There was no formal exit plan as such. However, during
the course of the ground war, the Bush administration
decided to limit the offensive to 100 hours. In a speech
delivered shortly after the ceasefire, President Bush
indicated that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as was
prudent. The President stated: "I have directed Secretary
Cheney to begin the immediate return of American combat
units from the gulf” fCOWR. March 9, 1991, transcript of
address by President Bush, 624) . The first group of
soldiers returned that day.
By April 4, some 20,000 troops had arrived home and
most returned by the summer. As American troops were
withdrawn, they were replaced by United Nations observers
and representatives of international relief organizations.
Formal control of southern Iraq was transferred to the
United Nations on April 26 and the last American troops
left Iraq on May 6, 1991 (Hilsman, 1992: 167-8).
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12. What were the •»lnmed-iate results of the intervention?
Military Situation
In his speech to Congress on March 6, 1991, President
Bush declared: "I can report to the nation: Aggression is
defeated; the war is over" fCOWR. March 9, 1991, transcript
of address by President Bush: 632). Indeed, the immediate
result seemed to be one of the greatest military victories
in United States history. Kuwait was liberated, and the
Iraqi war machine all but destroyed. Some Republican Guard
Units, although weakened, were spared so that internal
order within Iraq could be maintained in the aftermath of
the conflict. It was also envisioned by the Bush
administration that these units would be necessary to deter
any attempts by Iran to exploit the confusion in Iraq for
its own benefit.
Damage to Kuwait was extensive, but could not yet even
begin to be estimated. Perhaps the most vindictive act
committed by retreating Iraqi troops was the setting of all
of Kuwait's oil wells ablaze. This act of environmental
terrorism so blackened the skies that the noon sky was a
dark as night over much of Kuwait. It would cost the
Kuwaiti economy billions of dollars in damages and lost
revenue in the months it would take to put all of the fires
out (Keesing's, December 1993: 39792; Keesing's, February
1991: 37987).
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Iraq, too, suffered heavy, inestimable damage to its
infrastructure. Most of the phone lines and electrical grid
had been destroyed, which, it was estimated, would take
years to fully restore. Both Basra and Baghdad had been
bombed so heavily that the country seemed to have been
regressed to a pre-industrial state. There were sever
shortages of medicine, food, fuel, and other necessities
(Keesing's, February 1991: 37984; Keesing's, March 1991:
38082).
Iraqi casualties were staggering. It was asserted by
some that as many as 100,000 to 150,000 Iraqis may have
died during the conflict, although a more commonly cited
figure was a total of 100,000 casualties, of which 35,000
were deaths. The British Defense Ministry estimated that
175,000 Iraqis had been captured (Keesing's, February 1991:
37986).
At the time of the initial ceasefire on March 3,1991,
the coalition forces were in control of 15% of Iraq's
territory, including most of the coastal area near the city
of Basra (Keesing's: March 1991: 38081).
The immediate terms of the ceasefire included: the
prompt release of allied prisoners of war held by the
Iraqis, help in locating landmines, arrangements to
separate coalition and Iraqi forces so as to prevent
skirmishes, Iraqi acceptance of responsibility to pay war
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damage claims, and for Baghdad to accept the terms of, and
to implement, all UN resolutions regarding Kuwait.
During the negotiations for a formal ceasefire, the
United Nations added several stringent conditions. Iraq was
to renounce terrorism, Baghdad was to accept the 1963 (pre
invasion) borders with Kuwait; it was to destroy all
stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons; it was to
dismantle all facilities capable of producing nuclear
weapons; it was to destroy its Scuds and other missiles;
and it was to pledge to never attempt to acquire such arms
again (Hilsman, 1992; 168).
Sanctions were eased on food, medicine, and emergency
needs, however, a request to allow Baghdad to sell its oil
to pay for these goods was denied (Keesing's, March 1991:
38083). The UN also mandated that 25 percent of all future
oil revenues were to be set aside to pay reparations
(Hilsman, 1992: 168).
Economy
The massive bombing campaign that opened the war, as
was noted earlier, inflicted extensive damage on Iraq.
Observers described the destruction as being "nearapocalyptic," relegating Iraq to a "pre-industrial age"
(Keesing's March 1991: 38082). The lack of food and other
necessities lead to rationing. A black market soon emerged
that made many items available, but only at staggering
prices (Hilsman, 1992: 169). The International Red Cross
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sent emergency food and medicine to ward off starvation and
epidemic (Keesing's, March 1991: 38082).
Sanctions were kept in force pending Iraqi compliance
with all United Nations resolutions. It was the position of
the United States, as well as the western allies, that Iraq
would be allowed no oil sales or the lifting of sanctions
until at least two major demands were met: (1) the
dismantling of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons,
ballistic missiles, and facilities capable of producing
nuclear weapons and (2) Iraq payment of up to 30% of future
oil revenues to Kuwait as reparations (Hilsman, 1992: 170).
Political Situation
As the Gulf War ended, Iraq was instantly faced with
the outbreak of two major rebellions that threatened to
dismember the country. In the south, the Shiite majority
and "Marsh Arabs" revolted, and in the north, the longsmoldering Kurdish rebellion flared anew.
The southern rebellion began in the Basra area on
March 1, 1991. It quickly spread to other southern cities
including Nasiriyha, Karbala, and Najaf, even reaching to
the very suburbs of Baghdad itself. The reported aim of the
rebels was to establish a state with an Islamic government,
presumably resembling that of neighboring Iran.
On March 5, government forces began to counterattack.
Spearheaded by the surviving units of Hussein's Republican
Guard, armor and heavy artillery pounded rebel forces in
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fierce fighting. Saddam's forces, while gaining the upper
hand in battle, were having trouble holding what they had
captured, as soon as government troops pushed on from a
captured area, rebels would reclaim much of the lost
territory.
The rebellion was brutally repressed, as 30,000 were
believed to have died in shortly over a week of fighting.
Government troops were ruthless in their vengeance, as they
executed large numbers of captured guerrillas and
civilians. By mid-March, Basra had been re-taken by
government forces. At the end of March, the rebellion in
the south had been subdued (Keesing's, March 1991: 38081).
In northern Iraq, the Kurdish minority took advantage
of the post-war disorder to resume their intermittent
rebellion. This time, the rebellion was centered near the
city of Mosul and the Kirkuk oil region. As in the south,
the rebels initially enjoyed spectacular success,
threatening to completely overrun Iraqi Kurdistan.
The tide of battle soon began to turn. Iraqi forces
used air raids and heavy shelling in a counterattack that
lead to the recovery of the major cities by early April. As
a result, three million refugees retreated into the
mountains in the extreme north of Iraq in order to escape
certain retribution and possible genocide. The Iraqi army
made use of fixed-wing aircraft (in violation of the UN
ceasefire agreement) as well as chemical bombs and
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phosphorus shells against rebel forces. Furthermore, it was
confirmed that napalm was being used against retreating
civilians.
Kurdish guerrillas were able to check the Iraqi
advance with heavy fighting near Sulaimaniya. Toward the
end of April, Saddam offered to grant "limited autonomy" to
the Kurds. Kurdish leaders, however, while open to the
negotiations, warned that wide differences existed between
the two sides as to the actual nature of "autonomy"
(Keesing's, April 1991: 38126-7).
A common link between both rebel groups was the sense
of betrayal by the United States. For months, Washington
had not-too-subtly encouraged the rebellions, but then did
nothing to support the insurgents. The parallels to the
ill-fated Hungarian rebellion of 1956 were obvious.
Speaking for the Bush administration, State Department
spokeswoman Margaret Tutweiler denied that Washington ever
had called for an uprising against Hussein, reminding
reporters that the overthrow of the Iraqi dictator was not
a stated American objective.
It is undeniable that Bush had encouraged such
uprisings through his fiery rhetoric both before, and
during, the Gulf war.

However, Bush apparently developed

"cold feet" after the war's conclusion. The President
realized that, despite the emotional satisfaction that
Saddam's overthrow would provide, the collapse of Iraq

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

196

would undoubtedly create a power vacuum that Iran, Syria,
or both would attempt to fill. Neither of these prospects
was in the long-term interests of the United States. The
expansion of Iran would be particularly troublesome due to
the fact that its brand of Islamic fundamentalism would
then be even closer to Israel.
Furthermore, Washington's Turkish allies were alarmed
at the prospect of an independent Kurdish state formed from
northern Iraq. Host Kurds reside in Turkey, and therefore
Ankara feared that calls for a "greater Kurdistan" that
would surely follow.
The United States was also afraid, or so it claimed,
to directly involve itself in another state's internal
affairs. Should Washington embark on this course, it would
both set a dangerous precedent for elsewhere, as well as
engage it in an open-ended commitment in Iraq.
Ironically, the United States was forced to allow
Hussein to remain in power because it could find no
credible alternative to the Iraqi tyrant. This, perhaps,
explains why Republican Guard units were allowed to survive
the war. For better or worse, the status quo assured that
internal order was maintained and that greater threats like
Iran were kept out. In any case, the Bush administration
could encourage a coup by disgruntled officers that would
replace Saddam with a more acceptable military regime (New
York Times. June 28, 1993, article by Thomas L. Friedman).
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As the Kurdish situation became more serious, Bush
reversed his non-interference policy. Perhaps feeling a
degree of guilt over the plight of the Kurds, the allies
set-up safe havens along the Turkish border. Named
"Operation Provide Relief," this effort established tent
cities to house refugees, as well as providing food and
medical care. To protect these camps, the United States
declared a "no military activity" zone north of the 36th
parallel, although the oil region around Mosul was
exempted. Any attempt to interfere with relief efforts
would be met with military force (Keesing's, April 1991:
38128).
13. What was the long-term situation?
Iraq
Despite Saddam Hussein's iron-fisted rule, Iraq has
been plagued by a degree of political instability. There
have been reports of several coup attempts, the most
serious of which took place in June of 1992.

Rebel

officers attempted to assassinate Hussein and seize control
of power (New York Times. July 9, 1992, dispatch by Michael
R. Gordon). However, a rogue Republican Guard mechanized
brigade was intercepted by loyalist forces as it tried to
lead or join the revolt (New York Times. July 6, 1992,
article by Patrick E. Tyler).
The Bush administration believed that the coup attempt
showed that Saddam's hold on power is tenuous. However,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

198

some experts on Iraq drew the opposite conclusion: that
Hussein is in very effective control of internal security
and that this is proven by his ability to root out such
conspiracies (New York Times. July 9, 1992, dispatch by
Michael R. Gordon). Saddam has purged military units of
those whose loyalty has been suspect. Senior military
officers have been systematically arrested, tortured, and
killed.
Since 1991, the CIA has been authorized to attempt to
destabilize the Iraqi government. To this end, covert
contacts were made with sympathetic Iraqi citizens and
officials. However, JCS Chief General Colin Powell has
warned that the only way that Washington could secure
Hussein's departure was the use of American ground combat
forces (New York Times. July 6, 1992, article by Patrick E.
Tyler).
Despite the concern that the war's bombing and the
economic embargo would push Iraq back into a "preindustrial” age, within a year of the end of the conflict
an impressive reconstruction effort was well underway. By
July 1992, telephone service had been restored in Baghdad,
as was limited international service. Gasoline is plentiful
and cheap, which has generated perpetual traffic problems.
According to the Iraqi government, by mid-1992, more
than 70 percent of the damage done by allied bombing had
been repaired, 120 of 134 bridges destroyed were again
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functioning, and most of the electrical grid had been
repaired. The electrification of the city of Baghdad in
mid-1992 had been restored to 90% of 1989 levels. Clearly,
much of the phenomenal recovery is due to the availability
to Iraq of money from secret funds abroad, as well as help
that it has received from other states in evading United
Nations sanctions (New York Times. July 14, 1992, dispatch
by Paul Lewis).
On the diplomatic front, Hussein has engaged the
United Nations in general, and the United States in
particular, in a war of nerves. Since the end of the
conflict, there have been numerous instances of Saddam
challenging various aspects of the ceasefire and/or
sanctions, only to back down when faced with the prospect
of an armed response. Two such instances stand out from the
others.
The first was an Iraqi attempt to assassinate former
President George Bush. In April 1993, during a visit to
Kuwait, Kuwaiti authorities uncovered a plot to kill the
American statesman (New York Times. June 27, 1993,
transcript of address by President Clinton).
In a speech to the nation, President Clinton revealed
that both the FBI and the CIA had conducted an
investigation which confirmed that Iraq was behind the plot
(New York Times. June 27, 1993, dispatch by Gwen Ifil).
Evidence included forensic data which revealed that the
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device used was consistent with those that Iraq had used in
the past (New York Times. June 28, 1993: transcript of
address by Madalaine Albright).
To punish Saddam, President Clinton ordered the U.S.
Navy to fire 23 Tomahawk cruise missiles at Baghdad from
frigates stationed in

the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf (New

York Times. June 27, 1993, article by

TimWeiner). The

target selected by the President was the headquarters of
Iraqi Intelligence, the undoubted source of both the plot
and the bomb. Mr. Clinton asserted that his response was
consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
which allows for self-defense. During his speech, Clinton
called the attempt to assassinate Mr. Bush "an attack
against our country and against all American we could not,
or have not, let such

actions against ournation go

unanswered" (New York

Times. June 27, 1993, transcript of

address by President Clinton).
President Clinton's action was based on the precedent
established by President Bush when cruise missile were used
to knockout an Iraqi nuclear weapons facility in January,
1993 (New York Times. June 28, 1993, article by Eric
Schmitt). The selection of the cruise missile was also
based on a desire to limit civilian casualties and to
respond in a way that would not prompt Saddam to strike
again in an even more spectacular manner (New York Times.
June 28, 1993, article by Thomas L. Friedman).
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The other major event was the October 1994 crisis over
troop deployment near the Kuwaiti border. On October 12,
1994, 80,000 Iraqi troops massed at the border within 20
miles of the UN buffer zone separating Iraq and Kuwait. The
alleged reason for this provocation was Hussein's desire to
draw the attention of the international community to the
crippling effect of UN-imposed sanctions on Iraq.
The United Nations responded by adopting Resolution
949, which placed new restrictions on Iraqi troop
movements. The resolution demanded an immediate withdrawal
of Iraqi units from the southern region of Iraq and their
subsequent return to their bases. It also mandated that
Baghdad refrain from acting in a "hostile or provocative
manner [threatening to] its neighbors."
On October 7, 1994, President Clinton ordered American
warships to move into the Persian Gulf area in order to
deter Iraq. Initially 2,000 troops were sent to Kuwait in
order to shore up defenses. By mid-October, the United
States had deployed 40,000 soldiers, 600 aircraft, and a
naval task force. These forces were joined by 1,000 Royal
Marines from the United Kingdom. After several tense weeks,
the crisis ended when Iraqi troops were withdrawn
unilaterally (Keesing's, October 1994: 40255).
On November 10, 1994, Iraq formally recognized
Kuwait’s boundaries, which effectively renounced any claim
that the emirate was a "19th province" of Iraq. The United
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States welcomed this development, yet still refused to lift
the sanctions until all other UN resolutions were fulfilled
(Keesing's, November 1994: 40302-3).
Iraq has formally agree to accept long-term weapons
monitoring. A United Nations special commission stated that
Baghdad's stock of 155 mm shells containing mustard gas had
been destroyed. Furthermore, Iraq had begun to send
irradiated uranium to Russia for disposal (Keesing's,
December 1993: 39791).
Kuwait
The oil field fires ignited by retreating Iraqi forces
were finally put out, and the wells capped, on November 7,
1991 (Watson and Lewis, 1993: 182). The Kuwaitis then
shifted their attention to the removal of land mines (New
York Times. October 15, 1992, dispatch by Chris Hedges).
As in Iraq, Kuwaiti rebuilding has proceeded at a
rapid pace. The most incredible change, however, has been
political. Kuwait's first free parliamentary elections were
held in October, 1992. This fulfilled a promise made by
Emir Sheik Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah during the period of
Iraqi occupation.
The result of the balloting was a huge defeat for the
government, as opposition candidates won 31 of 50 seats. It
is particularly noteworthy that 19 of the opposition's
seats were won by Islamic fundamentalists. The ability of
the opposition to effect real change, however, would appear
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to be greatly limited because of the secular/religious
division, as well as infighting within the ranks of the
fundamentalists. A further limit would appear to exist in
the form of the Emir's veto power. There is a real fear
that if the Parliament goes "too far" in exercising its
prerogative that it will be shut down again, as was the
case in 1986 (New York Times. October 18, 1992, dispatch by
Chris Hedges).
14. What elements about this case are unique?
The Persian Gulf War was unique in a number of ways.
First, and perhaps best publicized, was the introduction of
ultra-modern Cold War-inspired weapons systems into a
conventional conflict. High Tech weapons such as cruise
missiles and M1A1 tanks greatly contributed to the speed of
victory and low casualty rates. The premier of these
weapons systems answered a question that had long been on
the mind of defense planners: "Do these weapons really
work?" The answer is "yes." Despite their imperfections,
these weapons represent a great stride in military
technology (Alonso et al., 1993: 73-76).
A second, yet associated, variable was the employment
of the new tactics of movement. Speed and mobility were
used, in conjunction with the high-tech weapons, to soundly
trounce a force that was believed to be larger in size.
Furthermore, flanking maneuvers like the "left hook" or
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"Hail Mary" were enormously successful (U.S. News, 1992:
159-60).
A less heralded, but profoundly important, difference
from past interventions since 1945 was that the Soviet
Union sided with the United States. For the first time,
America could be absolutely sure that there would be no
counter-intervention by another superpower. Therefore,
Washington was able to virtually guarantee victory because
it could fight without inhibition; it could do whatever it
would take to win decisively (Brune, 1993: 55).
Unfortunately, the Persian Gulf War introduced the
world to two new aspects of warfare. The first was the use
of hostages as "human shields." Hostages have been taken
since antiquity, but, never before have civilians been so
shamelessly exploited as when women and children were kept
on military and industrial sites so as to dissuade allied
forces from bombing. The second was eco-terrorism.
Partially as a tactic to fill the skies with smoke so as to
"blind" allied airmen and partially as an irrational,
vindictive act, Iraqi troops uncapped and set ablaze 732 of
Kuwait's oil wells. The fires continued for months,
blackening the skies over Kuwait. Furthermore, Iraqi
soldiers blew apart oil lines and allowed a huge, 30 mile
long oil slick to form in the upper Persian Gulf. Although
it was probably intended to either block shipping or to
foul desalination plants that provided the emirate with
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drinking water, the result was that the regional ecosystem
was severely disrupted (Watson, 1993: 214; Brune 1993: 111112). Allied bombers were able to alleviate some of the
problem of open pipelines by bombing to seal them.
Another unique characteristic of this case was
Saddam's use of terror bombings. Just as the Nazis had used
V-2s 45 years earlier, Hussein used modified Scud missiles,
not so much to hit military targets, but to terrorize
innocent civilians in a country with which he was not even
at war. In their modified form, Scuds were so inaccurate
that they

had no other purpose but to be aimed at citiesto

kill civilians and intimidate governments (Brune,

1993:

111 ).

Finally, a unique and very curious feature of the war
was that Hussein, while dramatically posturing in the world
media, hardly put up a fight, especially during the air
war. His concession of the skies to the coalition so early
in the war essentially sealed his fate. The Iraqis were so
battered, and the destruction so extensive, that when the
ground war finally came, the Iraqi troops were all but
waiting for the earliest possible opportunity to surrender
to allied

troops. The only troops that showed any fightin

them were

the elite Republican Guard. There still is no

adequate explanation as to why Saddam did not fight back in
the war's early stages. It may just be speculation, but
perhaps he knew that defeat was inevitable and so he chose
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to simply endure the punishment and, hopefully, in the
process make himself into a martyr.
15. Was the intervention "successful?11
The success or failure of the operation as a whole can
perhaps best be evaluated by considering the fulfillment of
goals on various levels: operational goal, officially
articulated political goals, unofficial political goals,
and the establishment of a New World Order.
Operational Goals
Operational goal established by military planners were
achieved with rapid success. At the outset of the war, the
allies were able to cut off Iraqi command and control at
its Baghdad source. Unfortunately, the bombing campaign
also did more damage to the Iraqi electrical grid than was
intended, and thus the citizenry was made to suffer (New
York Times. February 23, 1992, article by Michael R.
Gordon).
The allies were successful in gaining control of the
skies and the relentless bombing campaign had the desired
effect on Iraqi defenses. Baghdad's military was largely
destroyed before it got the chance to face coalition forces
in the ground war. Soldiers, mostly conscripts, were
demoralized by the constant barrage and surrendered en
masse to anyone who would take them, including western news
crews. The United States military made skillful use of
deception. The faked Marine landing in Kuwait succeeded in
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diverting Iraqi forces, thus allowing the allied flanking
maneuvers to enjoy overwhelming success. Finally, the
ground offensive managed to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait
and allowed the coalition to move on Basra in only 100
hours, 44 hours ahead of the anticipated schedule. The only
operational failure was that the allies were not altogether
successful in discovering and destroying Scud launchers and
facilities for the development and storage of Iraqi weapons
of mass destruction.
Officially Articulated Goals
President Bush first articulated American policy goals
for this intervention episode in an August 8, 1990 speech,
and they were subsequently reiterated in later speeches and
official policy statements in the months leading to January
1991.
The first goal, to secure Iraqi withdrawal (or, if
necessary, expulsion) from Kuwait, obviously, was
fulfilled. The second goal was the restoration of the legal
Kuwaiti government. The Emir al-Sabah was, in fact,
restored to this throne after the liberation of Kuwait by
coalition forces. In addition, as was noted earlier, a
limited democracy has been allowed, although its long-term
future remains to be seen.
The protection of U.S. lives in Kuwait and Iraq was
the third goal publicly articulated by the Bush
administration. As far as civilian lives were concerned,
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United States citizens who were being held as "human
shields" during the summer and fall of 1990 were released
unharmed before the start of the war. These nearly 100
Americans were sent home in early December 1990 (Brune,
1993: 66). As far as American soldiers were concerned,
military casualties were dramatically lower than predicted.
A commonly accepted figure was that coalition forces would
suffer up to 100,000 deaths in the war's first three days
(Brune, 1993: 94). Actual casualty figures, however, were
astoundingly low: 148 combat deaths, 458 combat wounded,
and 120 non-combat deaths (Brune, 1993: 121).
The final articulated goal was that of regional
security and stability. In this respect, the war seems to
have been a success. For the most part, the Iraqis have
been contained. The only aggressive act which Saddam has
attempted outside of Iraq (the attempted assassination of
President Bush) was a failure, and President Clinton saw to
it that Iraq was punished for it.
Whether or not it is directly connected to the war is
unclear, but during the course of the last four years since
the end of the conflict, the peace process seems to have
been revived. Israel is finally at peace with Jordan and
has an autonomy arrangement with the PLO. Even Syrian
dictator Hafez Assad, long an implacable foe of Jerusalem,
seems willing at least to talk about peace.
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Finally, the United States has finally gotten
something that it wanted under President Reagan's
"strategic consensus" but was never able to achieve: the
right to preposition supplies in several Persian Gulf
states. In

addition, the United States also has a security

arrangement with Kuwait.
Unofficial Political Goals
Perhaps the most ambitious of this class of political
objectives was the unstated, yet transparently obvious,
desire of Washington to remove Saddam Hussein from power.
This has been a total failure.
In direct contrast to American expectations, Iraqi
civilians, at least publicly, assign the blame for their
woes to the United States and the UN embargo, rather than
their own leader and his ruinous policies (New York Times.
July 31, 1992, dispatch by Paul Lewis). As a matter of
fact, it seems that the worse conditions get, the more that
the Iraqi public rallies to Hussein. There is, of course, a
very real possibility that this is actually a reaction
based on fear. Living in a ruthless police-state, people
know what to say and do in public or before western news
cameras. They save their grumblings and dissatisfaction for
private airings with family and trusted friends.
It is, however, undeniable, that the Iraqi dictator
appears to be at least as powerful, at least with regard to
domestic politics, as before the war. It can plausibly be
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argued that he is perhaps even stronger and more secure
than was the case in 1990 (Hilsman, 1992: 205). His ability
to uncover and quash coup attempts seems to imply an
efficient secret police apparatus (New York Times. July 9,
1992, article by Michael R. Gordon). Despite CIA operations
to destabilize his regime, Saddam's two-faced rule
(ruthless, yet benevolent) appears to have earned him
support among the Iraqi people (New York Times. July 6,
1992, article by Patrick E. Tyler; July 31, 1992, article
by Paul Lewis). An ongoing process of thorough purging has
largely succeeded in keeping his military in line and loyal
to Hussein personally fNew York Times. July 9, 1992,
dispatch by Michael R. Gordon).
Another goal, implicit in American policy at the
beginning of the crisis, and only later publicly admitted,
was the destruction of Iraq's military capability. Much of
this goal was achieved during the war, as was demonstrated
earlier. As the war was reaching its climax, however,
President Bush seemed to be rethinking the wisdom of
completely disarming Iraq, especially in light of the
regional balance of power. This may explain why the ground
war was suspended two days ahead of schedule, allowing the
elite Republican Guard and some of Hussein's best tank
units to survive (Hilsman, 1992: 205). 700 Iraqi tanks were
spared destruction (U.S. News, 1992: 412). Iraq also
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retained a considerable proportion of its fleet of
helicopter gunships.
As regards the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction and nuclear facilities, it seems that bombing
did some damage to Baghdad's capabilities and United
Nations teams are accomplishing much of the rest. Yet given
his history, Saddam must still be closely watched in order
to insure his compliance (Hilsman, 1992: 205). United
Nations Resolution 715 established a permanent UN
monitoring system, complete with surveillance cameras. Once
this is operational, Iraqi test sites, installations, and
weapons facilities can be more easily policed by
international watchdogs (Spencer, 1994: 24).
The New World Order
President Bush, like many Americans in 1991, was very
optimistic about the role played by the United Nations in
confronting Iraqi aggression. There was great hope that the
UN finally had lived up to the vision of its founders. This
optimism, combined with a certain sense of euphoric
invincibility regarding interventionism, may have had the
originally unforeseen consequence of encouraging American
intervention in Somalia and Haiti, as well as NATO
airstrikes in Bosnia.
If the New World Order were to be worthy of its name,
it would need a leader, and clearly that leader was the
world's only superpower, the United States of America.
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However, while American citizens are understandably
reluctant to take on all of the responsibilities that such
leadership entails, so too have U.S. leaders become fearful
of ceding such authority to multilateral organization,
especially the United Nations. As a result, over time the
phase "New World Order" has all but disappeared from public
discourse. The only exception is its use for the purpose of
ridicule, along with other memorable phrases as "voodoo
economics" or "feeling your pain."
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CHAPTER VI

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE; HUMANITARIAN RELIEF IN SOMALIA

Introduction
The overwhelming victory of coalition force in the
Persian Gulf War generated a sense of optimism among
American leaders, as well as those of other countries. The
United Nations finally seemed to be fulfilling its purpose
of creating a better, more secure world. In Iraq, UNsponsored intervention had rolled back aggression. As a
result, President George Bush's New World Order seemed off
to an auspicious start.
While the war in the Gulf was being fought, in the
East African state of Somalia rebel clan militias toppled
the 22-year old dictatorship of Mohammed Said Barre. The
ensuing civil war and a severe drought combined to cause a
famine of biblical proportions. Although it would not
become clear for several months more, the New World Order
was about to be put to an early test.
Undertaken, as it was for the highest of motives —
humanitarian famine relief —

the American intervention in

Somalia seemed to be a defining moment for America in her
role as the post-Cold War era's lone superpower. Despite
its initial success, however, Operation Restore Hope
rapidly degenerated into a manhunt for a warlord. Somalia
213
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provides a case study illustrating the limits of
multilateral military operations and the failure of
"nation-building" in a society embroiled in anarchy.
1. What vere the prevailing conditions initially in the
"target11 country?
In January 1991, the 22 year reign of Somali dictator
Mohammed Said Barre came to an end when it was overthrown
by an alliance of clan-based militia groups fCOWR. October
16, 1993: 2826). Vast stockpiles of arms, accumulated over
the course of three decades from Barre's Cold War patrons
(first the Soviet Union, then from 1977 on, the United
States), were seized by the various factions. United only
by their hatred of Barre, the now heavily-armed militias
began to turn their firepower on each other. The result was
a multi-sided civil war that fragmented Somalia into a
series of clan-based fiefdoms (New York Times. December 4,
1992, article by Thomas Gordon).
Despite the multitude of clan-based militias, by 1992,
four major contenders emerged. The first group was the
United Somali Congress (USC). Led by Ali Mahdi Mohammed, it
was based on the Hawiye clan of Central Somalia. The second
group was Mohammed Farah Aidid's Somali National Alliance
(SNA). Formerly a high official in the USC, Aidid broke
away after a falling out with Ali Mahdi in 1991. The SNA
was subsequently formed by a union between the Aidid
faction and several other clan groups. Based in the
Mogadishu area, the SNA drew its strength mainly from the
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Hawiye clan, although others were represented as well
(Makinda, 1993: 26, 32).
The Somali National Front (SNF), headed by General
Mohammed Said Hersi Morgan, was a third force. It was
composed of forces still loyal to Barre, and its power base
largely rested in Southern Somalia, near the port city of
Kismayu (Bryden, 1995: 147).
Finally, there was the Somali National Movement (SNM).
Led by Adel-Rahman Ahmed Ali, it was mostly composed of
members of the Issaq clan (Makinda, 1993: 25). Its support
base was in northwestern Somalia, in what was known until
1960 as British Somaliland. In May, 1991, the SNM declared
its territory to be the independent Republic of Somaliland
(Keesing's, May 1991: 38182-3). The republic has received
no international recognition.
A 1991 post-revolution peace conference named the
USC's Ali-Mahdi as interim president. War, however, quickly
broke out among the clans. Farah Aidid, jealous of Mahdi's
selection, decided to challenge his leadership militarily
(Bryden, 1995: 147).
It bears noting, however, that both Aidid and Ali
Mahdi had limited support within the country. This was
because in Somalia, clan loyalties have traditionally been
stronger than any shared national identity. Only rarely,
usually when faced by an external threat (such as the war
with Ethiopia in the late 1970s) do the clans show any
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inclination toward unity. Even then, when the foreign
threat recedes, such ad hoc alliances inevitably dissolve.
Despite various peace conferences, fighting continued
among the factions. In terms of its impact on national
politics, the most important fighting was between Aidid and
Ali Mahdi in, and around, the capital city of Mogadishu
(Makinda, 1993: 18).
While the conflict raged in the early 1990s, Somalia
was further plagued by a severe drought. The result,
predictably, was a nationwide famine fCOWR. October 16,
1993: 2826; Makinda, 1993: 41) Starvation was said to
threaten 30% of the Somalian population, Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs), such as the French Medecins Sans
Frontieres. the UK-based Save The Children, and the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were the
first to respond to the crisis with relief efforts
(Keesing's, July 1992: 38992). However, anarchy, growing
out of the warfare engulfing Somalia, interfered with the
humanitarian operations. Gunmen associated with the various
clan militias looted food and medical depots, hijacked or
blocked relief shipments, and kidnapped relief workers. The
motive behind these callous acts was usually to gain profit
on the black market and/or to prevent rival groups from
receiving humanitarian relief (Makinda, 1993: 42).
By May 1992, it was estimated that 4.5 million of the
total 6 million Somalis were threatened with starvation,
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with the crisis exacting its greatest toll in the country's
southern and central regions (Keesing's, May 1992: 38902).
According to UN diplomat Mohammed Sahnoun, by late July
1992 as many as 5,000 people a day were dying in Somalia. A
further 1.5 million were on the brink of death, with 4.5
million more nearing starvation. Taken together, these
figures represented almost all of Somalia's population
(Keesing's, July 1992: 38992).
In response to the ongoing suffering, the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed UNSC Resolution 767,
which established the first United Nations Operation in
Somalia (UNOSOM I). The resolution created operational
zones in Somalia for UN-sponsored relief efforts, as well
as authorizing the Secretary General to organize an "air
bridge" to speed relief to the famine victims (Keesing's,
July 1992: 39992). The resolution further established a
peacekeeping force to provide security for UN and NGO aid
activities in the greater Mogadishu area. In an action that
mirrored previous UN peacekeeping operations, 50 unarmed
military observers were dispatched to monitor the Mogadishu
"green line" which separated Ali Mahdi and Aidid's forces
(Makinda, 1993: 62).
Ambassador Sahnoun was able to secure an agreement
with Aidid to allow 500 armed guards to enter Somalia to
protect food distribution centers. Sahnoun emphasized the
food distribution mission, insisting that armed troops were
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not going to engage in peacekeeping. However, on August 28,
1992, the UN Security Council authorized the commitment of
3,000 more armed UN troops, to be deployed as four 750member strong "security units" (Keesing's, August 1992:
39034).
The United States, too, became involved in the relief
efforts by starting an emergency airlift that lasted four
months. The supplies were to be shipped directly to Somalia
if possible, otherwise the alternate route was to fly into
northern Kenya, then tranship the goods to southern Somalia
from there. The plan was to send 80,000 tons in the first
six weeks, to be followed by another 145,000 tons more
after October 1 (Keesing's, August 1992: 39035).
By October 1992, it had become clear that United
Nations peacekeepers had failed to prevent armed gunmen
from interfering with relief distribution. Believing it to
be a problem of manpower, the UN proposed raising its
peacekeeping presence to 4,200 soldiers. General Aidid, who
at the time controlled most of southern Somalia and twothirds of Mogadishu, opposed further UN deployment, calling
it a threat to Somalia's sovereignty (Keesing's, October
1992: 39132). Aidid's reluctance to permit a large United
Nations presence stemmed from his negative view of UN
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who, as Egyptian
Foreign Minister, had been close to Barre. Believing
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Boutros-Ghali now to be partial toward Ali Mahdi, Aidid
viewed the UN with suspicion (Makinda, 1993: 65).
Although the United Nations had approved a deployment
of 3,500 men, most of them had not been sent due to
objections from the various warlords in Somalia. New York
believed that the cooperation of the various clan militia
leaders was necessary to the ultimate success of UNOSOM I
and, therefore, the deployment was put on hold in order to
avoid antagonizing the chieftains. In December 1992,
therefore, the strength of United Nations forces in Somalia
was 564 total. This figure included 50 military observers,
500 in a security battalion, and the remainder distributed
as headquarters staff and logistical personnel.
UNOSOM I had very constrained rules of engagement
(ROE). As is the usual modus operandi of such operations,
UN personnel were authorized to use force only for self
defense. Given the size of the UN contingent and its
restrictive ROE, UNOSOM I was largely ineffective in
fulfilling its mission of famine relief. Because UNOSOM
played virtually no positive role in Somalia, by December
1992 it had become obvious that a larger, better equipped
force would be needed if the chaotic situation were to be
brought under control (Makinda, 1993: 67-8).
Under these conditions, President Bush offered the
United Nations the use of a large American force in order
to stabilize the situation in Somalia and thus make
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possible the resumption of food and aid delivery fCOWR.
October 16, 1993: 2826). On December 3, 1992, the Security
Council passed UNSC Resolution 794, which formally accepted
the American offer (Makinda, 1993: 64).
2. Why did the United States choose to get involved?
It is a generally accepted fact that President Bush
initially chose to intervene in Somalia for humanitarian
reasons. (New York Times. December 5, 1992: article by
Thomas Friedman). The key motivating factor for Bush was
the scale of death taking place. As Bush explained it in
his address to the nation:
Every American has seen the shocking images from
Somalia. The scope of suffering there is hard to
imagine. Already over a quarter million people,
as many as live in Buffalo, N.Y., have died in
the Somali famine. In the months ahead, five
times that number, one and a half million people,
could starve to death (New York Times. December
3, 1992: Text of Bush address).
The President explained that "anarchy prevails" in
Somalia, and that relief workers feared for their very
lives. Therefore, Bush declared, "confronted with these
conditions, relief groups called for outside troops to
provide security so that they could feed people."

As a

result, it was now clear to Bush "that military support is
necessary to insure the safe delivery of the food Somalis
need to survive" (New York Times. December 5, 1992, text of
Bush address).
Although Bush acknowledged that "the United States
alone cannot right the world's wrongs," he argued that the
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United States must take the leading role to bring aid to
Somalia because:
Only the United States has the global reach to
place a large security force on the ground in
such a distant place quickly and efficiently and
thus save thousands of innocents from death (New
York Times. December 5, 1992, text of Bush
address).
Bush reassured Americans: "We will not, however, be acting
alone. I expect forces from about a dozen countries to join
us in this mission” (New York Times. December 5, 1992, text
of Bush address).
It is impossible to overestimate the influence
television had on the decision to intervene in Somalia. Its
persistent displays of grim images of human suffering
shocked both the public and the government. The sight of
the mass starvation of Somali children was instrumental in
leading to American action (Makinda, 1993: 69; Bryden,
1995: 148).
Aside from the generally agreed-upon humanitarian
reasons for American intervention, some political observers
suggested certain less altruistic motives. One writer
speculated that after his electoral defeat, Mr. Bush wanted
to leave office in an upbeat, statesman-like manner (New
York Times. December 6, 1992, article by Michael Wines).
Others suggested that Bush viewed Somalia as the first test
of the New World Order. According to this view, Bush was
quite embarrassed that his scheme was now being undermined
by the mass starvation of children in the Horn of Africa.
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If the New World Order was to become more than mere words,
action was imperative (Makinda, 1993: 69). Finally, it was
also suggested that, with congressional liberals demanding
a "peace dividend," the military needed to find missions
that would justify its being spared large budget cuts. A
relief operation to Somalia was originally perceived as a
low-risk means of accomplishing this goal (Makinda, 1993:
73) .
3. What were the intended results, or objectives, of
American intervention?
During his December, 1992, address to the nation,
President Bush outlined the humanitarian mission of the
U.S. intervention in Somalia. Despite the apparent
simplicity of the two goals that the President set, he did
not elaborate on their specifics. As a result, American
forces operated in pursuit of rather ambiguously defined
objectives (Keesing's, December, 1992: 39225; New York
Times, December 5, 1992, text of Bush address).
Bush's first objective was to "create a secure
environment in the hardest hit parts of Somalia so that
food can move from ships overland to the people in the
countryside now devastated by starvation" (New York Times.
December 5, 1992, text of Bush address). The potentially
open-ended commitment entailed in this goal was quickly
pointed out by critics. As a New York Times editorial
queried: "Just what is a secure environment?...On this Mr.
Bush said nothing, despite expectations in Somalia that
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Americans will be peacemakers, not just alms-givers" (New
York Times. December 5, 1992, Editorial).
The other objective outlined by Bush was that once
this "secure environment" was created, the United States
would withdraw its forces and hand over the operation to
United Nations peacekeepers fNew York Times. December 5,
1992, text of Bush address).
While agreeing in principle with Mr. Bush's
objectives, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
believed that under the terms of UNSC Res. 794 which
authorized the U.S. action, he had the right to determine
what exactly constituted a "secure environment."

The

Secretary General argued that American and other allied
forces could only create a secure environment by disarming
clan militias and destroying their heavy weapons. The U.S.
Commander for Somalia, however, argued that disarmament was
not part of his mission and, consequently, would not be a
high priority.
There were several reasons for this disagreement
between the United States and the United Nations over what
exactly constituted a secure environment. One such reason
was that both sides had very different definitions of the
term. For the UN, it meant leaving Somalia in a condition
that was conducive to peacekeeping and a negotiated
settlement of political differences between the clans. If
the arms stockpiles were not confiscated, the militias
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would undoubtedly become reactivated shortly after the
departure of U.S. and allied forces.
The U.S. theater commander, however, saw matters
differently. For General Johnston, the goal of humanitarian
relief did not necessitate disarmament per se. Supply
corridors could be opened, and relief distributed, without
unnecessarily engaging Somali militia groups. Furthermore,
Washington simply did not want to take on any high risk
ventures beyond its stated objective of opening up supply
routes.
Another related concern was that disarming the
militias would undoubtedly be a long-term operation
(Makinda, 1993: 71). Even if disarmament were to be
undertaken as an American mission, given the proliferation
of weapons in Somalia, how would one ever know for certain
when the goal had been accomplished? To engage in such
operations would have the potential of keeping U.S. troops
in Somalia long after the January, 1993, withdrawal date
that the President had set.
These goals originally envisioned by President Bush
would later be subject to change; they would be subjected
to what would be called later, "mission creep." The
evolution of United States and United Nations objectives as
the operation continued is discussed later in this chapter.
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4. What was the nature of the operation?
The United States' intervention in Somalia actually
occurred in two phases. The first was the Unified Task
Force (UNITAF), the other was the second United Nations
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II).
UNITAF, or Operation Restore Hope as it was called in
the USA, ran from December 1992 until May 1993. The United
Nations Security Council authorized the mission by passing
UNSC Res. 794 on December 3, 1992. The terms of
authorization were similar to those under which Operation
Desert Storm was commissioned. Essentially, like the
Persian Gulf War, Operation Restore Hope was ostensibly a
multilateral UN undertaking, although once again most of
the troops sent were American. Likewise, the mission was
commanded by a high-ranking officer from the U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM); Lt. General Robert Johnston was put in
charge of the Somalian operation (Makinda, 1993: 70).
There were, however, several differences from the
earlier Persian Gulf enterprise. Unlike Operation Desert
Storm which operated independently under a U.S. command, at
the insistence of many Third World states, UNITAF was
authorized only on the condition that the American command
maintain a close liaison with UN headquarters in New York
and with UN officials in Somalia (Makinda, 1993: 70) [For
the full text of the resolution, see COWR. December 5,
1992: 3766].
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Another difference between the two operations was that
while both sought to deploy massive force in order to
overwhelm opponents, Operation Restore Hope employed
substantially fewer troops. Furthermore, due to its
humanitarian nature, UNITAF envisioned the use of forces in
a considerably more restrained manner.
UNITAF was largely a humanitarian mission within a low
intensity war zone. It was unique in that it had no clear
link to any discernable vital interest of the United States
(COWR. December 5, 1992, article by Pat Towell: 3761).
By design, UNITAF had a limited operational mandate.
American forces were only to engage in relief support
missions in southern and Central Somalia, with a focus on
the greater Mogadishu area (Makinda, 1993: 76). Also, as
noted earlier, due to the consultative mechanism
established by the Security Council in the authorization
resolution, the UN, in the person of the Secretary General,
had a voice in determining when the security aspects of the
mission had been fulfilled. Only with the certification of
the Secretary General would the Security Council allow the
termination of UNITAF and the transition to a more
traditional UN peacekeeping operation (COWR. December 5,
1992, article by Pat Towell: 3762).
The United Nations successor operation, UNOSOM II,
began in May 1993. Although American participation ended in
March 1994, UNOSOM II continued for another year,
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concluding in March 1995. It consisted of a multilateral
force under a direct United Nations command. Its commander
was Turkish General Cevik Bir (Keesing's, May 1993: 39451).
Initially, plans called for the United States to commit
5,000 troops. In the end UNOSOM II was to have 20,000
soldiers, drawn from 35 countries (Keesing's, March 1993:
39356). U.S. Major General Thomas M. Montgomery was named
deputy commander of UN forces. In part, his role was to
oversee American forces in UNOSOM II, most of whom were to
function in supply and logistical capacities. Under this
arrangement, Bir would decide when the troops were to be
deployed to a particular area. Montgomery would then issue
the orders which would carry out the mission (COWR. May 22,
1993, article by Gregory J. Bowens: 1304).
General Montgomery also was to have direct command of
a 1,300 troop "quick reaction force." Although it was
intended to back up United Nations forces, this was an
independent United States force, accountable only to
Washington (COWR. October 16, 1993, story by Gregory J.
Bowens: 2826). Stationed on American ships cruising off the
Somali coast, the quick reaction force was intended to act
as an "over the horizon"

deterrent against the Somali

militias (Makinda, 1993: 77).
The original plan envisioned that UNOSOM II would
cover all of Somalia, a significant expansion from the
earlier UNITAF mission (which included only 40% of the
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country). UNOSOM XI*s expanded mandate followed three major
themes. First, UNOSOM II was to maintain the ceasefire.
This included the clearing of mines, the disarming of the
various factions, and the destruction of confiscated
weapons.
Second, the United Nations force was to facilitate the
delivery of humanitarian aid. This meant securing ports and
airfields and maintaining supply routes, as well as
protecting UN and NGO personnel and their supplies.
Finally, UNOSOM II was to create conditions conducive
to a political settlement in Somalia. It was this aspect of
the mission that would substantially broaden in scope as
the operation progressed. This was originally conceived as
achieving national reconciliation among the various clan
groups, but it later grew into efforts at nation-building,
by means of UN restructuring of national institutions
(Makinda, 1993: 76).
5. What was the American domestic political climate during
this crisis?
Public opinion
At the outset of United States intervention in
Somalia, the public's opinion of the operation was very
favorable. In December 1992, a Harris Poll revealed that 95
percent of Americans had read or heard about the famine and
starvation in Somalia. The results of the polling question
showed that they seemed to be very affected by the news
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coverage of the famine: 75% favored sending in U.S. troops,
with only 20% opposed.
By and large, Americans even supported the potentially
longer-term objective of nation-building. When asked about
the more ambitious goal of staying in Somalia until a "new
and more effective government is put in place, even if that
takes a long time?," the results were surprisingly
positive. Sixty-three percent favored staying until a new
government was in place, while 28% favored leaving Somalia
in the "hands of warring gangs."
Regarding general attitudes toward using U.S. troops
on humanitarian missions, 71% favored sending the military
"to save lives and help distribute food in countries where
people are starving, but where U.S. national security is
not involved." Twenty-two percent opposed this view.
Only a 48% plurality agreed, however, that the United
States should send troops "to help restore order and save
lives in war- t o m countries where effective government has
broken down, but where U.S. national security is not
involved." A strong 42% opposed dispatching troops in this
scenario (Harris Poll. December 10, 1992).
A February 1993 poll (taken two months into Operation
Restore Hope) showed continued support for the mission. By
a 77% to 20% margin, respondents favored keeping American
troops in Somalia until authority could be transferred to a
"reasonably stable government." The same poll found that
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71% favored the more ambitious, UN-sponsored goal of having
U.S. troops disarm the clan militias in Somalis. Twentyfour percent disapproved of such a policy (Harris Poll.
February 8, 1993).
As Operation Restore Hope continued past its
originally forecast completion date of mid-January 1993,
the mission's gradually expanding goals and increasing
costs (in terms of both lives and money) caused public
opinion to shift. Polls taken in October, 1993, shortly
after the fighting escalated, found that two out of three
Americans favored withdrawal from Somalia. About half
favored recalling U.S. troops even if it meant leaving
Somalia in turmoil, and even if a second famine resulted.
Even after President Clinton's speech outlined the need to
send more troops to Somalia, an ABC news poll showed that
53% did not approve of the President's handling of the
situation (New York Times. October 9, 1993, article by B.
Drummond Ayres, Jr.)
A poll taken in November 1993 showed that a majority
of 56% continued to favor sending American troops to Third
World countries to prevent famine. By this time, however,
the public had become wary of the type of operation that
UNOSOM II had become. Sixty percent now opposed committing
troops for the broader goal of restoring law and order in a
Third World country, even if the existing government were
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to collapse (Los Angeles Times. November 2, 1993, article
by Doyle McManus).
Congressional Mood
When it commenced, United States intervention in
Somalia received strong, bipartisan support on Capitol
Hill. As Speaker of the House Tom Foley (D-WA) stated at
the time: "there is strong bipartisan support among the
leadership for the action the president is taking" (COWR.
December 5, 1992, story by Phillip A. Davis: 3760).
Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee Lee
Hamilton (D-IN), however, believed that such support should
not preclude the Congress from giving its formal consent.
As Hamilton put it: "It seems to me Congress should act to
put [on record) its approval or —
circumstances —

you can imagine the

its disapproval with respect to what's

happening" (COWR. December 5, 1992, report by Phillip A.
Davis: 3760).
A curious feature of the early debate, one that would
become more glaring as the operation wore on, was the
apparent role reversal between congressional liberals and
conservatives. The Congressional Black Caucus was unusually
enthusiastic about the intervention. Rep. John Lewis (D-GA)
acknowledged that, especially in light of his anti-war
activism dating back to the 1960s,:
It would seem somewhat out of the ordinary for me
to support a military effort, but after going to
Somalia and seeing what I consider the violation
of just human decency...there are no other
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affirmative means to alleviate the situation
except for the use of the necessary military
power to see that food and medical assistance be
available to the people there (COWR. December 5,
1992, report by Phillip A. Davis: 3760).
Although not a member of Congress, Jesse Jackson may
have expressed a more underlying motive for some black
Democrats, when he stated that the effort in Somalia
"breaks new ground, because for the first time we've been
willing to risk the lives of American soldiers to save an
African people" (COWR. December 5, 1992, article by Phillip
A. Davis). Such a quote suggests that, for at least some
liberal black Democrats, enthusiasm for the intervention
was based largely on racial considerations.
Despite general approval for intervention, there were
a few early voices of dissent, mostly sounded by
congressional conservatives. Senator Hank Brown (D-CO)
believed that President Bush had committed U.S. forces
"without clear, precise military objectives." Brown was
upset that, given the absence of a clear target date for
American withdrawal, the lack of established limits to
American involvement, and hazy rules governing their
authority, U.S. troops potentially faced a situation
resembling other open-ended fiascos such as Vietnam and
Beirut. Brown also was concerned that American forces were
going to have too prominent a role in the early stages of
the operation. He believed that troops from Muslim
countries should take the lead in Somalia, since it is an
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Islamic country (New York Times. December 5, 1992, dispatch
by Michael Wines).
Other critics were concerned that the United states
was shouldering too large a share of the burden for the
relief effort. Senator Larry Pressler (R-S.D.) declared:
"there is no reason the American taxpayer should play 80
percent of the Santa role in providing military and
economic aid to Somalia"

(COWR.

December 5, 1992, report by

Phillip A. Davis: 3760).
The wide-ranging support for intervention
notwithstanding, the Senate did not formally consider a
resolution authorizing American action for two months after
the operation began. On February 4, 1993, by voice vote,
the upper house approved Senate Joint Resolution 45, which
authorized the commitment of United States forces to the
UN-sponsored operation in Somalia

(COWR.

February 6, 1993:

277). During the debate on the measure, some members of the
Senate voiced concern over the lack of a withdrawal date.
In addition, the resolution called for the United Nations
to take over the operation "at the earliest possible date"
(COWR. February 6, 1993: 277).
The House did not take action until May 25, 1993 when
it also passed S.J. Res. 45. The tally was 243-179 in a
vote that divided largely along party lines. This vote gave
retroactive approval for UNITAF (which had ended earlier
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that month) as well as authorizing U.S. participation in
UNOSOM II for up to a year.
The House debate focussed on the congressional role in
deploying troops. As adopted, the resolution invoked the
War Powers Act, an aspect side-stepped in the Senate
version. Democratic sentiment on the issue was expressed by
Rep. Harry A. Johnston (D-FL) who argued: "My gosh, if we
ever want this establishment, the U.S. Congress, to be
relevant to the situation, then we must acknowledge the War
Powers Act is the law of the land" (COWR. May 29, 1993,
article by Gregory J. Bowens: 1373).
Republicans, by contrast, held to their traditional
position that the War Powers Act is unconstitutional.
Furthermore, they argued that a dangerous precedent was
being set by placing American forces under a United Nations
command. Rep. Henry Bonilla (R-TX) stated plainly: "I do
not believe that the American people want us to vote to put
the destiny and lives of American troops in the hands of UN
commanders" (COWR. May 29, 1993, article by Gregory J.
Bowens: 1373).
As UNOSOM II's mission began to drift from
humanitarian relief into nation-building, and finally
deteriorated into a vain manhunt for a fugitive warlord,
the congressional mood shifted dramatically, especially as
casualty figures climbed. A principal critic of the United
Nation's mishandling of the situation was Senator Robert
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Byrd (D-W.V.). In reopening the debate, Byrd argued that:
"The United Nation's mandate to disarm the warlords and
rebuild a civil society in Somalia, approved by the UN
Security Council, was never addressed, never debated or
never approved by this body" (COWR. September 11, 1993,
report by Elizabeth Palmer: 2399).
Although done in a somewhat less strident manner,
Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) agreed:
No one wants to leave [Somalia] in shambles. No
one wants to set up a situation where they go
right back into the same kind of despair they had
before. But neither do we want to set up a
situation where the United States has committed
its military to a mission that is very broad and
basically has no end point and really no
definition (COWR. September 11, 1993, report by
Elizabeth Palmer: 23990.
Perhaps unintentionally, other members of Congress
invoked arguments reminiscent of the Vietnam era by
expressing concern that pulling American troops out of
UNOSOM II would "undermine American credibility." Senator
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) argued: "If we pull out
prematurely, chased out by a tin pot warlord, I believe
that U.S. leadership, prestige, credibility, and national
self-respect will be significantly harmed" (COWR. September
11, 1993, report by Elizabeth Palmer: 2399).
However, President Clinton's decision to send in
additional troops in the wake of the October 1993 slaughter
of American Rangers, and the desecration of their dead
bodies by Somali mobs, evoked horror from traditional
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friends of the administration. Representative Patricia
Schroeder (D-CO) reacted strongly to testimony before the
House Armed Services Committee by Secretary of Defense Les
Aspin, who defended the President's decision. Schroeder
agonized: "I kept thinking 'come on Les, pull yourself
together. Have you forgotten everything you learned in
Vietnam? Remember the quagmire?'M (New York Times. October
8, 1993, dispatch by Douglas Jehl).
Senator Byrd, in particular, was outraged that the
Clinton Administration seemed to have no plan or direction
except to follow the lead of UN Secretary General BoutrosGhali. Many of his colleagues agreed with Byrd that the
Somalia mission served no national interest. There was
disagreement in their ranks, however, over a proper
schedule for withdrawal (New York Times. October 12, 1993,
article by Clifford Krauss).
Senator Byrd sponsored an amendment to the annual
defense authorization bill (S. 1298) that would have cut
off funding for the U.S. mission in Somalia within a month
of passage, unless Congress explicitly authorized their
continued deployment (COWR. September 11, 1993, report by
Elizabeth A. Palmer: 2399) . On October 15, however, the
Senate approved a compromise which would terminate funding
for United States participation in UNOSOM II after March
31, 1994. In passing 76-23, this marked the first time
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since Vietnam that either chamber had voted to cut-off
funding for an ongoing military operation.
Furthermore, the Senate killed a measure that would
have required congressional approval before the President
could place U.S. forces under a foreign command. The final
tally was 33-65. On November 9, 1993, in a 226-221 vote
that largely followed party lines, the House approved a
non-binding resolution that endorsed the March 31, 1994
withdrawal date that the President had accepted after heavy
Senate pressure (COWR. December 18, 1993: 3457).
6. What was the position of the military leadership
regarding the operation?
At the outset, the Pentagon had little enthusiasm to
get involved in a humanitarian mission in Somalia.
President Bush's decision, during the summer of 1992, to
engage in relief flights to Somalia, as well as to deploy
Marines to the Indian Ocean, were made despite the
reservations of the military leadership (New York Times.
December 6, 1992, article by Michael Wines).
During the fall of 1992, after military planners
studied various options, they decided that a relief
operation in Somalia was feasible. This assessment was
based on several considerations. One factor was that
military planners believed Somali clan militias to be
disorganized and capable only of token resistance. Except
for a few incidents of sniping and mining, it was expected
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that these groups would retreat when American troops
arrived.
A second consideration was Somalia's desert terrain.
Its flat, open landscape made conditions on the ground look
more like Iraq than Vietnam or Bosnia. Since potential
enemies would have little cover, it appeared that the
chance of Somalia turning into a quagmire of guerrilla
warfare was minimal (Bryden, 1995: 148).
In the official mission statement for Operation
Restore Hope, General Powell underscored the humanitarian
aims of the mission and went to pains to make clear that
the United States did not seek to impose a political
solution on Somalia. The plan itself bore a strong
resemblance to Operation Desert Storm. It called for a
large force to be decisively applied over a short period of
time. Once port facilities and supply routes were secured,
the humanitarian operation was to be quickly transferred to
the United Nations.
General Powell publicly warned the clan militias that
they would not be allowed to disrupt relief efforts. Unlike
UNOSOM I, UNITAF was going to have the means and the will
to project massive force, even taking preemptive measures
when necessary. To quote General Powell, force would be
imposed "in a rather decisive way so that there will be no
question in the mind of any of the faction leaders in
Somalia that we would have the ability to impose a stable
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situation, if it came to that, without their cooperation”
(New York Times. December 5, 1992, report by Michael R.
Gordon).
The plan concentrated on the delivery of assistance to
famine victims. Although it called for the United States to
attempt to buy weapons back from the clans, the plan
deemphisized disarmament as a central goal. As noted
earlier, it was feared that to make disarmament an
operational objective would extend the mission further than
the political leadership intended, as well as presenting
the possibility of drawing the United States much deeper
into Somalian politics than was desired. A Pentagon
official explained that the main idea of the plan instead
was that, "we will be the peacemaking force and then we'll
turn it over [to] the UN peacekeeper...". Perhaps
foreshadowing future complications, he further mused: "But
how do we know when we are done?" (New York Times. December
5, 1992, dispatch by Michael R. Gordon).
The Pentagon's plan was organized into four phases.
Phase One began with the arrival of U.S. Marines in
Somalia. Once ashore, they were to seize the international
airport and the port of Mogadishu, as well as the city's
food warehouses. Once these facilities were secured, the
Marines would then head inland to the town of Baidoa. This
was intended to allow the Americans to bring food overland
to the interior of Somalia.
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Phase Two called for Army troops to join the Marines
at Baidoa, and then to establish bases to the north of
Mogadishu at Belet, Uen, Hoddu, and Gailalassi. Within a
week after Mogadishu and Baidoa were secured, large numbers
of additional troops were to arrive. In Phase Three, U.S.
forces were to deploy to the south and west. This would
extend relief to the southern port city of Kismayu and the
interior town of Bardera.
Finally, Phase Four envisioned turning over the
operation to the United Nations. However, the plan was
vague as to the definition of a "secure environment," the
condition under which the UN would take over the mission.
Furthermore, there was a fear that the various clans might
just fall back, bide their time, and then reassert their
power shortly after the American withdrawal (New York
Times, December 5, 1992, article by Michael R. Gordon).
The plan concentrated on southern Somalia because it
was most severely affected by both the famine and by clan
interference with relief efforts. The Pentagon took a "wait
and see" attitude before it would make a decision to extend
the mission northward (New York Times. December 5, 1992,
dispatch by Michael Wines).
There was, however, a dispute over the projected
duration of Operation Restore Hope. President Bush had
envisioned a relatively short mission, with the troops
returning home within a few weeks, probably in time for
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Inauguration Day, January 20, 1993 (New York Times.
December 9, 1992, report by Jane Perlez). An unnamed
Pentagon official called such a timetable "ridiculous" (New
York Times. December 4, 1992, article by Michael R.
Gordon).
In the view of the military leadership at the
Pentagon, the complex logistics presented by the chaotic,
barren country made it a strong possibility that the
operation could take much longer than the President
believed (New York Times. December 9, 1992, report by Jane
Perlez). General Powell refused to give a specific date for
American withdrawal, citing the uncertainty of the
situation (New York Times. December 5, 1992, article by
Michael Wines). He did, however, indicate that he believed
the operation could take several months (Makinda, 1993:
72). In addressing the issue of possible withdrawal
timetables, Powell acknowledged that a contingent of
Marines and a naval task force would probably remain as a
quick reaction force, after the main body of troops had
withdrawn. Such a force would assist UN forces should
trouble erupt later. The General also stated that "a few
units" of ground forces would remain in Somalia as part of
the UN operation, following the departure of American
forces (New York Times. December 5, 1992, story by Michael
Wines).
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7. How was the operation actually carried out?
Operation Restore Hope began on December 9, 1992, when
U.S. Marines staged a dawn landing on beaches near
Mogadishu. Later in the day an additional 1,800 troops
landed (Keesing's, December 1992: 39225). Once ashore, the
soldiers quickly gained control of the port facilities and
Mogadishu International Airport fNew York Times. December
9, 1992, dispatch by Jane Perlez). With the exception of a
minor exchange of fire at the airport, the initial landing
was a peaceful operation.
On December 9, American and French forces took control
of much of Mogadishu and confiscated some weapons. Troops
began quickly to seize transportation-related facilities
and started to open up routes for relief into other coastal
areas and the interior. The Marines captured the former
Bali Dogle military airfield, 160 km. west of Mogadishu on
December 13. Three days later, U.S. and French troops
escorted a food convoy into Baidoa and seized the town's
airstrip, encountering no opposition. UNITAF then pushed on
to the southern port city of Kismayu. Due to a negotiated
settlement with local factions, on December 20 American
forces entered the city unopposed. Once secured, Kismayu
functioned as a food distribution center for the Juba
Valley of Southern Somalia (Keesing's, December 1992:
39225).
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Even at this early stage of the operation, there was
evidence of "mission creep." On December 23, Brigadier
General Tony Zinni, the U.S. military operations director,
stated that the United States would begin to seize armed
vehicles from Somali factions. This announcement seemed to
indicate that American policy was moving closer to the
United Nations version of what constituted a "secure
environment." The United States began implementing this new
policy on December 29, when American forces swept gunmen
from Mogadishu in anticipation of a visit by President
Bush. American soldiers seized weapons, armed vehicles, and
missiles from clan militias (Keesing's, December 1992:
39226).
As a matter of practice, United States troops avoided
the fighting among militia factions that did not interfere
with relief operations or threaten UNITAF forces. However,
by early January 1993, American commanders began to suggest
that UNITAF forces might intervene if rival groups did not
stop fighting. Furthermore, the U.S. command reaffirmed its
policy of confiscating Somalian weapons. As Marine Colonel
Michael Hagee stated: "Once we have a definitive location
of those weapons, we'll remove those weapons" (Washington
Post. January 2, 1993, dispatch by Keith B. Richburg).
Although at the outset the United States was reluctant to
intervene in clan fighting for fear of being pulled into
their conflict, the change in policy seemed to be prompted
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by the ever-increasing proximity of the fighting to western
relief centers.
Ongoing Mission: Early 1993
On January 7, UNITAF commander General Robert Johnson
indicated that his troops had successfully opened up supply
routes into the interior and, therefore, the operation was
now to enter a "new phase." This appears to have meant
undertaking more aggressive pacification operations. As
inter-clan warfare continued, U.S. forces raided militia
weapons facilities, destroying substantial stocks of arms
(Keesing's, January 1993: 39255). Such operations were not
without cost. On January 13, Marine Private Domingo Arroyo
was killed by gunmen in an attack near the Mogadishu
airport. This was the first American fatality of the
operation (New York Times. October 7, 1993, chronology:
All) .
During the operation, the increasingly frequent
accidental killings of Somali civilians began to worry
UNITAF commanders. Fearing that these deaths may be the
sign of a general complacency developing among his weary
soldiers, the Marine commander in Somalia, Maj. General
Charles Wilhelm, ordered his men to "adjust attitudes" and
show greater respect for Somali civilians. United States
involvement in the fighting deepened on January 25, 1993
when American and Belgian troops intervened in order to
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halt a force loyal to deposed strongman Said Barre from
advancing on Kismayu (Keesing's, January 1993: 39255).
UNITAF Winds Down
The American withdrawal began on January 31, 1993,
when 2,700 U.S. troops returned home (Keesing's, January
1993: 39255). Early in February, Col. Fred Peck of CENTCOM
informed Washington that the military task of restoring
security was almost complete. As a result, during February
United States troop levels in the theater fell from 24,000
to 17,000. Other nations sent in additional soldiers to
replace the withdrawing Americans.
Despite Washington's claims that the situation was
under control, violence, often aimed at American forces,
began to erupt. UNITAF weapons sweeps, usually directed
against Aidid's SNA, fueled the Somali General's suspicions
that interventionist forces were beginning to take sides in
political quarrels. Rumors that Washington was tilting
toward Aidid's rival, General Hersi Morgan, sparked further
attacks against U.S troops in February.
In early March, the British newspaper Guardian
reported that relief agencies were claiming that the United
States deliberately acted to conceal the failure of
American intervention in order to accelerate the withdrawal
of American troops (Keesing's, February 1993: 39308).
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IX Begins

On May 4, 1993, the United States formally turned over
the operation in Somalia to the United Nation's UNOSOM II
force. The U.S. withdrew all but approximately 3,000
troops, which remained on with UNOSOM II, mostly in a
logistical capacity (COWR. October 16, 1993: report by
Jennifer S. Thomas: 2826). The total UN force numbered
20,000 troops and was drawn from 35 countries (Keesing's,
May 1993: 39451).
The UNOSOM II operation was authorized by the United
Nations Security Council on March 26, 1993 with the
adoption of UNSC Res. 814. This resolution defined the
mission and scope of the new operation. Derived from the
provisions outlined in Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter (the details of which are covered later), UNSC Res.
814 gave the Secretary General, through his field
commander, the authority to take all necessary measures,
including armed force, to enforce UN resolutions pertaining
to Somalia.
UNOSOM II was conceived as a two-tiered operation. As
such, it was to act in a peacekeeping mode where possible,
yet engage in peace enforcement when necessary (Makinda,
1993: 77). With a scope considerably wider than UNITAF,
UNOSOM II's objectives included attempts to foster progress
toward national reconciliation, and the reconstruction of
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political institutions (Keesing's, May 1993: 39451;
Makinda, 1993: 80).
In terms of its operational mandate, UNOSOM II was
charged with doing whatever was necessary to maintain the
peace in Somalia. The United Nations applied a broad
construction to "maintaining peace," so that it included
such activities as disarming the various factions,
protecting relief workers, clearing mines, repatriating
refugees, establishing a constabulary, and engaging in
efforts to help rebuild the economy. It was expected that
UNOSOM II would cover the entire country (Keesing's, March
1993: 39356; May 1993: 39451).
Entering the Morass
It did not take long for the clan militias to begin to
challenge UNOSOM II. On June 5, 1993, Aidid's SNA forces
ambushed Pakistani units assigned to the UN force. The
result was 24 Pakistanis killed and 54 wounded. This
firefight signalled the start of four months of almost
daily clashes between UNOSOM II and the SNA (New York
Times. October 7, 1993, chronology: All).
The United Nations Security Council reacted to the
escalating violence in Somalia by adopting Resolution 837.
This measure reaffirmed the nation-building mandate of
UNOSOM II. In addition, it authorized UN forces to find and
punish those responsible for the ambush (Makinda, 1993:
80). President Clinton endorsed the use of retaliatory
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strikes by UNOSOM II and the U.S. quick reaction force. He
justified the United Nations' more aggressive posture,
arguing that action against Aidid was necessary to restore
order, as well as to strengthen the effectiveness and
credibility of "UN peacekeeping in Somalia and around the
world" (Makinda, 1993: 81). The Security Council backed up
its words with action. On June 17, the chamber issued an
arrest warrant for General Aidid. A raid aimed at arresting
Aidid was launched, but failed to capture him (Keesing's,
June 1993: 39499).
The United Nations' actions of June, 1993, were
evidence of further "mission creep." As the nature and
goals of the operation started to drift, the mission began
to take on the appearance of a personal vendetta between
Mr. Boutros-Ghali and General Aidid. This impression was
further reinforced during the fall of 1993, as the focus of
UN operations became increasingly fixed on neutralizing the
warlord.
In the view of many Somalians, the United Nations
actions seemed to validate Aidid's claim that the UN was,
in fact, taking sides in the civil war. For this reason,
UNOSOM II efforts to capture Aidid began to have the
unintended result of giving the warlord a measure of
popularity among the Somali populace. To compound the
United Nations' problems, UNOSOM II seemed to be in a
Catch-22. If it did not respond to attacks against it,
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UNOSOM II would invite more aggressive provocations.
However, when it did retaliate, the inevitable result was
civilian casualties, which only fueled Somalian resentment
against an intervention that only months earlier had been
viewed as the country's salvation (Makinda, 1993: 81).
UNOSOM II's problems seemed only to grow worse in
October 1993. On October 3, United States Rangers were
pinned down by Aidid's forces during a botched raid on his
command compound. American losses included 18 killed and
nearly 80 wounded. Somali losses were estimated at 300
(COWR.

October 16, 1993: report by Jennifer S. Thomas:

2826). To make matters worse, a U.S. helicopter pilot,
Michael Durant, was captured and held hostage by the SNA.
Back in the United States, citizens were horrified by
televised images of a beaten Durant being forced to read a
statement obviously prepared by his captors. However, it
was the pictures of a dead U.S. Army Ranger being dragged
through the streets of Mogadishu in front of jeering mobs
that most sickened the American public. This unfortunate
episode was to be a critical turning point for United
States participation in UNOSOM II (New York Times. October
9, 1993, dispatch by R. Drummond Ayres, Jr.).
Under intense bipartisan congressional pressure, on
October 7, President Clinton announced the withdrawal of
all U.S. troops from Somalia by March 31, 1994, regardless
of the situation on the ground. In the interim, however, he
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ordered the immediate deployment to Somalia of 1,700 troops
and 104 armored vehicles. Furthermore, an additional 3,600
Marines were to join the American fleet off the Somali
coast (Keesing's, October 1993: 39675). The President
justified the deployment as a measure taken to stabilize
the situation, reassure UNOSOM II's other participants, and
allow for an orderly withdrawal. Employing language
chillingly reminiscent of Lyndon Johnson during Vietnam,
Clinton spoke of the need to avoid the appearance that
America was going to "cut and run" from Somalia (New York
Times, October 7, 1993, article by Thomas L. Friedman).
Clearly, the President's actions were at least partially
motivated by his need to deflect criticism which arose over
revelations that the U.S. commander in the theater, General
Montgomery, had urgently requested the deployment of
additional armor before the October 3 battle, only to be
refused by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin (New York Time.
October 9, 1993, article by Steven A. Holmes).
On October 14, after negotiations between the United
States and Aidid's forces, Durant was released. President
Clinton took great pains to deny that a deal was made to
secure the pilot's release. By November, however, there was
an obvious shift in Washington's policy toward the fugitive
warlord. The most glaring example of this occurred on
October 19, when the President recalled 600 American
Rangers who had been used in the effort to find and capture
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Aidid. Soon afterward, the administration was said to have
lobbied the United Nations Security Council to suspend
operations aimed at arresting Aidid. American policy now
apparently sought to facilitate the public rehabilitation
of the General, so that Washington could engage in
negotiations with him. The talks between the two sides
began on November 18 (Keesing's, October 1993: 39675;
November 1993: 39721). In December, 1993, the United States
went so far as to use its military aircraft to transport
Aidid to a peace conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
(Keesing's, December 1993: 39768).
The United States Withdraws
The final American pull-out from Somalia began in
December 1993, when 2,500 U.S. troops were withdrawn
(Keesing's, December 1993: 39768). Even though early 1994
found American forces still involved in skirmishes with
local clan militias, the withdrawal continued (Keesing's,
January 1994: 39806). United States participation in UNOSOM
II came to a close on March 25, 1994, when the final
evacuation of U.S forces was completed. All that remained
of the American presence in Somalia was a 60-man token
force. Of this remnant, ten remained at UNOSOM headquarters
in logistical support roles, and 50 stood guard at the
United States Embassy in Mogadishu. The departure of
American, and other western, forces left UNOSOM as
basically a Third World operation. Until its termination in
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1995, UNOSOM II comprised mostly troops from Pakistan,
India, Indonesia, and Egypt (Keesing's, March 1994: 39899).
8. What types and quantities of forces were used?
UNITAF
When the original United Task Force was proposed in
late 1992, military planners believed that Somali militias
posed no real threat. For this reason, it was not
considered imperative to deploy troops on the scale of
Operation Desert Storm. Because Somalia was not perceived
to be a "combat mission" per se, it did not seem necessary
to arm American soldiers with the full array of high-tech
weapons used in the Persian Gulf. Still, the plans called
for a massive presence, the aim of which was to both
overwhelm and intimidate the local warlords so as to ensure
their non-interference with UNITAF operations. At the
outset UNITAF numbered 35,000 troops, of which 28,150

were

American (Keesing's, December 1992: 39225; New York Times.
December 9, 1992, article by Jane Perlez). As noted
earlier, the initial landing involved 1,800 U.S. Marines.
To support UNITAF, the United States dispatched a
naval task force, which was to remain just off the coast of
Somalia. Leading the force was the USS Tripoli, an
amphibious assault ship which carried 23 helicopters. Her
air complement included 4 AH Cobra attack helicopters, 12
CH-46 Sea Knight medium-lift helicopters, 4 CH-53 Sea
Stallion heavy-lift helicopters, and 3 UH-1 Huey support
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and logistics helicopters (New York Time. December 9, 1992,
diagram: A16).
Soon after this initial deployment, a three-ship
carrier task force was diverted from the Persian Gulf to
join the Tripoli group. The lead vessel was the aircraft
carrier

tts s

Ranger. It was accompanied by the cruiser USS

Valley Forge and the destroyer USS Kinkaid. Meanwhile
16,000 troops of the First Marine Expeditionary Force and
some 10,000 soldiers from the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain
Division light infantry were sent to the theater. As a
result, UNITAF reached its peak of 38,300 troops by midJanuary, 1993 (Keesing's, January 1993: 39356). Washington
began to withdraw some of its forces after a few weeks in
Somalia. In January 1993, the first 2,700 were sent home
(Keesing's, January 1993: 39255). [For individual country
totals, see Table 6.1 in Makinda, 1993: 73].
UNOSOM II
It was the desire of UN Secretary General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali that UNOSOM II be a peacekeeping force
endowed with enforcement capability. In his view, such
powers were necessary so as to avoid simply repeating the
failure of UNOSOM I, which had been lightly armed and
operated under extremely restrictive rules of engagement.
The Security Council agreed with Boutros-Ghali and, as a
result, UNOSOM II was much better equipped and better armed
than previous peacekeeping missions (Makinda, 1993: 77-8).
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The United Nations requested the continued commitment
of combat units from states which had participated in
UNITAF, but few nations obliged. An exception was the
United States, which agreed to send troops to work mainly
on logistical tasks. The initial U.S. commitment to UNOSOM
was approximately 3,000 soldiers. As noted earlier,
Washington also sent a 1,300 strong quick reaction force,
to be station off the Somali coast (Makinda, 1993: 77-8).
Following a battle between UNOSOM troops from Pakistan
and the SNA militia in June 1993, the Security Council
requested that UN member states send heavy weaponry,
including tanks and attack aircraft to support UNOSOM II
forces. The United States again complied, using carrierbased aircraft in retaliatory strikes against Aidid's
forces in southern Mogadishu between June 12 and June 16
(Keesing's, June 1993: 39499).
In response to the ambush of American troops by Aidid
loyalists in October 1993, President Clinton ordered the
American presence in the region beefed up. Upgrading of
firepower came in the form of the aircraft carrier USS
Abraham Lincoln and its battle group (New York Times.
October 8, 1993, article by John H. Cushman, Jr.). The
carrier has 60 warplanes, mostly fighter-bombers that gave
U.S. forces a formidable heavy air strike capability (New
York Times. October 10, 1993, diagram: 7). Further
reinforcements included 104 armored vehicles, including
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tanks and armored personnel carriers (New York Times.
October 8, 1993, report by Douglas Jehl). In addition, the
quick reaction force was expanded to 3,600 men.
Helicopter gunships were also sent to Somalia to
provide additional airpower. Additional transport
helicopters provided the necessary lift capacity to afford
greater mobility. In addition, the U.S. dispatched AC-130
gunships, which are slow- flying planes possessing a rapidfire cannon that can be used for aerial support of ground
forces. These capabilities were placed under a U.S. command
and were to depart when American forces withdrew in March
1994 (New York Times. October 8, 1993: article by John H.
Cushman).
With these additional forces, U.S. strength in the
region jumped from 4,700 to nearly 20,000 troops (this
figure includes U.S. forces in UNOSOM II, the quick
reaction force, and naval personnel). This increase cheered
American military officials who had maintained that the
original 4,700 troops had been vulnerable (New York Times.
October 8, 1993, story by Douglas Jehl). These senior
Pentagon officials had never been satisfied with UNOSOM II
arrangements. Their discontent was largely rooted in the
fact that U.S. forces were being used in pursuit of
objectives defined by the UN Security Council, rather than
by America's own leaders (New York Times. October 8, 1993,
article by John H. Cushman).
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9. Was the conflict limited in scope?
The answer to this question is yes. From the outset,
UNITAF limited it operations to the southern 40% of
Somalia. No attempt was made to expand its area of coverage
beyond these hardest hit areas (Makinda, 1993: 15).
Although UNOSOM II's original mandate was to cover all
of Somalia, it never succeeded in doing so. The desire to
expand operations was effectively checked, as UNOSOM II
became increasingly bogged down in fighting Aidid's forces
in and around Mogadishu. As a result, UNOSOM II never had
the opportunity to spill across Somalia's frontiers; even
its plans to expand into northern Somalia never
materialized (New York Times. March 26, 1994, dispatch by
Donatella Lorch).
10. What was the nature of the theater commander1s power
and influence?
UNITAF
During the UNITAF portion of the U.S. intervention in
Somalia, American Forces were commanded by Lt. General
Robert B. Johnston of the First Marine Expeditionary Force
(New York Times. December 4, 1992: article by Michael R.
Gordon).
Under the terms of UNITAF's authorization, although
the United States retained control of the command, the
United Nations was given an oversight responsibility.
Therefore, while UNSC Res. 794 mandated that the United
States inform the Security Council of what was being done
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in the name of the United Nation, the U.S. was essentially
free of the kind of close control the UN usually exercises
in peacekeeping operations. Washington, in turn, gave
General Johnston the relatively free hand in the field that
he had desired (New York Times. December 9, 1992, report by
Paul Lewis).
Perhaps the clearest example of the freedom in the
field that General Johnston enjoyed occurred during a
dispute over the issue of disarming the clan militias. As
noted earlier, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali wanted
United States forces to stay in Somalia until they disarmed
the warring factions, removed mines, and restored order
(New York Times. December 11, 1992, article by Elaine
Sciolino). General Johnston objected, arguing that
disarmament was not part of his mission. Johnston
maintained that disarmament and mine removal were long-term
goals. Such goals clearly went beyond the U.S. objectives
of securing supply routes and then removing American
forces. Furthermore, Johnston argued, with so many weapons
in the country it was too dangerous to try to collect them
forcefully. Even if it were possible to do so, how would
one know when "disarmament" had been accomplished (Makinda,
1993: 71-72)?
President Bush and Defense Secretary Cheney agreed
with Johnston and did not make disarmament officially part
of the military's mission per se. They did, however, set
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the secondary goal of seizing and destroying as many
weapons as possible. In fulfilling this goal, General
Johnston and his subordinates were allowed considerable
discretion regarding whether to buy weapons from the
various factions (New York Times. December 11, 1992,
article by Elaine Sciolino).
Although the extent to which Johnston was included in
the original planning seems unclear, he appears to have had
considerable authority in the theater. It was, for example,
his pronouncement that his forces had succeeded in opening
up relief supply routes that triggered the start of U.S.
troop withdrawal. General Johnston was also allowed to take
action in the field as he saw fit. At the outset, Joint
Chief Chairman Colin Powell indicated that American forces
under Johnston would be allowed to take preemptive action
if the situation called for it. UNITAF's actions in early
1993 (such as aggressively engaging gunmen and preliminary
attempts at disarmament) showed that Johnston did, in fact,
exercise the full authority delegated to him (Keesing's,
January 1993: 39255).
The rules of engagement under UNITAF also indicate the
wide discretion granted to the theater commander (New York
Times, December 5, 1992, report by Michael Wines). In the
case of self-defense, unlike UNOSOM I, UNITAF forces were
not compelled to wait until shot at before firing on
hostile forces. Leaflets dropped on Mogadishu in late
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December 1992 clearly warned the Somalis that anyone
pointing a weapon at members of the multinational forces
would be shot (Keesing's, December 1992: 39226).

Although

UNITAF soldiers were given strict orders to fire only in
self-defense, because of the chaos in Mogadishu, the troops
were allowed personal discretion in judging each
potentially dangerous situation. As one colonel stated "If
an individual vehicle shows hostile intent, we'll take away
its ability to do that...we can disarm it or we can
vaporize it" (New York Times. December 9, 1992, dispatch by
Eric Schmitt). President Bush underscored this "wide
leeway" policy for his commanders by stating that they and
their troops "have the authority to safeguard the lives of
our troops and the lives of Somalia's people" (New York
Times. December 5, 1992, report by Michael Wines).
Perhaps as a reaction to the rules of engagement (ROE)
used in the past, which were seen as so restrictive that
they interfered with the ability to accomplish the mission
at an acceptable cost (as in Beirut, Vietnam), the
engagement guidelines followed in Somalia left troops
relatively free to determine for themselves when they could
resort to force. Some military legal advisors believed that
in Somalia, American soldiers had been granted more leeway
than ever before outside of a traditional combat zone
(Washington Post. January 25, 1993, article by Keith
Richburg).
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UNOSOM IX
As both deputy commander of UNOSOM II and the
commander of United States forces in the Somalia theater,
Maj. General Montgomery had the power to question any order
that was opposed by the United States fCOWR. February 20,
1993: 395; March 6, 1993, article by Carroll J. Doherty:
529). As stated earlier, Montgomery also had unilateral
U.S. command over a quick reaction force stationed on
American ships off the Somali coast (Makinda, 1993: 78).
General Montgomery appears to have been in substantial
agreement with UN goals, particularly the capture of Aidid,
which he saw as important to the entire humanitarian/
nation-building enterprise. During congressional hearings
on Somalia, Montgomery would later say that he "thought it
made sense to take Aidid off the scene," because, he
believed, that if the warlord had been apprehended, the
Somali resistance might have crumbled (CQWR, May 14, 1994,
article by Richard Sammon: 1234). In another interview,
Montgomery reiterated his support of UN efforts to capture
Aidid, but expressed slight disagreement with the methods
used. Montgomery declared: "I would have done it, but not
announced it" fA&E Investigative Report: "A Soldier's
Peace." air date: April 23, 1995).
In the fall of 1993, the extent of Montgomery's
influence was put to the test. After the ambush of UNOSOM
II forces on September 9, General Montgomery sent the
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Pentagon a request for heavily armed M1A1 tanks and Bradley
Fighting Vehicles. Montgomery said that they were needed to
help escort convoys, break through barricades, and patrol
more dangerous areas of Mogadishu (New York Times. October
5, 1993, dispatch by R.W. Apple, Jr.).
General Montgomery's request was declined by Defense
Secretary Les Aspin, who feared congressional objections
(New York Times. October 9, 1993, article by Steven A.
Holmes and October 8, 1993, article by John H. Cushman).
After the deaths of the American Rangers in October, Aspin
would admit that he made a mistake by not honoring the
request.
As noted earlier, in response to the killing of the
Rangers, President Clinton virtually doubled the American
presence while dispatching ample firepower, all of which
was placed under Montgomery's direct command. Most of the
criticism for the events leading to the Rangers' deaths
fell on Defense Secretary Aspin, who later resigned, in
large part as a result of the incident.
11. Wa3 there an »exit strategy?" If so. was it adhered to?
No clear timetable was ever articulated for either
UNITAF or UNOSOM II. Before UNITAF, President Bush declared
that he wanted the troops out of Somalia by January 20,
1993 which was also to be his last day in office. Defense
Secretary Cheney and General Powell, however, indicated
that the troops might have to stay longer. President-elect
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Clinton agreed with their assessment (Keesing's, December
1992: 39225). Even after Operation Restore Hope was
underway, the withdrawal date remained unclear.
The Security Council resolution authorizing UNITAF
stated that force was to be used to establish "a secure
environment." Only when this task had been accomplished to
the satisfaction of the Secretary General and the Security
Council would the United States be withdrawn (New York
Times. December 4, 1992, article by Paul Lewis).
This policy, however, was exceedingly vague and could
be construed as permitting an open-ended engagement for
Washington. It may be recalled that there was considerable
disagreement between the United States and the United
Nations over whether a "secure environment" was contingent
on disarming the clan militias. The U.S. maintained that
the goal was simply to establish sufficient order so that
relief could be distributed. As a practical matter,
Washington's veto power in the UN Security Council could
effectively stop any attempt to keep the U.S. in Somalia
any longer than it wanted to be there (New York Times.
December 11, 1992, report by Elaine Sciolino).
When, in January, 1993, American commanders began to
certify the security of relief operations, the troops
started to return home (Keesing's, January 1993: 39255). On
March 5, Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed May 1, 1993, as the
date that the United States could turn over the operation
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in Somalia to the United Nations (Keesing's, March 1993:
39356).
Despite the completion of the United States mission in
May 1993, some American forces remained in Somalia under
UNOSOM II and in the quick reaction force. At the time,
General Powell stated that he had "no date in mind" for the
final withdrawal of all American forces. He declared ,
however, that "we'll keep [American forces in Somalia] as
long as its serving a useful purpose" (Washington Post.
April 6, 1993, article by Keith Richburg).
UNOSOM II
Backed by American support in the Security Council,
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali set several ambitious goals
for UNOSOM II. Among the new objectives were: to maintain
the ceasefire, to facilitate the delivery of relief
supplies, and most ominously, to create conditions
conducive to a political settlement. This latter goal
carried an implied commitment to building a new state
apparatus that could function effectively and maintain
order (Makinda, 1993: 76). But this seemed to beg two
important questions: First, how does one develop stable
political institution out of anarchy? (Makinda, 1993: 31).
Second, could military intervention compel the Somalians to
address these issues? Such questions, especially those
concerning basic identity (i.e. loyalty to clan vs. shared
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nationality) are not easily answered, and certainly cannot
be imposed.
A more basic question was never addressed.
Specifically, given the anarchy and intense inter-clan
hatreds, is "unity" a goal even worth striving for? If the
clans cannot live together, why not encourage the creation
of two, or more, Somalian states?
The pace of events soon compelled a revised timetable
for withdrawal. The killing of the Rangers on October 3,
1993 sparked tremendous outrage within the public and the
halls of Congress. Under intense pressure, President
Clinton devised a new policy, the bottom line of which was
that U.S. troops would be withdrawn no later than March 31,
1994, regardless of the state of conditions within Somalia.
The President unveiled four new missions for American
forces in the interim period. The first was self-defense
for U.S. personnel. The second was to keep open
communication routes for UN relief operations. The third
objective was "keeping the pressure" on local irregular
forces which had attacked American troops. Fourth, and
finally, to maintain the security necessary so that
"through that pressure and the presence of our forces, [we
can] help [make] it reasonably possible for the Somali
people...to reach agreement among themselves so that they
can solve their own problems" fCOWR. October 16, 1993,
report by Pat Towell: 2823).
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In support of this new policy and withdrawal schedule,
President Clinton doubled the size of the American military
presence (New York Times. October 8, 1993, Editorial).
Citing possible damage to U.S. credibility, Clinton
declared that "It is my judgement and that of my military
advisors that we may need up to six months to complete
these steps and to conduct an orderly withdrawal" (New York
Times. October 8, 1993, text of Clinton address). These
fears notwithstanding, United States troops were finally
withdrawn from Somalia on March 25, 1994, almost a week
ahead of schedule (New York Times. March 26, 1994, dispatch
by Donatella Lorch).
12. What were the -Immediate results of the intervention?
At the time of the final withdrawal of United States
forces the situation in Somalia remained largely unsettled.
The American record had both accomplishments to be proud of
and major deficiencies.
On the positive side, by March, 1994, the famine had
ended. Relief efforts had been, for the most part,
successful. Life in the Somalian countryside had largely
returned to a "normal" routine. Relief workers could take
pride in the fact that many Somali children had been
vaccinated against disease. Furthermore, the United States
and United Nations had successfully completed numerous
public works projects; many new wells and roads had been
built. Due to military protection provided by U.S and UN
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intervention, agriculture had begun to return to Somalia's
few arable areas.
On the political front, in March 1994, fifteen clan
groups, including the two major factions (those headed by
Ali Mahdi and Aidid) met in Nairobi, Kenya. At the
conclusion of the conference, they signed a pact that
seemed to give hope for a peaceful future. The terms of the
document included: (1) a ceasefire among the factions, (2)
a repudiation of violence, and (3) a set date for a
national unity and reconciliation conference (New York
Times. March 26, 1994, article by Donatella Lorch).
However, the immediate post-intervention situation
also had its negative aspects. By April, 1994, the peace
process mentioned above had collapsed, as the scheduled
reconciliation conference failed to take place. With both
major factions accusing the other of undermining the
Nairobi agreement, it was clearly evident that the two
sides were still far apart (Keesing's, April 1994: 39948).
In March, 1994, although the initial problem of famine
was under control, a new problem, pestilence, appeared in
the form of a major cholera outbreak. By late March, more
than 1700 cases had been reported, with at least 100 deaths
confirmed.
Operationally, the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces
left UNOSOM II in the hands of substantially less well
trained and equipped units from Third World countries. In
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fairness, it is difficult to say what the immediate effect
of this development would be for Somalia because after
July, 1993, U.S. and UN forces rarely ventured out of their
secured compounds for fear of taking more casualties. A few
patrols were dispatched, but they studiously avoided
certain hazardous areas. In fact, some new roads were built
around dangerous sections of Mogadishu so that American
tanks could bypass them. The relative absence of UNOSOM II
patrols allowed a noticeable increase in banditry and
looting.
Although the American withdrawal removed a substantial
number of troops from the operation, in March, 1994, UNOSOM
II still had approximately 19,000 troops in the country.
However, the departure of the United States removed
substantial firepower and a coercive presence that had
acted as a psychological deterrent. There was a pervasive
fear, both in Somalia and outside it, that in the absence
of a Somalian political settlement, conditions would soon
deteriorate (New York Times. March 26, 1994, dispatch by
Donatella Lorch).
13. What was the long-term situation?
Unfortunately, in the period since the American
withdrawal, the situation in Somalia has not substantially
changed. Fighting among the various factions continues. The
leadership of the northern breakaway Republic of Somaliland
has asserted that it will never rejoin Somalia.
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For a year, UNOSOM II remained and continued to take
casualties in a war seemingly without end. In August, 1994,
UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali finally
acknowledged the possibility that the operation might not
achieve its objectives. Furthermore, the few UNOSOM II
troops that had been allowed into Somaliland were expelled
and the civil war there resumed (Keesing's: March-December
1994). In March 1995, United States forces returned to
Somalia, this time to evacuate safely the remaining UNOSOM
forces, thereby abandoning Somalia to its fate.
In the period since all foreign troops had withdrawn,
inter-clan fighting has continued unabated. As was the case
before western intervention, the conflict is inconclusive,
with no one group able to achieve a decisive advantage
(Bryden, 1995: 151).
14. What elements about this case are unique?
Perhaps the most unique element of this case was the
motive behind the intervention. Although altruistic
rationales are often applied to American military ventures
abroad, in Somalia this truly seems to have been the case.
The claim that Operation Restore Hope was undertaken for
humanitarian reasons is validated by the fact that there
was no discernable American national interest at stake in
Somalia. In earlier years, American involvement on the Horn
of Africa had been motivated by its strategic location and
the need to have a client state in the region to balance

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

269

Soviet influence. However, with the demise of the Cold War,
these justifications are no longer relevant.
It seems in this case that the scale of human
suffering, presented night after night on the evening news,
motivated the President's action and gained him a large
reservoir of support in both the public and Congress (New
York Times. December 5, 1993, text of Bush address).
A second unique element of this case was the
anarchical environment in Somalia. In his speech explaining
initial U.S. intervention, President Bush accurately
declared: "There is no government in Somalia. Law and order
have broken down. Anarchy prevails" (New York Times.
December 5, 1992, text of Bush address). Somalia presented
no "enemy" to defeat, only conditions (e.g. famine, civil
war) to deal with; therefore, it was difficult to define
goals and determine their fulfillment.
Third, Somalia represented the first time that the
United Nations had ever used Chapter VII of the UN Charter
to justify an invasion of a member state (Makinda, 1993:
70). This authority arises from Chapter VII, Article 42 of
the Charter which states that the Security Council, when
necessary, "may take such action by air, sea, or land
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security" (United Nations, 1979:
389). A broad construction of the concept of "international
peace and security" apparently was accepted by the Security
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Council, allowing it to utilize these provisions of the
Charter.
Chapter VII, therefore, was the underlying
justification for both UNITAF, and later, UNOSOM II. As a
case in point, UNSC Res. 794, which authorized the initial
UNITAF mission, utilized Chapter VII by granting the
military operation the right "to use all necessary means to
establish as soon as possible a secure environment for
humanitarian relief operations" (emphasis added)(Makinda,
1993: 70). In comparison to earlier UN
peacekeeping/humanitarian operations, the authority granted
in this case was broadened considerably, representing a
virtual "blank check." Secretary General Boutros-Ghali saw
to it that this authority was later extended to UNOSOM II,
I

making it a peacekeeping operation with enforcement power.
Because of its concern with peace and international
security. Chapter VII was also seen as a way of evading
Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, a provision which
prohibits outside interference in the domestic affairs of
another state (Makinda, 1993: 70).
A fourth distinction is that UNOSOM II marked the
first time that U.S. forces were placed under a foreign
command. As noted earlier, 3,000 U.S combat-capable troops
served under the direct command of Turkish General Bir.
Although U.S non-combat forces have served under the United
Nations flag in the past, Somalia represented the first
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time that combat-capable forces have operated outside of
the American chain of command. Although the additional
quick reaction force remained under a U.S. command, it too
often followed the UN's lead into action (COWR. May 22,
1993, article by Gregory J. Bowens: 1304).
Finally, this operation was very unusual in that it
was initiated in a very open manner. Usually, to hold
casualties to the lowest possible number, the exact
location and time (H-Hour) of a landing are closely guarded
secrets. Even the soldiers involved are kept in the dark
until the last possible minute. By contrast, in Somalia,
United States officials were sent to Mogadishu the day
before the landing in order to meet with the two main clan
militia leaders. It was hoped that by explaining the
humanitarian nature of the UNITAF mission, American
officials could secure the militias' cooperation during the
initial deployment. The equally unusual result was that the
December 1992 landing represented one of the few times that
an "opponent" ordered his forces to welcome U.S. troops as
"friends" (New York Times. December 9, 1992, dispatch by
Jane Perlez).
15. Was the intervention "successful?11
UNITAF
UNITAF, which represented the initial American
intervention, was generally quite successful. President
Bush had outlined only two goals, and they were largely
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fulfilled. The first was to create a secure environment for
relief operations. As early as February, 1993, it was clear
that UNITAF was having its intended positive effect
regarding this objective. Ports and airports in Mogadishu
and southern Somalia were secured, greatly facilitating
increased shipments of food, medicine, and other relief
supplies. Likewise, virtually all supply routes through
south and central Somalia were cleared and made usable.
Furthermore, bandits had all but disappeared from
Mogadishu. The looting of relief supplies was stopped.
As a result of the success of these military
operations, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
was able to engage in various public works projects.
Perhaps the most important indicators of American success
was that the death toll from starvation dropped
dramatically. In sum, United States forces succeeded in
establishing a secure environment for relief efforts in
areas where U.S. troops had been deployed (Makinda, 1993:
74).
The other official American objective —

the rapid

withdrawal of U.S. forces after the establishment of the
"secure environment" —

was accomplished during the spring

of 1993, culminating with the turning over of operations in
Somalia to the United Nations in May 1993.
Despite clashes between American troops and Somali
gunmen, casualty figures remained quite low. As a result,
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and as long as that remained true, U.S. public opinion
viewed the UNITAF operation as having an acceptable cost
politically. This is to say that there was a sufficiently
low number of casualties in relation to the minimal (in
terms of the nation's vital interests) importance of the
objectives pursued.
Although some relief agencies claimed that American
officials had attempted to cover-up Operation Restore
Hope's alleged "failure'' in order to hasten the pace of the
U.S. withdrawal, when considered in terms of fulfilling the
objectives originally set by Washington, the mission was a
success (Keesing's, February 1993: 39308). It is
interesting to note also that many of the relief workers
who originally complained about UNITAF eventually came to
see it as a success and requested that it stay longer
(Makinda, 1993: 74).
UNOSOM XI
UNOSOM II, the United Nation's successor mission to
UNITAF, is generally considered a failure. Starting with
the ambitious goal of rebuilding the Somali nation, it
rapidly degraded into little more than a manhunt for
General Aidid.
UNOSOM II was originally conceived as a new type of
United Nations operation: peacekeeping with the power to
use force to ensure the fulfillment of Security Council
resolutions. It was, however, handicapped from the start.
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Despite its unprecedented enforcement authority, in terms
of both its armaments and manpower quality, UNOSOM II was
substantially inferior to the U.S. force that it replaced.
Although a quick reaction force was available to assist
UNOSOM II, it remained under an American command.
UNOSOM II's original mandate was to cover all of
Somalia. In practice, however, it never succeeded in doing
so. UNOSOM II's effectiveness largely remained confined to
southern and central Somalia. The cause of this immobility
was two-fold. First, southern and central Somalia were the
regions hardest hit by the famine. Second, the fighting
between the two main clan militias increasingly centered on
Mogadishu.
In reviewing the ambitious goals that the Security
Council set for UNOSOM II, the extent of its failure
becomes more evident. The objective of disarming the clan
militias was never realized. Given the proliferation of
weapons throughout the country, this goal was never very
realistic from the start.
In terms of the broader goal —

fostering peace and

national reconciliation so that Somalia could be rebuilt —
the mission also failed. The United Nations sponsored at
least three major peace conferences. Despite the huge
expense associated with them (in the "five to six figures"
according to a western diplomat), nothing constructive ever
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resulted from these meetings. Afterward, fighting continued
unabated.
Although it assumed control of the port and airport in
Mogadishu from the United States, UNOSOM II had difficulty
maintaining the supply routes from these facilities into
the famine-stricken interior areas. Indeed, American forces
attached to UNOSOM II actually had to build roads around
parts of Mogadishu so that clan strongholds could be
avoided.
UNOSOM II was unable to maintain the peac«. , which was
one of its central objectives. To make matters worse, when
UNOSOM II did engage in firefights with clan militias, it
often took unacceptably high casualties. As a result, UN
forces all but abdicated their peacekeeping role, spending
the last few months of their mission inside the secure
confines of their fortified bases in order to avoid further
casualties. When the United Nations force left Somalia in
March 1995, the capital was still so torn by fighting among
the rival gangs and militias that even relief workers
withdrew.
UNOSOM II's one major success seems to have been
famine relief. Aid workers believe that intervention may
have saved as many as 300,000 people from starvation. So
complete has the recovery been for Somalia that the country
now produces almost enough food to fulfill its domestic
consumption needs. It has even begun to export modest
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quantities of livestock and fruit. These exports form the
basis for Mogadishu's slow return as a regional trade
center (New York Times. March 3, 1995, article by Donatella
Lorch).
The political situation is still greatly fractured and
unstable. Elections promised for 1995 have not taken place.
The effort of the United Nations to act as an agent of
Somalian national reconciliation failed miserably, in some
measure undone by a personal vendetta that developed
between Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and General
Aidid (New York Times. March 3, 1995, dispatch by Donatella
Lorch). The Security Council clearly erred in making the
fugitive warlord’s capture a central part of the mission.
The other and more important United Nations objectives
became subordinated to this goal, as UNOSOM II's "mission
creep" allowed the operation to degenerate into a manhunt.
The efforts to apprehend Aidid led to U.S. losses,
when in October, 1993, American Rangers were killed by
Aidid's militia. This incident may have had unforeseen
long-range implications for future UN peacekeeping
missions. Appalled by the casualties in what was originally
characterized as a low-risk operation, the

Congress and

the American public demanded that U.S. troops be withdrawn,
a move which greatly diluted the quality of forces
available to UNOSOM II.

More importantly, however, the

United States may well have become permanently soured on
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the idea of committing troops to any future multilateral
operations that are not under direct American command. This
disenchantment with United Nations operations seems at
least partially justified. Boutros Boutros-Ghali was a poor
steward of United States military resources; and toward the
end of UNOSOM II operations, he seemed to be more driven by
his own ego than by stated policy objectives.
In this case, however, the failings of the United
Nations are also largely the failings of Washington's
policy. UNOSOM II*s operations were overseen by the UN
Security Council, where the U.S. was a permanent member
with veto power. Therefore, Boutros-Ghali could actually do
no more than the United States would allow. In fact, the
American Ambassador to the United Nations, presumably
taking her orders from President Clinton, supported and
loudly praised the Security Council's policies (New York
Times, March 3, 1995, report by Donatella Lorch)!
Even the President's own revised, and more narrowly
defined, post-October 1993 mission goals remained largely
unfulfilled. The additional forces and equipment dispatched
to Somalia after the killing of the Rangers did allow U.S
forces to protect themselves until they were withdrawn, as
promised, in March 1994. The Clinton Administration failed,
however, to accomplish its other "revised" policy goals (of
maintaining pressure on local irregular forces and
maintaining sufficient security in Somalia) that would
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afford a breathing space to permit the formulation of
solutions for the multitude of political problems that
existed in Somalia.
UNOSOM II, and the U.S. role in it, were perhaps best
summed up by Senator Bill Bradley (D-N.J.), usually one of
President Bill Clinton's staunchest allies in Congress.
Bradley condemned the venture as "a series of ad hoc
decisions, divorced from any overall strategy, [that] led
our troops into an ill-defined, poorly planned, and openended mission'1 (New York Times. October 16, 1993, article
by Clifford Krauss).
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CHAPTER VIX

CONCLUSION: EVALUATING THE INTERVENTIONIST TYPOLOGY

Introduction
During the course of the preceding six chapters, this
work has touched upon issues that cross the breadth of the
discipline. Although the chief focus has been within the
field of international relations, this study also contains
elements of comparative politics (e.g. civilian-military
relations, military doctrine) as well as aspects of
American politics (e.g. domestic public opinion, U.S.
executive-legislative relations).
The primary theoretical contribution of this study,
however, is in the subfield of conflict, specifically
direct military intervention by the United States. It
considers the efficacy of direct military intervention:
when it will work, when it will not, and how to undertake
such action in a manner that will bring rapid victory at an
acceptable political cost.
Although much has been written on the general subject
of military intervention, most of the literature centers on
other aspects and problems related to the use of force,
such as deterrence and coercive diplomacy. As was pointed
out in Chapter I, there is a dearth of literature dealing
systematically with the preconditions that need to be
279
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fulfilled before an interventionist policy can successfully
be undertaken. Much of what has been written largely deals
with intervention in the abstract; that is to say, dealing
with the subject from a theoretical perspective and
unapplied to actual cases. Our purpose here has been to
fill this gap in the literature by identifying the specific
criteria that favor the success of direct military
intervention.
With the policy of the United States more inclined now
toward the use of direct military force than during any
other time in the post-Vietnam period, this concern with
the preconditions necessary for successful intervention
acquires unusual urgency. Clearly, military intervention
requires more preparation than other policy options if it
is going to fruitful. The investment that such a policy
entails, in terms of money, hardware, and human lives, is
so great that the failure to execute it skillfully and
successfully may greatly curtail its availability as a
future policy option.
Review of Elements of the Typology
The typology's criteria basically fall into four broad
categories. The first (covering items 1-6, and 12) are
situational variables. These criteria are concerned with
the nature of the situation confronting the United States
and call for identification of American interests in each
case. This group of variables first requires the
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enunciation of a clear and attainable set of goals. On the
basis of these criteria, these recommendations are made
about how to proceed under certain specific circumstances.
These precepts include admonitions against engaging in
peacekeeping operations, against involvement in
humanitarian missions in war zones, against intervention in
civil wars, and against placing American troops under
multilateral commands. Finally, collectively these criteria
suggest that military force should only be used to defend
tangible assets or other narrowly-defined vital national
interests.
The second category (items 8-11, 13) consists of
operational variables. These deal with how a particular
mission is actually carried out. The criteria are concerned
with such issues as the American society's willingness to
support forces in the field, as well as the quantity and
quality of troops and weapons deployed. Other criteria deal
with the need to consider alternatives beyond the use of
air power, such as the possible need to deploy ground
forces in the theater.
The third category (14-15) concerns the dynamics of
civilian-military relations. These criteria require that
the theater commander be integrated into the decision
making process. This is to be done by giving him input into
strategic decisions, as well as allowing him discretion and
initiative in the pursuit of the war effort.
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The final category concerns the public and
congressional reaction to military intervention. It
acknowledges that, as a general rule, intervention requires
the support of both the public and its representatives at
the Capitol. The larger the scale of the proposed
operation, the greater the need for such support. There
are, however, several ways that the president can
circumvent this requirement. As was the case in Panama, the
president can quickly and secretly insert the troops into
the theater, effectively presenting potential critics with
a fait accompli. This acts to impose on Congress an
acquiescent silence, since few members would dare to
criticize the war effort with American troops under fire
and thus risk being perceived as "anti-American."

Finally,

the president can also initiate action while Congress is in
recess, making it difficult for the legislative body to
react independently.
Evaluating the Typology
In this section the typology will be evaluated by
relating the cases presented in the previous chapters to
the criteria set forth in Chapter III.

Although few in

number, these cases provide an adequate test of the utility
of the various criteria identified in this dissertation.
The cases represent mixed results, with Panama and
Iraq representing generally successful interventions, while
Somalia illustrates the failure of such a policy. However,
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as will become readily apparent in our evaluation, the
typology's criteria are effective predictors of the outcome
of a post-Cold War interventionism by the United States.
Consequently, the results of this study will demonstrate
that success is associated with adherence to these
principles and that failure is a likely product of their
violation.
1. A clear and attainable goal of U.S. policy exist.
This condition is vital because it provides a
rationale for the proposed mission. It explains what needs
to be done, thereby establishing a standard which, once
fulfilled, allows the interventionist action to be
concluded and the troops brought home.
In both Panama and Iraq, clearly formulated and
precise goals were articulated. The goals in Panama were to
apprehend Noriega, to restore the democratically-elected
Endara government, to secure the Panama Canal, and to
safeguard American lives in the country. In Iraq, initial
policy goals included the ejection of Iraqi occupation
forces from Kuwait, the restoration of the legitimate
Kuwaiti government, the protection of American lives, and
the establishment of security in the Persian Gulf region.
Once the fighting began, however, this concern with
security was construed to included the destruction of
Iraq's destructive capabilities, and, although never
articulated publicly, the possible removal of Iraqi
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dictator Saddam Hussein. As the crisis continued, the
regional security goal was expanded into an envisioned New
World Order intended to govern the future conduct of
international relations.
As was indicated in the preceding chapter, Somalia
involved two different missions. The initial American
intervention, UNITAF, had as its objective the
establishment of adequate security within the country (the
so-called "secure environment"), so that famine relief aid
could be safely and effectively distributed. As soon as the
requisite level of security was reached, U.S. troops were
to withdraw and turn the operation over to United Nations
peacekeeping forces. From the outset, however, there was
controversy between the United States and the United
Nations over what precisely constituted a "secure
environment," as well as what role, if any, the disarmament
of the various clan militias in Somalia played in creating
such conditions.
The United Nations' successor operation (UNOSOM II)
was even less clear in its objectives. UNOSOM II had goals
that were significantly more ambitious than previous UN
peacekeeping operations. However, these ends were so
ambiguously defined that they would certainly require a
commitment of forces for an indefinite period.
The mission's original intent was to effect the
disarmament of clan militias and to rebuild civic
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institutions so that, at some unspecified date, authority
could be transferred to a viable Somalian government.
However, within months, this ambiguity of purpose created
real problems, as United Nations policy began to show signs
of "mission creep." There occurred a gradual, yet clearly
evident, shift from the nebulously-defined goal of nationbuilding to an almost obsessive manhunt for fugitive
warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid. The unintended consequence of
this development was to transform UNOSOM IX from an
impartial peacekeeper into a de facto participant in the
Somalian civil war.
As noted in Chapter III, an ancillary concern to the
existence of achievable goals is the development of an
effective plan for military withdrawal or "exit strategy."
Such plans serve an important function in domestic
politics, since they reassure both Congress and the general
public that there is no ongoing or permanent commitment of
American forces. However, some critics of such strategies
argue that they are too restrictive, setting an arbitrary
schedule that may be unrealistically optimistic. The result
is that as the date for withdrawal passes unfulfilled,
there is a tendency to see a Vietnam-like quagmire where
none exists. In reality, it may simply be that from the
start, the operation was going to take longer than the
White House calculated or thought prudent to reveal.
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In all three cases, the development and articulation
of such exit strategies was unsatisfactory.

From the

evidence presented, it appears that plans for the
withdrawal of American forces are often developed on an ad
hoc or impromptu basis. In Panama, for example, it was not
necessary to draw up a detailed plan of withdrawal because
most of the troops used during the 1989 invasion were
permanently stationed on American bases in the former Canal
Zone.
In Iraq, again, there seems to have been no formal
pre-arranged exit strategy. President Bush had only
promised to bring home American troops as soon as possible.
Withdrawal began almost as soon as the truce had been
formalized. Most U.S. forces were returned by mid-summer
1991.
In Somalia, there was no exit strategy worthy of the
name until near the end of the U.S. presence. During the
original UNITAF mission, President Bush proclaimed that
United States forces would be home by the time he left
office in late January, 1993. However, Pentagon and
administration officials, as well as Bush's critics, said
that such an optimistic assessment was unrealistic,
especially in light of the pursuit of such an ambiguously
defined goal as establishing a "secure environment."
Agreeing to oversight by the UN Security Council only

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

287

complicated matters and made it more difficult to establish
a firm date for an American withdrawal.
During the second phase, UNOSOM II, once more there
was no pre-arranged plan for the departure of American
troops. According to the United Nations, UNOSOM II would be
pulled out only after the fulfillment of its goals (see
above). Considering the wide scope of UN objectives, the
practical effect of such a policy was to give UNOSOM II a
virtually limitless mandate. There was even some discussion
of reestablishing a UN trusteeship over Somalia during the
nation-building process. It was only after the October,
1993, slaughter of the American Rangers in Mogadishu that
Washington finally devised an exit strategy. Actually, this
plan, articulated by President Clinton in October, 1993,
was more of a forced withdrawal than an "exit plan," since
the President's hand was being forced by an angry Congress
which had voted to cut off funding for the operation. These
arrangements constituted a de facto admission of
intervention's failure, because the withdrawal was to be
accomplished regardless of the situation on the ground.
2. The intervention is not a peacekeeping operation.
This condition is important for four reasons. First,
peacekeeping operations by their very nature often require
an ongoing, open-ended commitment of forces. Second,
hallmarks of peacekeeping are often a lack of strategic
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objectives and the pursuit of nebulously-defined goals that
have a great potential for leading into a quagmire.
Third, peacekeeping operations generally require a
degree of restraint, both in terms of action and armaments,
that puts the troops involved in danger. Such restraint is
perceived as necessary so as to avoid presenting a threat
to the opposing sides; but the result often is that such
passive and lightly armed units are vulnerable and unable
to function as anything more than a "tripwire."

Finally,

trained as they are for combat, U.S. troops lack the
specialized training required to carry out peacekeeping
operations.
Of the three case studies, only Somalia was a
peacekeeping operation. In that case, all of the above
concerns were present. The usual perils were compounded by
the fact that Somalia was in a state of total anarchy. By
definition, there was an absence of a government with which
the intervening powers could cooperate.
Somalia was embroiled in a multi-sided civil war.
There was, in fact, no peace to keep. Furthermore, most of
the provocations directed at UNOSOM II came from one side
(Aidid1s SNA). As a result, military action to keep the
peace increasingly focussed on capturing Aidid and
disarming his militia. Consequently, to many Somalis, the
conflict became to be seen as one between UNOSOM II and
Aidid. Ironically, despite the official mission of
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peacekeeping, throughout the operation the level of
violence spiraled upward. When American, and later UN,
forces withdrew, the situation was as bad, if not worse,
than when foreign troops arrived!
3. The intervention is not a humanitarian mission within
a war zone.
This admonition is critical because often the
intervening power is tempted to look beyond the immediate
humanitarian situation and try to resolve what it sees as
the root (usually political) cause of the nation's
instability. As a result, what started as a relief
operation may end up as direct involvement in the local war
in a well intended, but greatly misguided, effort to impose
lasting stability.
This caveat does not apply in the Panama or Iraq cases
except in a very general sense. Only in Somalia was such a
concern the central motive for the intervention. From the
outset, American intervention had as its primary purpose
the delivery of relief aid for the victims of the famine
which gripped the country. Such action was deemed necessary
because of the widespread looting of relief supplies and
the kidnapping of aid workers by gunmen belonging to the
warring factions had made humanitarian relief efforts all
but impossible.
As noted above, the UN Security Council came to see
the general anarchy and chronic warfare in Somalia as the
root causes of the famine. As a result, UNOSOM II was given
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significantly broadened objectives to pursue in the search
of a long-term political solution. Consequently, willingly
or not, UNOSOM II became deeply involved in the civil war
as a de facto ally of Ali Mahdi against General Aidid.
Gradually, therefore, the original humanitarian aid
mission became subordinated to the political goal of
rebuilding a Somalian nation-state. However, with American
and allied casualties mounting as a result of the low
intensity warfare, the widespread sympathy and compassion
for conditions within Somalia that had inspired the initial
intervention dissipated. In the United States, popular
bitterness over the apparent ingratitude of the Somali
people, along with the ever-increasing level of violence,
led Washington in time to wash its hand of Somalia.
American troops were ordered home no later than March 31,
1994, regardless of the situation on the ground. The
failure of the humanitarian relief mission in Somalia
appears to have had the effect of making such intervention
less likely in the future. For example, despite the graphic
images of massive human misery in Rwanda which, like
Somalia before it, were presented nightly on the evening
news, the reaction of the American people this time was
significantly more limited and restrained.
4. United States forces are not subject to a multilateral
authority.
On the basis of the evidence of these cases, there
are compelling reasons why the United States should avoid
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committing its forces to combat under a multilateral
command. Since the orders that the American troops will
follow will emanate from a source other than Washington,
there is a real chance that once U.S. forces are sent into
combat they will become, in essence, hostages to the agenda
of the multilateral entity. Even if the United States
retains a degree of control over its troops, the fact that
Washington seeks the imprimatur of a multilateral entity,
such as the United Nations, places it in the uncomfortable
position of having to potentially subordinate all or a
portion of its policy goals to the decisions of the
international organization. The mandate that the
multilateral command is granted may be either too narrow or
too broad to serve American policy interests.
These concerns do not apply to the Panama case, which
was a unilateral United States undertaking. In Iraq,
although the United States obtained the UN's blessing for
the operation, the was no direct military UN role. All
American forces remained under the Pentagon's command.
Washington determined how the war was to be conducted and
chose the operational goals to pursue.
The United Nations was not, however, without its
influence over developments in Iraq. An officially
unannounced, yet plainly obvious, American objective was to
depose and/or kill Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein if
possible. As a result, U.S. bombing missions targeted
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locations from which the Pentagon believed he could be
conducting the war effort. However, when the ground
offensive finally got underway, the United Nations mandate
for the use of force (which was narrowly constructed to
include little more than the ejection of Iraqi forces from
Kuwait) acted as a political constraint, preventing
President Bush from entertaining the possibility of
allowing American troops from marching on Baghdad and
removing Saddam from power. Consequently, Hussein is still
in power, still posing a threat to the Gulf region, and
evidently still pursuing the acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction.
In Somalia, the resolution authorizing the original
UNITAF intervention was similar to that identified with the
Persian Gulf mission. A key difference, however, was that
this time the Security Council maintained an oversight role
over the operation. Almost immediately, in the case of
Somalia there were disputes between the UN and the American
command over what was meant by a "secure environment." This
disagreement ultimately lead the United States to begin
engagement in an unplanned operation to disarm clan
militias. As indicated earlier, the result was the start of
a long process of "mission creep," entailing a delay in the
departure of American troops until May 1993.
In the UNOSOM II phase of the Somalia intervention,
the UN command allowed, if not compelled, U.S. troops
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committed to it to become involved in the increasingly
partisan fighting in Mogadishu. As a result, American
troops took mounting casualties in what was rapidly
becoming UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's
personal war against Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid.
The Clinton administration found it increasingly difficult
to justify these losses to the American public, which was
becoming more and more restive as the operation progressed.
It does need to be pointed out, however, that the
Clinton administration bears a measure of the
responsibility for the policy disaster that Somalia became,
because the administration was far too willing to follow
the lead of the UN Secretary General. As a permanent member
of the Security Council, the United States possessed a veto
which it could have used to stop, or at least slow down,
the pace of the mission creep that was overtaking UNOSOM
II. Instead, Clinton virtually abdicated his role as
commander-in-chief in favor of the Security Council and
Boutros-Ghali. Within the Security Council, U.S.
representative Madeleine Albright gave an American
endorsement to the increasingly frequent retaliatory raids
that the council authorized against Aidid. Despite his
potential ability to influence misguided United Nations
policies in Somalia, Clinton did not publicly challenge
Boutros-Ghali's handling of the mission until October, 1993
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—

and then only after the Congress forced his hand by

voting to cut off funding and recall U.S. troops.
Judging by the public and congressional reaction to
the Somalia misadventure, any future action in which the
United States allows its forces to serve under a foreign
and/or multilateral command, with the exception of NATO, is
highly unlikely.
The case studies have brought to light two additional
concerns with multilateral operations that were not
discussed in Chapter III. First, the fact of the matter is
that no country sends its best units to participate in UN
operations. Although it is not always the case, often
peacekeeping responsibilities fall on the shoulders of
units from the Third World that simply are not up to the
task. In any case, such UN missions often reflect lesser
quality manpower and inferior firepower than the armies
that they are drawn from. In turn, these weaknesses invite
challenges from potential adversaries.
Second, no one has raised the important constitutional
issue of whether the president can pull forces from the
American chain of command and place them under a completely
foreign leadership. Is not such an act both a violation of
U.S. sovereignty and an abdication of the president's role
as commander-in-chief?
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5. Force is used to defend tangible assets or other vital
national interests.
This point is best summarized by recalling the
definition of vital national interest established in
Chapter III: "any asset (e.g. oil), place (e.g. Europe), or
principle (e.g. the freedom of navigation in international
water), the unavailability of which places a state at a
strategic or severe diplomatic disadvantage, if not
directly threatening its independence and/or national
security."
In both the Panama and Iraq cases this criterion was
fulfilled. During the 1989 invasion of Panama, the use of
force was undertaken with the aim of securing the Panama
Canal and associated installations, in the process shutting
off Panama as a conduit for the flow of illegal drugs to
the United States and toppling Panamanian dictator Manuel
Noriega from power. Noriega's removal was considered
necessary because he was seen as a root cause of the above
mentioned concerns, as well as posing a security threat to
the region because of his increasingly close embrace of
Communist dictators Fidel Castro of Cuba and Daniel Ortega
of Nicaragua.
Washington's interests in the Persian Gulf area were
long-standing and well known. Most important was the
security of the region's oil supply, and its continued free
flow at market prices. A related concern was the continued
freedom of navigation by U.S. and western shipping in the
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Gulf itself. The Bush administration also was motivated by
a strong desire to contain, if not remove, Saddam Hussein
so as to protect allies in the region. Adding to American
worries was Baghdad's drive to obtain weapons of mass
destruction (biological, chemical, and nuclear).
Hussein had already built up what was thought to be an
impressive military machine. Iraq's acquisition of such
weapons posed a grave threat to American interests in the
region, and with an adequate delivery system, beyond to
NATO territory.
In Somalia, however, no such compelling national
interest imperative existed. Although Berbera had served as
a host for American naval vessels in the 1980s, with the
end of the Cold War Somalia all but lost its strategic
value for Washington. The sole basis for United States
intervention was compassion for famine victims. As noted
earlier, despite this laudable motive, because no vital
American interests were at stake, intervention in Somalia
became increasingly difficult to justify (in term of both
lives and money) to an increasingly skeptical public and
Congress.
6. The political situation in the target country is not
one of civil war.
Again this condition was not present in either Panama
or Iraq. Somalia, however, was an extreme case. As
originally formulated, this criterion presupposed a civil
war as a situation in which a government fights against a
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rebel faction contesting its authority. Somalia was unique
in that all authority had collapsed and anarchy prevailed.
This fact notwithstanding, the basic premises advanced
in Chapter III remained: It was often difficult for
interventionist forces to distinguish hostile gunmen
clearly from the general population. The result was a

high

rate of civilian casualties, which had the effect of
promoting the increasing alienation of the Somali people,
who only months earlier had greeted American troops as
saviors.
As noted earlier, the United States was placed in an
increasingly difficult situation as mission creep drew
UNOSOM II ever deeper into the civil war. In light of the
original humanitarian which prompted the initial commitment
of U.S. forces, Washington seems neither to have
anticipated the type of Somali opposition that evolved nor
the possibility that the United Nations would become so
actively involved in what was essentially domestic Somalian
politics.
7. There is a strong probability of public support, or at
least indifference.
Opposition to intervention from the Congress, the
public, or both, may have the effect of undermining the
president's policy abroad. There is a danger that attempts
to "purchase" support for intervention may hold the war
effort hostage to domestic concerns. For example, it has
been argued that President Johnson used Great Society
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programs as a means of attempting to buy support for the
effort in Vietnam. Furthermore, there is the real
possibility that the opponent may attempt to exploit
American domestic divisions for its own benefit. For
instance, there is no doubt that anti-war rallies on
American college campuses during the 1960s were a boon for
North Vietnamese propaganda.
With regard to Panama, the public mood had long been
hawkish with respect to President Noriega. There was,
however, no consensus, among the public or within Congress,
for military intervention to topple his regime. When, in
December 1989, the United States invaded Panama, President
Bush had executed a fait accompli, as both Congress and the
general public were largely taken by surprise.
Interventionism against Iraq, by contrast, always
enjoyed wide public support, never commanding less than a
majority in most polls. There was, however, significantly
more disagreement in Congress over America's response to
the crisis in the Gulf. In both houses, while there was
wide support for President Bush's initial decision to
deploy forces to Saudi Arabia, there was bitter debate
about how, or even if, to commit American forces to combat
against Iraq. Even as late as January 1991, there was still
strong sentiment to give economic sanctions more time to
work. A resolution authorizing the use of force passed both
houses of Congress, but the strong division of opinion was
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especially evident in the Senate, where it passed by a slim
52-47 vote.
Initially, there was broad public support for the
humanitarian intervention in Somalia. Only after the
October, 1993, battle that resulted in the deaths of the
American Rangers did opposition sentiment begin to develop
in earnest. Soon, the public demanded an immediate
withdrawal, and the Congress passed a resolution compelling
an exit by no later than March 31, 1994. This vote marked
the first time Congress had ever voted to cut off funding
for an ongoing military operation.
Basically, then, this criterion was met in all three
cases, at least at the outset. Only in Somalia was there a
major reversal of opinion, and even then not until the
killing of the Rangers and the subsequent revelation of the
mismanagement of the operation, exemplified by Defense
Secretary Aspin's refusal to grant the theater commander's
urgent request for additional armor.
8.

The proposed intervention has the support of the
military leadership.
The approval of senior military officers is essential

if the success of intervention is to be assured. Pentagon
officials are very (some believe overly) cautious in
advocating a resort to force as a policy instrument,
General Clauswitz' famous dictum notwithstanding.
Therefore, the assessment of senior officers, based on
their study and understanding of the technical aspects of
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warfare, should be of crucial importance in the decision to
commit military forces to action. Their approval indicates
a relatively high probability of success at an acceptable
cost. Furthermore, the cooperation of the military is
essential for the development of usable military options.
In Panama, SOUTHCOM commander General Woerner was
originally opposed to intervention. However, his opposition
stemmed more from political, than from military, reasons.
When General Woerner was replaced by General Thurman, and
General Powell was appointed the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, at this point the military leadership gave
its support to an operation against Noriega. Generals
Powell and Thurman reworked the cumbersome existing
contingency plans into what became the highly successful
Operation Just Cause.
From the outset, high-level military officials
strongly supported the initial Desert Shield deployment as
a deterrent against further Iraqi expansion. There was also
general support in the Pentagon for the later direct
intervention that would be called Operation Desert Storm.
During the Fall, 1990, Generals Schwartzkopf and Powell,
Defense Secretary Cheney, and their staffs developed a plan
that would be ready to be implemented by the United Nations
deadline of January 15, 1991.
As the deadline approached, General Powell was largely
alone in urging President Bush to allow sanctions more time
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to take their toll on the Iraqi economy and military. For a
variety of reasons, Schwartzkopf pushed for a winter, 1991,
offensive, which was the plan that was eventually followed
By contrast, from the very start of the airlift of
August, 1992, the military was extremely apprehensive about
getting deeply involved in Somalia. Yet, despite Pentagon
warnings, a workable plan of intervention was developed,
with emphasis placed on a quick entry and an equally rapid
exit from the theater. Military officials especially
disliked UNOSOM II because of its pursuit of ill-defined,
often-changing UN goals.
In all three cases, the military devised workable
options. Only in Somalia did the military seem worried
about any potential problems. As early as December 1992,
Powell correctly predicted that there would be an American
involvement long after the completion of the UNITAF
mission.
9.

A willingness exists to support forces in the field.
If the military is to accomplish its mission, there

must be a commitment on the part of Congress and the
president to provide the troops in the field with what they
need, when they need it.
In Panama, such a concern was never really at issue
because of the massive permanent U.S. military presence in
the country, as well as the extraordinarily short duration
of the military action.
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During the Persian Gulf War, once the debate over the
use of force was concluded in January, 1991, Congress was
in basic agreement about supplying U.S. troops what they
needed. Both Republicans and Democrats vowed that the armed
forces would be given everything they needed to win quickly
and decisively.
In Somalia, there was no debate regarding Somalia and
the nature of the mission until after the operation was
well underway, but Congress nevertheless gave its assent
and support. The Clinton administration, however, was
afraid to go too far in calling for support for the troops,
out of fear of provoking the local warlords and
unnecessarily arousing congressional criticism. Only after
Secretary of Defense Aspin's rejection of a request by the
theater commander for additional armor resulted in the
October, 1993, Ranger disaster did President Clinton decide
to make a full commitment to support the military
operation.
10. A recognition mu3t exist that air strikes alone may not
be sufficient to accomplish the policy goals
established.
The efficacy of air power has its limits. Although
useful in inflicting damage and/or "sending a message" to
the adversary, the nature of warfare often requires the use
of ground forces to clear and claim an area from enemy
forces. Stated directly, air power can damage enemy forces,
but it may not, in and of itself, be capable of ejecting an
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entrenched opponent. Policymakers must remain mindful of
these limits, because a reliance on the air option alone
can often result in an unpleasant choice: backing down or
escalating involvement by using ground forces.
Because of its focus on removing Noriega from power,
from the very beginning Panama was conceived as a ground
operation. Therefore, the concern addressed in this section
was never an issue in this case.
To the contrary, in Iraq, there was a recognition of
this issue from the start. When the Bush administration was
reviewing its options in August, 1990, General Powell
argued that air strikes would serve to inflict punishment
on Iraqi forces, but that ground forces were going to be
necessary to roll back the invasion force.
In Somalia, awareness of the limits of an air option
was never really an issue due to the relief/peacekeeping
nature of the mission. Helicopters were used in both
transport and aircover support roles. Fixed wing aircraft
were largely absent from the theater until late into the
UNOSOM II mission.
11.

A willingness exists to utilize ground forces if
necessary.
This criterion is the logical extension of the other

issues addressed in the immediate previous section. To rule
out the use of ground forces per se is to give the enemy a
substantial advantage. Because an adversary now knows that
there is a limit to American intervention, it can tailor
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its strategy accordingly. As was stated earlier, such a
concern was not a factor in either Panama or Somalia since
by their very nature both required the use of ground
forces.
In Iraq, however, it was clear from the outset that
ground forces would be utilized. The accepted strategy
called for a thorough air war lasting up to four to six
weeks, followed by a massive, 144-hour ground offensive.
The only dispute that emerged concerned when and for how
long ground forces should be used, as President Bush and
General Schwartzkopf disagreed over when to terminate the
ground war.
12.

The war is limited in geographic scope.
The main point of concern here is that the intervening

power keep the fighting confined geographically so that
there is no spill-over into the territory of other
countries. Such an expansion of the conflict could have
unintended consequences, not the least of which is possible
counter-intervention by other great powers.
In all three cases considered here, the intervention
remained confined within the original theater of operation.
13.

There is a willingness by officials in Washington to
c o m m i t adequate forces to accomplish the established
goals.
This point concerns the scale of the intervention. It

asks if the quantity and nature of the forces being
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utilized are sufficient to complete the mission in a timely
manner.
In all three case studies, it became clear that a new
post-Cold War doctrine of the use of force has emerged;
entailing overwhelming numbers, well armed troops, and
force decisively applied. First developed by Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, this new
doctrine was aimed at remedying the perceived failure of
the policies of incremental escalation and tactical
restraint relied upon in Vietnam. This new approach called
for the use of superior numbers, backed by the use of the
ultra-modern weapons developed during the Cold War, to
energetically engage and defeat an enemy force. The
expectation was that victory could be swiftly achieved,
while greatly reducing casualties on both sides. This new
doctrine placed a high premium on mobility of forces,
calling for the reliance on helicopters for both their lift
capacity and their firepower.
The application of this new doctrine was clearly
evident in the cases of Panama and Iraq, with the Persian
Gulf War serving as a textbook example. Furthermore, Panama
witnessed the first combat use of the F-117A Stealth
fighter. Iraq, however, was where the full range of Cold
War conventional warfare capabilities saw its first combat
test. Included were such advanced weapons systems as the F117A, the M1A1 tank, laser and optically guided "smart”
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bombs, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and the Patriot antiballistic missile.
In Somalia, the initial UNITAF mission employed what
was believed to be an overwhelming force, with 28,150 of
the 35,000 troops contributed by the United States. Because
UNITAF was perceived as a largely non-combat relief
mission, most of the heavy equipment was left at home.
UNOSOM II, by contrast, was a fairly large operation
(22,000; 3,000 U.S) and better armed than most previous UN
peacekeeping operations.

However, this force still lacked

the quality of firepower, armor, and aircraft usually
employed during unilateral United States interventions. The
quick reaction force, while under a direct American
command, was not very heavily armed. The military disaster
of October 1993 finally prompted the dispatch of firepower
qualitatively comparable to that used in Panama and the
Persian Gulf. However, with the withdrawal of United States
forces in March 1994, the quality of both the manpower and
firepower available to UNOSOM II experienced a dramatic
decline. As a result, when the fighting escalated, UNOSOM
II preferred to remain largely confined in its bunkers
rather than risk taking more casualties.
The quantity and quality of American forces and arms
clearly accounted for the rapid and complete victories in
Panama and Iraq. By contrast, the failure of the efforts in
Somalia demonstrate the problem inherent in assembling and
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deploying a United Nations force. UN operations are
handicapped by four factors that ultimately place American
troops at risk: (1) The force is assembled by soliciting
contributions from member nations, but most countries,
especially the major powers, will not send their better,
more combat ready units. (2) Often UN peacekeeping forces
are drawn from Third World countries, which by and large
are inferior in their training and arms to their U.S.
counterparts. (3) Because of their generally lower level of
military professionalism, these other forces may get into
trouble from which they must be rescued by better armed and
better trained American troops. Finally, (4) by the very
nature of their profession, most soldiers lack training in
peacekeeping. As a result, they are not adequately prepared
for the situation to which they are committed, with
unnecessary bloodshed as the result.
14.

Theater aoimnanders must be allowed input into
decisions related to the conduct of the war effort.
This stipulation recognizes that the theater commander

has first-hand knowledge of the situation in the arena of
conflict. Because of his unique perspective, the field
commander usually possesses a clearer understanding of the
situation on the ground than his superiors in Washington or
at the Pentagon. By sharing his insights, the theater
commander is instrumental in helping policymakers to make
decisions better based on the most complete information
available.
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In both Panama and Iraq, the theater commanders had a
central role in planning operations. During the execution
of the mission, their insights carried great weight within
the Oval Office. It was General Schwartzkopf1s preferences
that largely determined the timing of the start of the
offensive against Iraqi forces. The only time that it
appears that the theater commander was overruled, in either
case, was when President Bush decided to reduce the length
of the ground war against Iraqi forces from 144 to 100
hours. This decision, however, was made only after the
military victory had essentially been won.
In Somalia, the degree to which General Johnston was
included in the planning for the UNITAF mission appears
unclear. He was, however, given wide leeway in the pursuit
of his mission. When the United Nations challenged his
conduct of the operation, his position was fully backed by
the Bush administration.
As deputy commander of UNOSOM II, General Montgomery
was authorized to question any order that might seem unwise
or place American lives at undue risk. However, his counsel
did not seem to carry much weight with the Clinton
administration. When Montgomery requested Washington for
more heavy weapons, his request was ignored at first, then
later refused. The commander's influence seems to have been
enhanced only after the events of October 1993.
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15. The theater commander must be alloyed discretion in the
pursuit of the war effort.
This condition is a conscious reaction to the failure
in Vietnam. It demands that theater commanders be granted
liberal rules of engagement so that they can achieve
victory in the most effective and least costly manner
possible. Furthermore, it urges the administration in
Washington to avoid the temptation to micro-manage the war
from the White House and simply let the military do its job
as it sees fit. This condition was present, to varying
degrees, in all three cases.
In Panama, General Thurman was allowed to develop his
own rules of engagement. The major guiding principle was
that he use the minimum amount of power needed to achieve
victory, but there was no pre-set limit imposed by
Washington. Although the individual rules followed by
American soldiers in Panama were fairly restrictive, they
were set by the theater commander who had carefully
tailored them to the situation there.
In Iraq, Schwartzkopf was given carte blanche to
pursue the war as he saw fit. The operation had only one
restriction on engagement: pilots had to get a positive
identification of their targets before bombing so as to
avoid unnecessary civilian casualties. A clear example of
how unrestricted the rules of engagement were is presented
by General Schwartzkopf's order that Iraqi soldiers, even
if in retreat, were to be considered hostile if they did
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not lay down their weapons and abandon their equipment.
Failure to disarm would make them fair targets and they
would be fired upon. As noted above, the only time
Schwartzkopf1s freedom to act was restricted was when the
President ordered an early ceasefire.
In Somalia, General Johnston also was permitted
liberal rules of engagement. UNITAF soldiers were allowed
to consider anyone even pointing a weapon at them as
hostile, and as such were allowed to fire first. U.S.
Marines were told only to fire in self defense, but were
allowed very wide latitude in determining when, in fact,
they were in danger.
As for UNOSOM II, there is not much information on the
authority of General Bir as the UN theater commander. What
is known, however, was that his orders could, under certain
circumstances, be questioned by his deputy commander, U.S.
General Montgomery. In addition, Montgomery retained a
quick reaction force under an independent American command,
which could be deployed at his discretion.
Clarifications and Refinements
These three cases appear to validate the criteria
established in the typology. Panama and Iraq clearly
demonstrate that a successful outcome is related to
adherence to these precepts. Somalia, by contrast, shows
that failure is associated with a failure to be guided by
these principles. Despite this correlation between the
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criteria and the cases, a few clarifications and
admonitions are in order.
First, UNOSOM II, a mission run under the direct
command of the United Nations, was a clear failure.
However, both UNITAF and the anti-Iraq coalition, remaining
under direct U.S. control, were both successful
multilateral operations. Bearing these facts in mind, its
seems justifiable to revise the fourth criterion by
narrowing its scope, to hold that: U.S forces will not be
placed under a direct non-American multilateral command.
Second, the criterion dealing with the need for public
support or at least indifference should perhaps be expanded
to include public ignorance (This criterion would now read:
"There is a strong probability of public support,
indifference, or ignorance") . Although the pervasiveness
of the news media is such that it is increasingly rare that
the public can be kept in the dark about preparations for
interventionist action, the Panama case shows that the
president can still occasionally take the public and
Congress by surprise. Action can in some cases (usually
smaller interventions) be taken before the public and
Congress can either form or articulate an opinion. This is
not meant to advocate the conduct of secret wars from the
basement of the White House. To the contrary, the statement
entails a simple recognition of the fact that, if the
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operation is small enough, it can successfully be concluded
before domestic opposition has a chance to crystalize.
Third, in point #8, it was contended that it is
necessary that the operation have the support of the
military establishment. It is more accurate, perhaps, to
redefine this necessary "support" as the absence of any
substantive opposition from senior officers. Opposition to
some of the technical elements of the operation, such as
its timing or composition of forces does not necessarily
indicate material or decisive opposition to a particular
mission. Conversely, the development of usable options does
not necessarily imply an endorsement of a proposed mission,
only the availability of a contingency plan. In some cases
there are even disputes among military leaders or between
the Pentagon and the theater commander regarding the
requirements and/or the wisdom of a specific mission.
Therefore, it is necessary not to have an endorsement per
se, but rather a lack of opposition from senior military
officers.
Finally, it appears possible that the requirement to
commit adequate force to accomplish the goals set (#13) may
be permanently fulfilled by the new post-Cold War doctrine
of the use of force: overwhelming number, well armed,
decisively applied. It remains to be seen if the Clinton
administration will continue official adherence to this
philosophy.
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Additional Considerations
There are a few points regarding post-Cold War direct
military intervention by the United States that, while not
directly related to this typology, do impinge on it to a
degree. These ideas are presented below.
First, the United States does not have a uniform
policy on humanitarian intervention. Washington seems
content to await the arrival of a crisis and then formulate
its reaction on an ad hoc basis. The result is that policy
tends to be driven more by emotion than by clear thought.
On the basis of experience, it is almost certain that there
will be no such formally articulated doctrine by the time
the next "Somalia" appears on the horizon.
Second, as noted earlier, judging by the public and
congressional reaction to the UNOSOM II fiasco in Somalia,
it seems clear that American participation in future United
Nations controlled operations is highly unlikely. This
belief has been reinforced by the events in Bosnia in 1995.
Even though the United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR)
has issued ultimata, air strikes and military action has
been handled almost exclusively by independent U.S. and
NATO forces.
This leads to a third and related consideration. If
the United States is reluctant to commit forces to a UNcommanded operation and, conversely, the United Nations
will not authorize American actions that it cannot control,
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then when the next major crisis arises clearly the U.S.
will have to act either unilaterally or in concert with its
NATO allies. Therefore, it seems that NATO may need to
develop a new military doctrine or rationale to address its
role in the post-Cold war era.
Fourth, a word regarding the overreliance on airpower
as a military option. American officials must remain
mindful that if airstrikes are used, there is a real
possibility that the planes could be shot down and the
pilot captured. The realization of such a prospect leaves
officials with a choice between two unpleasant options:
either humbly ask the enemy for the return of the downed
flyer or escalate the level hostilities as a means of
punishing the adversary for firing on American aircraft.
A fifth concern regards the defense budget and the
overextension of American power. Somalia notwithstanding,
the fairly short duration of recent American interventions
and their relatively low cost, in human terms, seems to
have fueled a newly found enthusiasm among some in
Congress, particularly liberals, for military intervention
to solve the world's injustices. If the military is
expected to carry out missions of dubious value, while also
having its budget cut, there can be no doubt that
eventually military readiness will suffer as a result.
As a final insight, in the post-Cold War era, the
willingness of American officials to intervene in a
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particular situation appears to be determined by the
following equation: a high level of severity of the crisis,
a low level of military risk, and a demonstrable national
interest.
Conclusion
Much has been written on the general topic of military
intervention, although most of it is embedded in literature
dealing with deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and other
related topics. Surprisingly little, however, has been
written concerning preconditions that favor the success of
interventionist policies, with most of it tending toward
the abstract and theoretical. There appears to be no
existing literature which identifies specific operational
and analytical preconditions which would promote success in
intervention, a need that is more urgent given the
resurgence of direct military intervention as an American
policy option in the post-Cold War era. It is this gap
which this study has endeavored to fill.
Although its criteria will no doubt undergo refinement
as circumstances change, this typology seems to be
essentially correct in its assumptions. While it is
recognized that the number of case studies examined has
been quite limited, nevertheless, they clearly demonstrate
that when the criteria advanced here are followed, success
has been the result. Conversely, when these precepts were
largely ignored, the result was political and military
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failure. It is the author's firm belief that, with the
passage of time, our typology will retain its heuristic
value.
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